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SCHOOL DESEGREGATION REMEDIES AND THE FAIR
GOVERNANCE OF SCHOOLS
PETER M. SHANEt
INTRODUCTION

No Supreme Court decision is better known than Brown v. Board
of Education1 [Brown I], and none has had a more conflicting legacy.
On one hand, Brown 's declaration that intentional racial segregation
in public schools is unconstitutional now commands overwhelming popular acceptance.2 In this respect, Brown I may be the Court's proudest
demonstration of the judiciary's capacity to catalyze social progress. On
the other hand, Brown v. Board of Education-[Brown II], the followup decision rendered a year later, was the progenitor of an unabating
controversy concerning the proper remedies for unlawful racial segregation in the public schools. The debate has focused on busing,' the most
widely publicized judicial tool against unlawful segregation, and has
spawned vigorous congressional attempts to withdraw the power of fed" Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa; A.B. 1974, Harvard; J.D.
1977, Yale.
The author would like to express his gratitude to the many teachers, colleagues,
students, and other friends whose support and suggestions have been so valuable to this
project. Special thanks go to Ron Allen, William Buss, Martha Chamallas, Robert
Clinton, and Martha Minow for their insightful critiques of earlier drafts; to Jerry R.
Parkinson, Iowa '85, for his exceptionally fine research assistance; and to the University of Iowa for an Old Gold Summer Fellowship.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 According to a February-April 1982 poll conducted by the National Opinion
Research Center, 91% of white Americans polled and 95% of black Americans polled
believe that black and white students should attend the same schools. Opinion
Roundup, PUB. OPINION, Oct.-Nov. 1982, at 28. The trend in public opinion polls
towards increasing public support for integration and decreasing support for affirmative desegregation remedies is reviewed in G. ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 108-18
(1978).
3 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
4 The familiar use of the short-hand term "busing" to refer to racial balance remedies involving student reassignment is misleading in two respects. First, student reassignments for purposes of racial balance need not involve, in every case, additional
requirements for public transportation. See infra note 65. Further, although a majority
of school children in the United States use some form of public transportation to attend
school, only three to five percent of the nation's school children are involved in desegregation-related busing. W. HAWLEY, R. CRAIN, C. ROSSELL, M. SMYLIE, R. FERNANDEZ, J. SCHOFIELD, R. TOMPKINS, W. TRENT & M. ZLOTNIK, STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE DESEGREGATION 8 (1983) [hereinafter cited as W. HAWLEY].
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eral courts and administrative agencies to impose that remedy.5 Far
from evoking public consensus on the Court's position, Brown II and its
remedial progeny have embroiled the Court in a profound battle over
the legitimacy of the federal courts' equitable powers.
The debate over the Supreme Court's endorsement of extensive
busing remedies has encompassed a variety of complex issues, including
the constitutional authority of courts to mandate the restructuring of
public school systems,' judicial competence to implement sensible busing remedies,7 the efficacy of busing to accomplish effective desegregation,8 and the degree of support within the minority community itself
for remedies focused on busing, rather than on educational quality per
se. 9 Despite the breadth of this debate, the writings of supporters and
critics of the Supreme Court's approach to remedies exhibit two complementary shortcomings. Supporters of busing often downplay the degree to which busing imposes significant burdens on the minority students for whose benefit it is implemented." For example, to the extent
that mandatory busing accelerates white flight from formerly segregated school systems," busing in such cases may only increase logistical
burdens on minority students, without providing the benefits of genuinely integrated schooling. Conversely, critics of busing underplay the
injury that minority students suffer from intentionally segregated public
schools. For example, a conception of school desegregation remedies
that focuses only on particularized aspects of educational quality for
' In the 97th Congress, the Senate approved one antibusing jurisdictional proposal, S. 951, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2, 128 CONG. REc. S1336-37 (daily ed. Mar. 2,
1982), but the bill died in House committee.
Busing opponents have succeeded, however, in curtailing federal administrative efforts to promote busing. On the history of congressional restrictions on the use 6f administrative enforcement procedures under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1976 & Supp. V 1981), see Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221, 1226
n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
On the unsuccessful efforts in 1982 to restrict the use of appropriations by the
Department of Justice for bringing legal action to compel busing, see 38 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 385-86 (1982).
o See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 117-33 (1977).
' The criticisms of judicial competence are reviewed briefly in M. REBELL & A.
BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 11-15 (1982).
1 See, e.g., L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECI-

277-81 (1976).
9 See, e.g., Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 490-92 (1976).
SIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS

'0 On the relevance of remedial costs to the design of school desegregation decrees,
see Fiss, The Jurisprudenceof Busing, 39 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoas., Winter 1975, at
194, 195-97.
11 See infra note 211.
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black students, such as the dollar value of resources expended for their
schooling, fails to take account of the intangible harms of segregated
schooling.
Whether these weaknesses in the public debate over busing are
attributable to the rhetoric of the Supreme Court's opinions is a question that defies satisfactory answer.12 There is, however, little in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence to counteract either tendency. The
Court has never stated precisely the benefits that busing or other remedies are supposed to yield in school desegregation cases or the harms
that desegregation remedies are intended to relieve.1 For supporters of
busing, the cases articulate no general standard for remedial success
against which the relative costs and benefits of remedies other than busing can be assessed. For critics of busing, there is no explicit statement
of remedial purpose as a reminder that institutionally modest remedies
may be insufficient to implement the insight into racial inequality embodied in the holding of Brown L
The central purpose of this Article is to fill this vacuum in the
Supreme Court's remedial jurisprudence by fashioning a remedial theory against which the utility and legitimacy of busing, and of school
desegregation remedies generally, can be assessed. The essential thesis
may be stated as follows: Whatever the Supreme Court's original rationale, the Court's conclusion in Brown I-that racially separate
schooling is inherently unequal-is correct because segregation imposes
a system of unfair governance on minority students and parents. By
"unfair governance," this Article refers to the systematic vulnerability
of minority students in segregated school districts to discriminatory
treatment by public school authorities. Where minority students are
systematically vulnerable to hostile or insensitive treatment, the racial
separation of schools effectively subjugates minority students in the
competition for educational resources and deprives them of any basis
for reasonable confidence in the evenhanded administration of their
schools. Recognition of unfair governance as among the evils prohibited
by the Constitution justifies both the Supreme Court's broad imposition
of liability for remedying racial segregation in the public schools and its
approval of institutionally burdensome remedies when such liability has
been imposed.
12 Professor Yudof emphatically faults the Court for inadequacies in public dialogue over racial justice in the schools. See Yudof, Nondiscriminationand Beyond: The
Searchfor Principle in Supreme Court DesegregationDecisions, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 97, 115 (W. Stephan & J. Feagin eds. 1980).
13 The ambiguity in the theory of right and remedy underlying the school desegregation cases has not gone unnoticed. For a brief critical review of attempts to re-explain
the cases, see generally Yudof, supra note 12.
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Explicit recognition of the harm of unfair governance highlights,
however, the Supreme Court's recurring ambivalence in weighing educational equality against state and local autonomy in political decisionmaking. Actual integration is so preferable a remedial goal under a fair
governance conception of the harms of segregated schooling that it justifies busing across school district lines. The Supreme Court's disap14
proval of interdistrict desegregation remedies in Milliken v. Bradley
[Milliken I], even when such a remedy was necessary to achieve actual
integration, is thus at odds with the fair governance theory. Assuming
Milliken I will not be repudiated, a critical judicial task is to fashion
intradistrict desegregation remedies that respond to the harm of unfair
governance as effectively as does the remedy of integration. The penultimate section of this Article considers what such remedies might be.
At this point in the history of public school desegregation, an inquiry into the justification for school desegregation remedies is likely to
be motivated by something more than a desire to understand the debate
over remedies more fully in the abstract. Further debate may yield consensus that busing is educationally or politically inappropriate, or Congress may, in any event, prohibit courts from ordering busing. Some
choice will then need to be made among other remedial approaches unless judicial attempts to end racial segregation in the public schools are
to be abandoned altogether. The fair governance conception of school
desegregation offers such an underlying remedial theory upon which
more fully reasoned court decisions may be fashioned.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S PUZZLING REMEDIAL JURISPRUDENCE

A theory of remedial design should identify the harms that a judicial remedy is to rectify. Yet Supreme Court school desegregation opinions rarely discuss the harms of segregated schooling and almost never
relate remedies the Court has approved to specific harms. Before articulating, in part II, a conception of the harms of segregated schooling
not explicit in the cases, it is helpful to explore the limits of the Court's
identification of the harms of segregated schooling.
A.

The Ambiguity of the Supreme Court's General
Remedial Strategy

The choice among conceivable school desegregation remedies
should depend upon what such remedies are intended to accomplish.
Familiar broad goals for legal remedies include retribution, compensa14

418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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tion, and deterrence. That is, the primary thrust of a particular remedy
may be to punish a wrongdoer, to make the victim whole, or to prevent
future wrongdoing by the particular wrongdoer (specific deterrence) or
by potential wrongdoers in general (general deterrence). Although such
goals are by no means mutually exclusive,"5 the choice among them will
certainly influence the remedial tools employed, both in kind and
degree.
By negative implication, the Court eschewed punishment as a central remedial goal in Brown 1I,11 and school boards since have never
labored under the threat of punitive damages for intentional segregative
acts. Avoiding a punitive approach was appropriate for several reasons:
the dubiousness of obtaining jury verdicts for punitive damages,'17 the
1 Punitive and compensatory remedies both are typically expected to have deterrent value. In a loose sense, even the goals of punishment and compensation may seem
to merge. Thus, the incarceration of a criminal may "compensate" the victim for
mental anguish, and a victim, if compensated with damages, may believe the wrongdoer
involved has been "punished." It is typical, however, not to view incarceration as primarily compensatory because it does not represent the performance of a duty owed to a
victim personally. Likewise, we typically do not label as "punitive" a damages remedy
in which the measure of damages is the compensation of the victim.
16 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The nonpunitive nature of the
remedies sanctioned by the Court in Brown II is implicit in three elements of that
decision. First, the Court approved equitable remedies, which ordinarily are not retributive in nature. See id. at 300. Second, the measure of the appropriate remedy articulated in Brown II is not a generalized social interest, but a "personal interest" of the
plaintiffs in nondiscriminatory admission to public schools. Id. Finally, the Court instructed lower courts initially to rely on the good faith efforts of the school boards for
the implementation of desegregation remedies. See id. at 299. Leaving school boards
that had been adjudged guilty of purposeful discrimination with the "primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving" the problems of accomplishing school desegregation effectively, id., is not a policy choice easily reconciled with any notion of
punishing those authorities.
Of course, certain punitive tools, such as the enactment of criminal statutes, would
have been beyond the Court's power in any event. Others may simply not have been
requested by any plaintiff. The remedial aim of the plaintiffs in the cases consolidated
in the first Brown decision, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was not
damages, but securing the admission of black children to formerly all-white schools, see
generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976), and the questions assigned for reargument in Brown II involved the pace and logistics of such a remedy. Brown II, 349 U.S.
at 298 n.2.
The availability of damage actions against government officials in their individual
capacity for violating the constitutional rights of individuals was not clear until Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
17 If the preferred remedy for unlawful segregation had been damages, implementation would have depended on jury verdicts because the Constitution guarantees a jury
trial in federal suits for damages amounting to more than $20. U.S. CONST. amend.
VII. Although, in theory, southern juries in federal courts might have responded to the
Supreme Court's lead more willingly than other southern institutions, the history subsequent to Brown II of tenacious public and private resistance to desegregation demonstrates the wisdom implicit in the 1955 decision not to rely on juries to put teeth into
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. See Alexander v. Holmes County Bd.
of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964);
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Court's past approval of segregated schooling,"8 and the greater resistance punitive remedies might have precipitated to implementation of
the Brown I holding. 9
Beyond avoiding retribution as a remedial goal, however, the Supreme Court's direction has been ambiguous. It opted for equitable relief, rather than compensatory damages, undoubtedly for the same
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), affd on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42
(E.D. La. 1960), affd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961). See generally J. WILKINSON, FROM
Brown TO Bakke 78-127 (1979).
Even assuming cooperative juries, however, punitive damages could have posed
intractable problems concerning the number of potential claimants and defendants. The
magnitude of liability that might have been imposed on behalf of all minority children
enrolled in public schools in the South in 1954 alone-putting aside, for the moment,
potential suits by all then-living black graduates of such schools who could, with equal
justice, have filed damages claims-would have been staggering and staggeringly difficult to manage. If states attempted to indemnify defendant school officials, for example,
one can imagine the justifiable damages claims of minority students exhausting many
state treasuries.
Additionally, if the Court had approved punitive remedies in school desegregation
cases, the universe of potential offenders, that is, public school authorities and other
government officials who had contributed to the establishment and maintenance of such
systems, would have been vast. Indeed, we may be thankful that the Court did not
endorse punitive damages because the specter of individual liability in school desegregation cases might have prompted the Court to be less vigorous in finding various forms
of segregated schooling unlawful in the first place. The doctrinal extension of the first
Brown decision, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to the schools of the
North and West might have been more problematic if such an extension had resulted in
drastic remedies against particular school officials in their individual capacities.
18 The Court could reasonably have thought it unwise to sanction punitive remedies against school boards because of the degree to which its own past decisions had
legitimated segregated public schooling. Although Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), in which the Court proffered its endorsement of the "separate, but equal"
formula for fourteenth amendment analysis, was not a schooling case, the Court supported its use of the separate but equal standard for interstate public rail transportation
by reference to the purportedly acceptable use of that standard to justify segregated
schooling in Massachusetts, id. at 544-45, and the District of Columbia, id. at 545,
550-51.
The origins of the separate but equal formulation appear to lie in Roberts v. City
of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1850), a case upholding the segregation of
Boston schools. In Brown I, the Court noted both the decision in Roberts and its reversal by state legislation in 1855. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491 n.6
(1954). On the dispute over segregated schooling in 19th century Boston, see L. LEvY,
THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 109-17 (1957);
SCHOOL REFORM: PAST AND PRESENT 178-96 (M. Katz ed. 1971). On the continuing
litigation over the desegregation of Boston schools, see infra note 215.
'9 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Effective implementation of the
result in Brown I meant a drastic rearrangement of a social institution affecting the
lives of millions of people and requiring, at a minimum, the "specific performance" by
thousands of public officials of new constitutional duties. Without such a positive and,
in some sense, cooperative undertaking by state and local officials, no amount of retribution could correct the core grievance presented in Brown L
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practical reasons it avoided the endorsement of punitive damages. " The
Court has not clearly indicated, however, the aims of such relief. Only
in recent years has the Court articulated a broad restorative purpose for
school desegregation remedies: to restore the victims of discrimination to
the position they would otherwise have enjoyed but for the occurrence
of discrimination."' This formulation fails to identify, however, the
harms such remedies are intended to rectify.
To understand better the nature of the problem faced by courts
deciding school cases, one might consider an example more trivial than
school desegregation. Imagine two friends, one of whom breaks a treasured heirloom of the other's family.22 Imagine that an arbitrator of the
victim's grievance 'determines that the remedy should be one that restores the victim to the position she would otherwise have enjoyed but
for the breakage. Under one approach, the arbitrator may consider as
the only relevant loss the destruction of the physical object. Restoration
may thus be limited to the repair or replacement of the object or payment in compensatory damages. This would be the most narrow remedial approach because it would focus only on the loss most obviously
embodied in an "objective" phenomenon, the breaking of a solid thing.
From the victim's perspective, however, such a remedy would not
restore the victim to the position she would have occupied but for the
accident. The victim's family has suffered grief, for which only an apology may be adequate relief. The victim may also have suffered mental
distress, for which psychological counseling would provide a remedy. A
remedy recognizing these additional factors would be restorative in that
it aims chiefly to restore the victim's status quo ante. Such a remedy
would be expansive, however, because of the wider scope of legally cognizable injuries it addresses.
Thus, in any given situation, a court's identification of losses or
injuries might logically proceed along dramatically divergent lines with
equally divergent implications for the proper design of remedies.2" In
20 Beyond the problems of manageability and enforceability discussed above with
reference to punitive damages, compensatory damages would have presented the additional troublesome problem of measuring the losses inflicted by segregation on individual black plaintiffs.
21 See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977).
2 Priceless heirlooms often provide useful illustrations of more broadly applicable
legal points. For a telling use of the priceless heirloom example to demonstrate the
disutility of foreseeability as a standard to establish the scope of a tortfeasor's liability
in damages for particular harms, see Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1405-09 (1961).
23 Professor Paul Gewirtz has recently elaborated a distinction between "Rights
Maximizing" and "Interest Balancing" approaches to the evaluation of remedies that
largely corresponds to the distinction drawn in this Article. See Gewirtz, Remedies and
Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 588-89, 591, 598-99 (1983). For a critical review of
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the face of Supreme Court silence as to whether a narrow or expansive
restorative approach is appropriate in desegregation cases, lower courts
are unlikely to produce consistent remedial opinions.
The treasured heirloom example illustrates three critical ways in
which the decisionmaker's conception of the cognizable harms will affect remedial design. First, the expansive approach is likely to include a
greater variety of remedial tools. Some harms, for example, can be rectified through monetary compensation. Others are less amenable to
compensation and require more imaginative relief.
Second, the narrow approach is less likely to reflect the victim's
subjective perception of the harms suffered. It is more likely to relieve
only those harms that are the most objectively measurable. This might
be either because of the decisionmaker's lesser sensitivity to the less
measurable, subjective harms the victim has suffered or because of institutional concerns (such as difficulties of proof) that the decisionmaker
weighs more heavily than the victim's losses.
Third, a broader perspective on harms is likely to lead the decisionmaker to take a more expansive view of the role of deterrence in
remedial design. Taking the heirloom incident again as an example, the
arbitrator might award a memorial rather than a mere apology as relief
if the aim is not only to restore the victim's immediate sense of wellbeing, but to assure a sense of well-being that will extend into the future. That the victim's status quo ante included no precisely equivalent
honor would be less significant in the choice of remedies once the arbitrator's priority shifts to protecting the victim against a future recurrence of the sense of loss.
The Supreme Court's remedial formula says nothing specific
about the importance of deterrence in school desegregation cases. This
silence may reflect the Court's determination that deterrence is not a
primary remedial goal in these cases. Alternatively, the Court may be
assuming implicitly that deterrence is a primary aim, but one that is
accomplished by restorative relief. For example, the Court may contemplate that, even if deterrence of future discrimination is a primary remedial goal, an injunction ending proven racially discriminatory practices in the public schools will be a sufficient deterrent.
Because the Court's remedial formula gives no clear direction on
deterrence, the question arises whether lower courts should limit prospective injunctions to prohibiting only those discriminatory practices
modem developments in antidiscrimination law that plumbs the possible ideological
significance of choosing a "victim perspective" or "perpetrator perspective" in legal
disputes, see Freeman, AntidiscriminationLaw: A Critical Review, in THE POLITICS
OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 96 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
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for which the plaintiffs have proved school authorities culpable. As the
heirloom example illustrates, to the extent the Court's perspective
moves closer to the victim's perspective on the appropriate protection of
her interests, in the future, such limited remedies will become less
likely.
The critical ambiguity in the Supreme Court's decisions on school
desegregation remedies is whether its remedial rationale is intended to
be narrow or expansive in its recognition of and protection against the
harms inflicted on minority students by segregated schooling. The
Court briefly discusses these harms only in Brown I,2 but this discussion does not link a theory of harms to specific guidance for remedial
design. Several aspects of the Court's remedial decisions subsequent to
Brown II imply that the harm to be rectified in school desegregation
cases is only the state-wrought distortion in the intradistrict attendance
pattern of formerly segregated schools. These aspects of the Court's remedial doctrine, however, are inconsistent with the expansive results of
the post-Brown II cases. The Supreme Court has produced a body of
cases that sanction substantial judicial interference in the policymaking
of local school districts but which do not explicitly attempt to justify
such broad intervention.
B.

Brown I and Ambiguities in the Supreme Court's
Conception of the Harms of Segregated Schooling

The ambiguity in the Supreme Court's conception of the harms to
be remedied in school desegregation cases is rooted in Brown I itself,
which contains the only extended Supreme Court discussion of the
harms of racially segregated schooling. The decision did not discuss
remedies but reached only the threshold conclusion that state-required
or state-authorized racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional and results in liability for some form of relief. Brown I is still the
logical starting point for identifying the harms of segregated schooling
that school desegregation remedies should attempt to rectify; the harms
to be targeted by those remedies should be the harms that justify the
conviction that segregated schooling is a violation of constitutional
rights in the first place. Otherwise, it would be hard to justify as a legal
matter the judicial imposition of those burdens that desegregation remedies create for defendants and, indeed, for plaintiffs as well."
The uncertainties of Brown I have been discussed at length else24

347 U.S. at 493-94.

25 Cf Fiss, supra note 10, at 194 (remedial orders should be based on determinations that discriminatory practices are sufficiently harmful to justify costs of remedies).
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where, in numerous attempts to identify and assess the various propositions for which Brown I can stand. My interest in tracing out here the
various conceptions of harm that have been frequently associated with
Brown I will be limited to two points. First, none of these conceptions
correlates very comfortably with the remedial strategies the Supreme
Court has endorsed since the Brown decisions. Second, and more important, none of these conceptions entirely explains the central factual
assertion of Brown I: "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.

12 6

I will argue that this assertion is true. The conceptions of

harm typically associated with Brown I do not satisfactorily explain the
assertion, in part because the conceptions are incomplete and in part
because, over the thirty years since Brown I, our perceptions of the
nature and significance of the harms of segregated schools have
changed. A current remedial theory would have to regard the catalogue
of harms cited in Brown I only as a starting point for analysis and take
account also of subsequent research into the nature of racial
27
inequality.
The harms often attributed to racially segregated schooling that
are typically regarded as explicit or implicit in the Brown I decision
include (1) interference with minority students' freedom of association,
(2) the impact of segregated schooling on minority students' academic
performance, (3) the impact of segregated schooling on the subsequent
adult status and income of black students, (4) the harm of racial isolation, (5) the damaging psychological effect of segregation on black chil26 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
27 Brown I could not, in any event, be expected to be as definitive or precise a
statement of the harms rendering segregated schooling unequal as the search for sound
remedial theory currently requires. First, it is a reasonable surmise that the harms of
segregated schooling at issue in Brown I were so egregious and notorious that a mincing
analysis in 1954 of what exactly made segregated schooling unequal might well have
seemed superfluous and belittling of the enormous injury the Court finally saw fit to
redress. Professor Black has persuasively written that the discriminatory purpose and
impact of segregation in the southern regional culture were "matters of common notoriety, matters not so much for judicial notice as for the background knowledge of educated men who live in the world." Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,

69

YALE

L.J. 421, 426 (1960).

Further, Brown I was a political document. The Court was commanding a restructuring of social institutions more dramatic than had ever before been ordered by
the courts. As author of the opinion, Chief Justice Warren was deeply concerned with
articulating the Court's judgment in such terms and in such a tone as to win his colleagues' unanimous endorsement. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 679-99 (1976). It
thus should not be surprising if, today, a comprehensive explanation of the constitutional rule in Brown I requires resort to certain factors not made explicit in the opinion. The sensitivity of the Court's decision may have counseled something less than a
candid statement of the evils of segregation that led the Court to its constitutional
judgment.
For a similar analysis of Brown II, see Gewirtz, supra note 23, at 611-12, 615.
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dren, and (6) the objective insult to blacks that segregation represents.
These harms are distinguishable from such "tangible" harms of resource inequality as may be present in individual cases, but on which
the Supreme Court did not rest in reaching its Brown I judgment.28
There is little doubt that the Supreme Court regarded the interference of segregated schooling with minority students' freedom of association as a significant harm. This is evident in a passage in Brown I
referring to the value to black students of contact with white students 9
and is perhaps also implicit in the reference in Brown II to the necessity of guaranteeing the "admission [of black children] to public schools
as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis.""0 It is clear, however, first, that the Court's post-Brown II endorsement of busing goes
beyond rectifying this particular harm and second, that this harm is not
a complete explanation for the "inherent inequality" of segregated
schooling.
That the Supreme Court has gone beyond enabling blacks to attend schools of their choosing is evident in the Court's rejection, in
Green v. County School Board, 1 of so-called "freedom-of-choice" plans
as adequate school desegregation remedies. Under such plans, school
children were typically assigned to the schools they had previously attended, but they could transfer at will. The usual result was that a few
black students in a formerly segregated district opted to attend previously all-white schools, but no white students opted to attend previously
all-black schools."2 Although laws requiring or authorizing separate
white and black schools were eliminated, public schools remained idenThe Court in Brown I, in explaining the unconstitutionality of segregation, did
not rely on any inequality in the tangible resources that white public school authorities
might afford to black and white schools. The Court articulated the issue before it as
turning on "intangible" inequalities: "We come then to the question presented: Does
segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the
physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does." Brown I,
347 U.S. at 493.
Any resource inequality that might be present in an individual case would be a
fact readily susceptible to particularized adjudication and would not explain the Court's
conclusion in Brown I that separate educational facilities are "inherently" unequal. It
is just as unlikely that case-by-case resource inequalities would persuasively justify the
Court's expansive post-Brown II remedial results, given that such inequalities could
seemingly be remedied through narrowly tailored injunctions requiring the equalization
of specific resources.
29 See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493.
30 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
31 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
3 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
1966-67, at 45-69 (1969); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGrrS, SURVEY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES 1965-66, at 30-42, 51-52
(1966).
26
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tifiably black or white.
It may be thatsocial circumstances partly resulting from past segregation prevented blacks under freedom-of-choice plans from freely
choosing to attend the schools they most preferred. Mandatory student
reassignment might then have been necessary to guarantee the right of
black students to a genuinely free choice. The Supreme Court in
Green, however, refused to adopt or reject findings of fact that would
have supported this possibility. 3 In at least one lower court case, Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Board of Education, 4 black parents have been
unsuccessful in asserting their children's right to attend neighborhood
schools of choice in the face of an integration plan that school authorities voluntarily adopted and that required the busing of black children
out of their neighborhood. The district court35 and court of appeals in
that case correctly interpreted Supreme Court desegregation decisions
as vindicating something other than free choice per se.
Aside from the inadequacy of a freedom-of-choice conception to
explain the Supreme Court's post-Brown II decisions, the impact of
segregation on blacks' freedom of association is not, when viewed in
isolation, the most compelling possible explanation of the inherent inequality of racially separate schooling. As Herbert Wechsler has pointed
out,3 7 it is difficult in the abstract to identify a constitutional principle
for choosing between a claim to free association by those who would
have it and a claim to deny free association by those who would wish to
avoid it."8 The choice is difficult, that is, unless that fact of exclusion is
assessed in a specific cultural setting that renders exclusion harmful for
reasons beyond the fact of nonassociation itself. 9 If racial exclusion is
unconstitutional, however, because of the particular impact of exclusion
in a racist society, then there must be additional harms associated with
racial exclusion that segregation imposes in such a society. These
harms, in addition to exclusion per se, are then part of what renders
segregated schooling inherently unequal.
In explaining its opinion in Brown I, the Court identified, at least
33 391 U.S. at 440 n.5.
3' 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969), affd, 423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970).
8 See Norwalk CORE, 298 F. Supp. at 224-26.
36 See Norwalk CORE, 423 F.2d at 124.
37 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1959).
38 Id. at 34.
19 See Black, supra note 27, at 424-28; Pollak, Racial Discriminationand Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 24-31 (1959). For
an especially trenchant later critique of Wechsler, see Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy,
and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20
STAN. L. REV. 169, 178-97 (1968).
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implicitly, several harms beyond the impact on free association that segregated schooling inflicts on black children. These harms are the detrimental impact of segregated schooling on the academic performance
and subsequent adult status and income of black students,40 the harm of
racial isolation,"1 and the damaging psychological effect of segregation
on black children.'2
The extent to which these harms may be traced directly to segregated schooling has been much debated since Brown I was decided. It is
unlikely, however, that racially segregated schooling has not affected
significant numbers of black children in these particular ways. Notwithstanding the social science controversies, public perception and disapproval of such iiijuries to minority students undoubtedly accounts for
much of the consensus behind Brown I.4' For purposes of our analysis,
however, it is important again to make two points. First, a remedial
40 The Court stated in Brown I that public education "is a principal instrument in
• . . preparing [children] for later professional training. . . . In these days it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if . . . denied the
opportunity of an education." Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.
41 In addition to asserting a relationship between public education and adult professional success, the Court cited the importance of public education in acclimating
students to the mainstream culture. According to the Court, education "is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, . .. and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment." Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493. The Court went on to cite its opinions in
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637 (1950), holding segregation unlawful in public higher education in part
because students in higher education, in order to have a full education, must "engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students." Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493 (quoting McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641). These observations imply that, apart from its impact
on future income or social status, racial isolation in public schools so depreciates the
schooling experience as to render such isolation unconstitutional.
42 "To separate [minority students] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. The Court based this finding on the "modem authority" of a number of social science articles, see id. at 494 n.11, that have since been
subjected to scholarly challenge. See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
It is important to sort out two notions of what "stigma" might mean in the school
desegregation context: first, the "subjective" internalization of insult; that is, the kind of
psychological harm to which Brown I refers explicitly; second, the "objective" insult
that intentional segregation represents irrespective of its psychological impact on the
victim. See infra text accompanying notes 57-60. The opinion in Brown I articulates
only the former conception.
13 See supra note 2. Professor Dworkin has argued, however, that, even if such
injuries to black students are prevalent, such a theory would not fully explain the constitutional command to desegregate because individual students should still be able to
prove under a "harm theory" that segregated education provides them, in particular,
with a more effective educational opportunity. See Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of Uncertainty, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 20, 26 (R. Rist & R. Anson eds. 1977).
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theory based exclusively on any of these harms does not fit comfortably
with the Supreme Court's post-Brown II doctrine. 44 Second, none of
these harms captures the full force of the assertion that segregated
schooling is inherently unequal.
Doctrinally, the threshold difficulty with reconciling a remedial
theory based on this list of harms with later Supreme Court decisions is
that such a theory would not account for the Court's adherence to the
de jure/de facto distinction as a key element in its constitutional analysis. One reason for this difficulty may be that the Court, although dealing with intentionally segregated schools in Brown I, did not consider
whether the intentionality of racial segregation was of constitutional
significance. The opinion condemned "separate educational facilities"
without reference to the causes of the racial separation. Nevertheless,
the Brown I opinion implicitly confirms at least that the Court was not
thinking about the application of its holding in de facto settings,45 and
more recently, the Court explicitly has stressed intent as the touchstone
of legal liability. Despite the urgings of Justices Douglas and Powell"'
and scholarly invitations to abandon the distinction,47 the Court retains
the doctrine that intentional segregation is unlawful but that adventitious racial separation in public schools is not."
44
4'

Id. at 25-26.

The facts of the cases consolidated for decision in Brown I made resolution of
this point unnecessary. Fiss, School Desegregation:The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 3-4 (1974). A footnote to the Court's opinion implies, however,
that an 1855 Massachusetts act outlawing segregated schooling in the state accomplished for segregated Boston what Brown I was intended a century later to accomplish
for the South. The footnote suggests that the Court was thinking of Brown I as dealing
with de jure segregation only. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 491 n.6.
46 See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 214-16 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 219-25 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
47 The abandonment has been urged not only because racial imbalance may be
equally harmful in all settings, see Carter, De Facto School Segregation:An Examination of the Legal and Constitutional Questions Presented, 16 W. RES. L. REV. 502,
503-12 (1965), but also, it is argued, because responsibility for the fact of imbalance
can justly be attributed to the government in every case, id. at 512-15; Fiss, Racial
Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564,
583-88 (1965); Comment, School DesegregationAfter Swann: A Theory of Government
Responsibility, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 421, 440-47 (1972). Professor Fiss notes, however,
that such an attribution involves a "nonaccusatory theory," which, unlike the Court's
current rhetoric, does not attempt to predicate liability on the "wrongfulness" of the
state's acts. See Fiss, supra note 45, at 29-31.
"I The de facto/de jure distinction is not compelled by the constitutional interpretation that limits the reach of the fourteenth amendment to "state action." The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). Justice Douglas has argued that a state's control and
support of its system of public education brings that system wholly within the purview
of the fourteenth amendment. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 758-59, 761
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Implementation of the distinction does, however, advance one of the goals that the state action doctrine serves, namely, preserving a realm
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Putting aside the social science debate concerning whether racially
separate schooling has a significant adverse impact on the academic
performance of black students or on their adult income and status, it is
unlikely that these detrimental impacts of segregated schooling would
depend upon the intentionality of the segregation. Likewise, whatever
harm is wrought by racial separateness per se would not seem to depend in any degree on the purposefulness of segregation. If racial isolation injures black students by depriving them of contact with the majority culture or of the opportunity to interact with people of a different
racial background, such injuries occur whatever the cause of their
isolation.
It may be that intentional segregation works a more detrimental
harm than does de facto segregation in terms of damaging the personality development of black children because purposeful segregation is a
more powerful and therefore more readily internalized white statement
of black inferiority. Even if the statutory enactment of segregation in
the South could simply be assumed to have had a greater psychological
effect on black children than de facto segregation, however, it is not
plausible to suggest that the tacit, subtle manipulation of attendance
patterns that the Court has condemned in cases outside the South inflicts damage on the personalities of minority children that de facto racial segregation does not. If internalized psychological harm were truly
the crux of the Court's conclusions, it would be difficult to understand
the Court's continued adherence to the de jure/de facto distinction in
school desegregation cases.4 9
A remedial theory addressing only these putative injuries not only
fails to account for the de jure/de facto distinction, but like the freedom-of-choice conception, it inadequately explains the inherent ineof private activity that need not conform to constitutional norms. For example, the
Court's unwillingness to sanction school board acquiescence in private choices to live in
racially separate neighborhoods undoubtedly makes it more likely that school boards
will not act to counter those choices.
49 One response to these observations is that the Court's adherence to the de facto/
de jure distinction is unrelated to the theory of harms underlying Brown I and should
be understood instead as serving the purpose of conserving judicial resources. Any judicial economy rationale, however, turns out to be flimsy or irrational in practice. For
example, at the remedial stage, cases of intentional segregation are not more manageable from a judicial standpoint than de facto cases would be, and they surely are less
manageable as a matter of proof at the stage of establishing the constitutional violation.
Nor is there reason to think that abandonment of the distinction would open the proverbial floodgates to greater numbers of desegregation cases than may now be legitimately filed under the current rules for proving intentional segregation. The de jure/de
facto distinction is thus not defensible on grounds of judicial economy. The distinction
would be most compelling if Brown I were explainable at least partly with reference to
a harm from intentional segregation associated with the purposefulness of government
discrimination.
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quality of racially separate schooling. There exist both empirical uncertainties regarding the harmful effects of racially separate schooling in
each of these respects and normative problems raised by, asserting that
single-race schools are harmful per se.
As an empirical matter, for example, no consensus exists as to a
correlation between segregated schooling and student achievement or
adult "life chances." There is only inconclusive support for theories
that desegregation improves minority children's cognitive skills or those
noncognitive work characteristics valuable in adult life. 50 The weakness
o Most of the research on the effects of desegregation has focused on the impact
of desegregation on the academic achievement of minority students as measured by performance on standardized tests. It has been estimated that, as of 1978, there were already as many as 200 such studies "[elven after the inadequate studies and those that
duplicate other reports are eliminated." Crain & Mahard, Desegregation and Black
Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1978,
at 17, 23.
Although the substantive and methodological issues raised by these studies defy
easy summary, it is helpful to note the general conclusions reached by some major
reviewers of the literature. Nancy St. John reviewed 68 studies on academic achievement and found a relatively small number of studies of sufficient methodological soundness to warrant serious consideration. She also concluded that the results of the welldesigned studies were so mixed that there was insufficient evidence from which to draw
any reliable conclusions about the effects of desegregation on minority students' aca-

demic achievement. See St. John, The Effects of School Desegregationon Children:A
New Look at the Research Evidence, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 84, 87-88
(A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman & C. Schelling eds. 1981); see also Edmonds, Effective
Education For Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or Confirmed?, in SHADES OF
Brown: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 109 (D. Bell ed. 1980) (arguing, in light of the same conclusion St. John reaches, that desegregation planners
should focus not on racial balance per se, but on establishing those school characteristics
that have been proven effective in improving all pupil performance).
Others have drawn a different picture based on the same material. Weinberg, after
a review of essentially the same studies as those analyzed by St. John, concluded that,
even though a significant number of studies found no effect or a mixed effect of desegregation on minority student achievement, "overall, desegregation does indeed have a
positive effect on minority achievement levels." See Weinberg, The Relationship Be-

tween School Desegregationand Academic Achievement: A Review of the Research, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. Paos.,, Spring 1975, at 241, 268. Weinberg qualified his conclusion, however, by noting reservations about methodological problems inherent in many
of the studies, and concedes that some of the studies' results may be attributable to
factors other than racial desegregation, such as the students' socioeconomic backgrounds, which may affect academic achievement. Id. at 243, 268.
Crain and Mahard reviewed 93 studies of the effect of desegregation on minority
achievement and concluded, "[Diesegregation is indeed beneficial, although it must begin in the earliest grades." Crain & Mahard, Minority Achievement: Policy Implications of Research, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 55, 76 (W. Hawley ed.
1981). Despite serious methodological problems that the authors recognized in much of
the research, Crain and Mahard concluded that the "methodologically strongest" studies, especially those made of students "desegregated at either kindergarten or first
grade," showed consistent positive results. See id. at 63. Crain and Mahard would not
assert, however, that the available evidence supports the conclusion that desegregation
beyond "the early primary grades" has positive effects on achievement. Id. at 76.
Even more controversial than the relationship between desegregation and minority
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in the data may, of course, reflect the limitations of social science,
rather than the actual relationship between segregated schooling and
adult income or status. If the aspiration of our inquiry, however, is to
identify a firm basis for the result in Brown I and for a consequent
remedial theory, reliance on an educational performance or "life
chance" hypothesis cannot fulfill this aspiration. Similarly, the data on
the impact of segregation on personality are inconclusive."1 Such data
test scores is the assertion of any significant relationship between improvement in test
scores and the "adult life chances" of minority students. It appears that the effect test
scores have upon a person's eventual income and occupational attainments is nominal
at best. See Levin, Education, Life Chances, and the Courts: The Role of Social Science
Evidence, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1975, at 217, 227-29. Levin's review
of the studies of the relationship between test scores and income and occupational attainments indicates that "at most only about 10 per cent of the differences in income
can be explained by test scores, leaving 90 per cent or more to be explained by other
factors," and test scores explain at most "about 25 per cent of the variance" in occupational status. See id. at 229.
There are a variety of possible explanations for the lack of relationship between
test performance and adult success. First, notwithstanding that studies of cognitive development tend to focus on standardized tests, there are "serious questions about
whether the standardized achievement test is the correct measure of cognitive outcomes." Crain & Mahard, Desegregationand Black Achievement, supra, at 25. Levin
further surmises that "noncognitive educational outcomes" such as "dependability, subordination to authority, respect for rules, and internalization of work norms" may have
more of an influence on adult success than cognitive outcomes of schooling. Levin,
supra, at 229-30. There is virtually no research, however, on the impact of desegregation on such noncognitive characteristics.
A key reason why no sufficient evidence exists from which reliable conclusions
may be drawn concerning the relationship of desegregation to the life chances of minority students is the paucity of research on the long-term impacts of desegregation. Id. at
218-21; McPartland, Desegregation and Equity in Higher Education and Employment: Is Progress Related to the Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary Schools?,
42 LAW & CONTEMP. PaOs., Summer 1978, at 108, 109. McPartland states that the
studies of such long-term consequences that do exist are generally "derived either from
very small . . . or unrepresentative samples, or from data that are out of date," and
concludes that "major new data collections will probably be needed to make real progress" on this issue. See id. at 132; see also McPartland & Braddock, Going to College
and Getting a Good Job: The Impact of Desegregation, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 141, 152 (W. Hawley ed. 1981).
51 In Brown I, the Court attributes its finding as to the impact of segregated
schooling on personality to seven books and articles, see Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11,
all but one of which were brought to the Court's attention by the appendix to the black
appellants' briefs filed in Brown I and reprinted in The Effects of Segregation and the
Consequences of Desegregation: A Social Science Statement, 37 MINN. L. REv. 427
(1953) [hereinafter cited as Effects] (reprint of appendix to appellant's briefs to Brown
1). The additional source, a chapter of a report edited by Witmer and Kotinsky, PERSONALrrT IN THE MAKING ch. VI (H. Witmer & R. Kotinsky eds. 1952), is, according
to Dr. Kenneth Clark, largely a summary of Clark's White House Conference manuscript on the personality effects of prejudice and discrimination, to which the appellants' appendix referred. See Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social
Scientist's Role, 5 VIL. L. REV. 224, 227 (1959-60).
Although Dr. Clark, among others, has vigorously defended the potential role of
social scientists in school desegregation cases against criticisms based on Brown I, see
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afford only a weak justification for regarding segregated schooling as
inherently unequal. Moreover, it is doubtful that racial isolation deprives black students of sufficient knowledge of the majority culture to
acquire healthy notions of citizenship, proper moral development, normal environmental adjustment, or adequate preparation for adulthood,
even in a racially mixed society. Even on the prejudiced assumption
that exposure to majority values is somehow necessary to achieve these
ends, there is no reason to suppose that minority students educated in
segregated schools are not educated in majority values. Indeed, it might
id., apparently no social scientist now argues that the studies cited in Brown I provide
an adequate empirical basis for an assessment of the impact of segregated schooling on
personality development. Indeed, the White House Conference report published by
Witmer and Kotinsky stated in 1950 that there did not then exist "thoroughly satisfactory methods of determining the effects of prejudice and discrimination [generally] on
health of personality." PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING, supra, at 139.
The studies cited in Brown I have been challenged both for inadequacy in experimental design, e.g., Gregor, The Law, Social Science, and School Segregation: An Assessment, 14 W. RES. L. REv. 621, 622-23, 626 (1963), and for a failure even to
attempt to isolate segregated schooling as the causal factor for any personality developments identified. "The main theme of that evidence was that Negro children, from a
very young age, are sensitive to and strongly affected by prejudice and discrimination
generally. None of the empirical studies brought to the Court's attention . . . even
purported to isolate the effects of public school segregation per se. . . ." Goodman, De
Facto School Segregation:A Constitutionaland Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV.
275, 279 (1972).
The research since the early 1960's concerning the effects of desegregationon personality development is also inadequate in determining the impact of segregated schooling on personality health. One reviewer of the literature concludes, "[I]t is virtually
impossible to determine with certainty whether or not desegregation has short-term or
long-term beneficial or harmful effects on minority students' self-esteem, aspirations, or
motivation." Epps, Minority Children: Desegregation, Self-Evaluation, and Achievement Orientation, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 85, 95 (W. Hawley ed.

1981). See also Cook, Social Science and School Desegregation: Did We Mislead the
Supreme Court?, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 420, 423-26 (1979); St.

John, supra note 50, at 90-92; Stephan, School Desegregation:An Evaluationof PredicationsMade in Brown v. Board of Education, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 217, 226-28

(1978).
In any event, the relative emphasis on stigma in Brown I may well reflect something other than the Court's determination that psychological harm really was the
wrong at issue in Brown L An obvious aspect of the rhetoric in Brown I is the Court's
attempt formally to cast that decision as comfortably as possible in the doctrinal mold of
earlier cases. The Court does not, for example, overrule the separate but equal rule of
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), but finds instead, in the context of public
schooling, that separate education is inherently unequal. To cast its argument in this
mold, however, the Court had to deal with the Plessy Court's rejection of the argument
that segregated train transportation was unequal because of the stigma imposed on
black passengers. The relevant passage from Plessy (163 U.S. at 551-52) is among the
most ignominious in the Court's history; but rather than dismissing it, the Court chose
instead to deal with Plessy by explaining that "psychological knowledge" as to stigma
had changed since the 1890's. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. How critical this response
to Plessy was to the result in Brown I may, however, be doubted, especially given the
weakness of the data cited in Brown L See Goodman, supra, at 278-83.
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be supposed that segregated schooling was implemented in part precisely to inculcate black students with majority cultural values hostile to
them. Finally, there is no strong support for the hypothesis that desegregation produces racial interactions that promote adult friendship or
reduce adult racial conflict; thus, the absence of such contacts in childhood may not be firmly regarded as harmful on these bases." In short,
the proposition that racial isolation is inherently harmful is very much
unproven by empirical evidence.
There are also philosophical objections to the proposition that allblack schools are inherently harmful. Black educators and political
leaders have voiced opposition to the implications of the suggestion that
black children will be better off if integrated with white students in
school.53 Several predominantly black schools have been noted for
52 The paucity of useful research on the relationship between desegregation and
race relations is widely noted. "Reading this literature leaves one impressed with how
little is known and how much additional research . . . is needed." McConahay, The
Effects of School DesegregationUpon Students' Racial Attitudes and Behavior: A Critical Review of the Literature and a Prolegomenon to Future Research, 42 LAW &
CoNTEMp. PRoas., Summer 1978, at 77, 100. See also Cohen, The Effects of Desegregation on Race Relations, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PIoBs., Spring 1975, at 271, 297-98;
Cook, supra note 51, at 430-31; St. John, supra note 50, at 93. In addition, the reviewers of the literature in this area decry the methodological weaknesses in the research
that is available. E.g., McConahay, Reducing Racial Prejudice in Desegregated
Schools, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 35, 36 (W. Hawley ed. 1981)
("[T]he literature is a methodological cesspool.").
Some authors have offered broad-and conflicting-generalizations on the issue.
See, e.g., McConahay, supra, at 36 ("[Wihile desegregation [has] not produced a situation in which race is irrelevant, there [are] more amicable interracial contacts and
friendships than one could have expected under segregation."); Stephen, supra note 51,
at 217 ("[D]esegregation generally does not reduce the prejudices of whites toward
blacks" and "desegregation leads to increases in black prejudice toward whites about as
frequently as it leads to decreases."). Despite such statements, the general consensus
among the reviewers is that it is "impossible to draw any firm conclusions" from the
available research. Id. at 224. In addition, it is apparent that there are simply no reliable studies of the long-term impact of desegregation on racial attitudes and behaviors,
so even the tentative conclusions drawn by some of the authors "apply, at best, to the
short-term effects of desegregation." Id. at 234.
One author's statement, made in 1975, about the state of the available evidence is
still true today:
In some instances desegregation of the schools appears to have improved
the self-images of racial minorities and racial attitudes of both majority
and minority students; in other cases there seem to have been no effects, or
even negative ones. One of the basic problems that pervades this research
is the questionable reliability and stability of any measure of human
attitudes.
Levin, Education, Life Chances, and the Courts: The Role of Social Science Evidence,
39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1975, at 217, 231 (footnotes omitted).
53 See, e.g., Bell, A Model Alternative Desegregation Plan, in SHADES
OF Brown:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 125, 125-27 (D. Bell ed. 1980);
Day, The Case for All-Black Schools, in EQUAL EDUC. OPPORTUNrrY 205 (Harv.
Educ. Rev. ed. 1969).
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achieving exceptional student performance. 5" At least one commentator
asserts that the sense of self-esteem and confidence that may proceed
from an ethnocentric public education, under black community control
will facilitate successful interracial contacts in adult life and prepare
students to assume roles of power in their own communities.5" The assertion that racial isolation is "bad," therefore, erroneously implies that
black political autonomy has no positive value.56
In sum, segregated schooling may well be harmful to personality
development and adult life chances, and it may be harmful in terms of
racial isolation per se. Empirical and, in one respect, normative doubts
about the scope of these harms, however, in addition to the difficulty of
reconciling a theory of Brown I based on these harms with the de jure/
de facto distinction in later cases, prompt further inquiry toward a
more compelling conception of the inherent harms of segregated
schooling.
In part because it is difficult to maintain a theory of current desegregation remedies based on any causal hypothesis linking segregation to
a measurable harm, it might be suggested that Brown I rests on an
abstract conception of stigmatic harm distinct from any observable impact on black students. Such a view rests not on a correlation of segregation and harm, but on shared understandings of the meaning of segregation in contemporary American society; that is, on an "objective"
conception of stigma. According to the objective stigma theory of harm,
an intentionally segregative act might result in an unjustified inequality
because the act imposes solely on the minority race a label of inferiority
or undesirability that is objectively insulting and degrading to the minority group.

57

"See, e.g., Sowell, Patterns of Black Excellence, 43 PUB. INTEREST 26 (Spring
1976); Sowell, Black Excellence-The Case of Dunbar High School, 35 PUB. INTEREs'r 3 (1974).
"' Maynard, Black Nationalism and Community Schools, in COMMUNITY CONTROL OF SCHOOLS 100 (H. Levin ed. 1970).
See generally Hamilton, Race and Education: A Search for Legitimacy, 38
HARV. EDuc. REv. 669 (1968).
" The use of the word objective, derived from its common use in tort law, to
describe this theory of harm may seem problematic. The identified harm is intangible
and is not associated with a verifiable impact on any victim. The injury, as a consequence, is a matter of normative, not sensory perceptions. This notion of stigma is
objective, however, in the sense that it relies on the legitimacy, in contemporary American society, of law imputing to the "reasonable person" the normative view that labels
of racial inferiority are wrong. As a consequence, courts may regard segregation as
universally injurious without regard to the views of particular individuals whose normative perceptions actually differ from the view that the law treats as shared by all.
That the Court's condemnation of segregation represents an interpretive judgment
that segregation is unjustifiable, rather than a causal judgment relating the phenomenon of segregation to particularized injuries to blacks, is suggested by the Court's use of
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The objective stigma theory is compatible with the doctrine of
Brown I and the accompanying opinion, Bolling v. Sharpe,5 8 which
overturned segregation in District of Columbia schools. The objective
insult arises from state misfeasance, not from state acquiescence in de
facto segregation, presumably because meanings other than official endorsement of the undesirability of interracial contact can reasonably be
attributed to state inattention to de facto segregation. The theory also
explains why separate educational facilities are inherently unequal; the
insult is directed only at blacks. Because the label of racial inferiority is
untenable, this inequality can never be justified.
Grounding a remedial theory in so noninstrumental a conception
of the harms of segregation is problematic, however, because it imputes
a harm from segregation independent of any objectifiable injury to the
victim class; it is thus difficult to link it nonarbitrarily with any particular remedial prescription. 59 If intentional segregation imposes no inherent harm other than the dissemination of an official statement that
blacks are inferior or that interracial contact is undesirable, the only
impact of the statement that needs to be redressed by a remedy is the
statement itself. Retraction of the insult, for example, by repeal of a
statute requiring segregation or the cessation of intentionally segregative administrative practices, might be fully sufficient.6 0 As will be seen,
per curiam orders to invalidate segregation in a variety of public facilities other than
schools. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54,
affg 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, affg 142
F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, rev'g
223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877, affg 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (beaches).
58 347 U.S. 497 (1954). When Brown I and Bolling were decided, the Court had
not yet settled on the now-familiar two-step constitutional inquiry into justification for
explicitly discriminatory government acts-an inquiry first into the level of justification
public authorities must proffer for such discrimination, and a second inquiry whether
such justification appears in the particular case. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
216-18 (1982). In Bolling, however, the Court made its position on justification clear:
"Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental
objective. . . ." 347 U.S. at 500. Thus, just as Brown I forecloses case-by-case adjudications whether proven intentional segregation results in inequality, Bolling forecloses
relitigation of the question whether such inequality is ever justified under the strict
scrutiny the Court employs for explicit racial classifications.
" See Fiss, supra note 10, at 194-95.
60 Reflecting this approach, a federal district court, in 1955, interpreted Brown I
as follows: "The Constitution . . . does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination." Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C.), on remand from
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The great majority of southern school
boards undertaking any voluntary desegregation relied on such reasoning to avoid affirmative integration prior to the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Under so-called "freedom-of-choice" plans, such
school boards purported to comply with Brown II simply by permitting those minority
students who chose to transfer to move from all-black schools to majority-white
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however, the Supreme Court's post-Brown II decisions cannot be reconciled with so modest a remedial approach."1
An understanding of the harms of segregation on which a remedial
theory can be based must identify some harm caused by intentional segregation that provides a useful measure of the scope of appropriate
remedies. If the harm at the heart of segregation is only the departure
of state authorities from a constitutionally prescribed normative position
without any necessarily corresponding tangible effects, it becomes difficult to justify any affirmative relief as reflecting more than the Court's
ex cathedrajudgment as to what constitutes natural justice. To accept
objective stigma alone as the crux of Brown I would render any attempt
to ground a remedial theory in the harms of segregation merely an exercise in mystifying the arbitrary value judgment that remedial design
entails.
This discussion does not deny that segregation imposes harms,
which, although not providing a useful gauge for appropriate remedies,
nevertheless exist. The degradation of all races and wasted human energy and talent are among those harms resulting from racism. Recognizing such harms, which do not suggest particular remedial strategies,
underscores the importance of identifying remedial approaches that will
address those harms of segregation the law is capable of relieving.
C. Narrow Conception of Harm and Expansive Results in
Post-Brown II Remedial Cases
None of the Supreme Court's decisions after Brown I deals with
the problems just catalogued of relating a particular conception of the
harms of segregated schooling to the Court's insight into the inherent
inequality that segregation imposes. Brown II did not relate remedy to
harm because it did not, in fact, specify the preferred form of remedy.
Instead, it left the process of remedial design to lower courts and to be
governed by "equitable principles. ' ' 6a The Supreme Court returned to
schools-an option that often led to little integration. Under its 1965 guidelines, the
then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare listed "freedom of choice" as an
adequate desegregation technique under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1976 & Supp. V 1981), but a year later, the guidelines were revised to
include detailed procedural requirements for freedom-of-choice plans, the acceptability
of which was conditioned henceforth on their effectiveness in furthering desegregation.
Goodman, supra note 51, at 288 & nn.57-58.
6 The "objective stigma" conception of the harm of segregation is limited in its
usefulness largely because of its abstract, isolated character. The richer and more useful
understanding, proffered in this Article, of this harm is not, however, entirely dissimilar
to an "objective stigma" approach.
" Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300.
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the problem of remedial design only after a lapse of thirteen years, to
reject, in Green, a freedom-of-choice plan that failed to undo the racial
identifiability of schools in a formerly segregated district."3
Since Green, the overriding issue in the Supreme Court's major
decisions has been the appropriate impact of a school desegregation
remedy on the racial composition of the schools in such a district. The
issue, in other words, is how much racial balance is required to undo
segregation. This concern with the racial composition of the schools is
best justified as a proxy for other concerns; that is, the Court, albeit
tacitly, has deemed an alteration in the racial composition of the schools
to be a remedy for ills other than the distortion per se in racial attendance patterns that intentional segregation creates.
These cases, however, emit conflicting signals in this respect. They
leave unclear whether the process of remediation should be broadly or
narrowly conceived. The rhetoric of several of the Court's decisions and
the result in Milliken v. Bradley" [Milliken I], the Detroit metropolitan desegregation case, imply that the harm to be relieved by school
desegregation remedies is only the distortion of intradistrict attendance
patterns. Although we cannot know what would have been the "natural" pattern of school attendance without discrimination, the Court has
spoken in these cases as if the remedial goal is to restore blacks to an
ascertainable attendance pattern they would have enjoyed but for the
fact of intentional segregation. On the other hand, the actual results of
all the post-Brown II cases are compatible with, and often only with, a
far less mechanical theory of remedial strategy.
It would be strange in principle to regard distortion in school attendance patterns as the constitutional evil of intentional segregation.
Even more than legal exclusion, racial imbalance, when viewed in isolation from other phenomena we associate historically with racially segregated school systems, seems to be of uncertain significance. The goal
of racial balance does not seem worth the burdens entailed by desegregation orders unless we can attach some value to it other than the creation of an attendance pattern that would have existed but for a history
of educational discrimination. Once we recognize some additional value
to racial balance, however, we are implicitly identifying some harm
other than the distortion of natural attendance patterns that we associate with racial separation. Such additional harm must be regarded as
part of what our remedy is trying to relieve.
Although the rhetoric of the Court's Green decision in 1968 was
Green, 391 U.S. at 441-42.
- 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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expansive in describing the aims of desegregation, the implications of
the case for permissible remedies were unclear because of the unusual
facts of the case. 5 The Supreme Court's formulations of the proper
85 In Green, the Supreme Court's first major opinion on school desegregation
remedies after Brown II, the Court overturned a so-called "freedom of choice" desegregation plan that a small rural school district in New Kent County, Virginia, had
adopted 11 years after Brown I to avoid losing federal financial aid eligibility. See
Green, 391 U.S. at 433. Under "freedom-of-choice," first and eighth graders were to
choose their preferred schools and all other students would be assigned to the schools
they had previously attended, unless the students requested otherwise. The district,
however, comprised only two schools for all grades, which, notwithstanding Brown II,
were operated as separate black and white schools until 1965. Despite "freedom-ofchoice," by 1967 the black school was still entirely black, and only 15% of the black
school children had elected to attend the formerly all-white school. Likewise, the complete segregation of black and white faculty continued to attest to the racial identity of
the two schools.
The Court in Green concluded that the "freedom-of-choice" plan provided an "intolerable" lack of "meaningful assurance of prompt and effective disestablishment of
[the] dual [school] system." Id. at 438. The Court used the phrase "dual system" to
refer to a school system segregated under state compulsion in which racial segregation
and other forms of discrimination had not been eradicated. In contrast, the Court characterized as a "unitary, nonracial system," id. at 436, one "in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch," id. at 438. Having evaded its responsibility
for 11 years after Brown I to effect any transition whatsoever from a dual to a unitary
system, the school board in New Kent County was required "to come forward with a
plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Id. at
439.
The language of Green suggested a broad conception of desegregation remedies.
Securing the nondiscriminatory admission of black students to formerly all-white
schools, as commanded in Brown 17, was characterized as "only the first step" in the
remedy. "[T]he ultimate end to be brought about" was the "transition to a unitary,
nonracial system of public education." Id. at 436. Brown II, the Court stated, "clearly
charged" school boards operating dual systems "with the affirmative duty to take
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch." Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
Toward this end, federal courts were declared to have "'not merely the power but the
duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects
of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future.'" Id. at 438 n.4 (quoting
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)). The Court approvingly cited
the formulation of one court of appeals judge, who described the "constitutionally required end" of school desegregation to be "'the abolition of the system of segregation
and its effects.'" Green, 391 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added) (quoting Bowman v.
County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring)). This
meant that school authorities must "convert promptly to a system without a 'white'
school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools." Green, 391 U.S. at 442. Although each
of these formulations can be read to require no more, with respect to students, than the
restoration of a pattern of attendance that intentional segregation had disrupted, the
Court's rhetoric does not, in its tone or phrasing, invite so crabbed a view.
Confined to its facts, however, Green could be reconciled with the narrow conception of remedial compensation later articulated by Justice Rehnquist in Dayton Bd.of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). New Kent County was a residentially integrated rural school district in which racial segregation had been maintainable only
through the actions of the school authorities in busing black and white children to
racially designated schools. In this context, the judicial command of total integration-the elimination of "racial discrimination root and branch"-thus required no
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objectives of school desegregation remedies were vague in Green and
continued to be vague6 6 prior to the Court's first opinion in the Dayton
school desegregation case, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman'"
[Dayton I], rendered in 1977. Not until Dayton I did the Court focus
expressly on the incremental distortion of the intradistrict pattern of
student attendance as the measure of harm to which desegregation remedies should be tailored.
The Burger Court's first major school desegregation decision, its
unanimous 1971 opinion in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of
Education, 8 seemed to augur a broad conception of school desegregation remedies. In Swann, following a complex series of lower court proceedings, the Court approved the district court's imposition of a desegregation plan that required extensive busing in the CharlotteMecklenburg school system. Under the approved plan, all of the city's
junior and senior high schools were desegregated, chiefly through zoning and consequent student reassignments, and the district's elementary
schools were desegregated through "zoning, pairing, and grouping techniques."6 The lower court imposed the plan, notwithstanding the
school board's objections and its submission of an alternative plan
promising significant improvement in racial balance but omitting a
number of the district's schools from substantial involvement in the desegregation order."0
The lower court plan, which the Supreme Court approved, clearly
did more than restore the pattern of school attendance that would have
prevailed but for the school authorities' racially segregative acts. In
1968-1969, Charlotte-Mecklenburg was the forty-third largest school
71
district in the country, with 107 schools spread over 550 square miles.
Although the school board's school site location decisions undoubtedly
more than that the board abandon its actions to preserve segregation. As the Court
noted, either geographic zoning-sending each child to the school closer to his or her
home-or grade consolidation-making one school an elementary school and the other
a junior-senior high school-would accomplish complete desegregation without any additional administrative burden for the local school authorities. See Green, 391 U.S. at
442 n.6.
66 The remedy should eliminate racial discrimination in schooling "root and
branch," Green, 391 U.S. at 438; the ultimate end of a remedy is "[t]he transition to a
unitary, nonracial system of public education," id. at 436; "the nature of the violation
determines the scope of the remedy," Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). Although the Burger Court gave these formulations a narrower
cast than had the Warren Court, each of these guidelines, in context, might be given a
relatively narrow or expansive interpretation.
67 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
68 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
69 Id. at 6-11.
70 See id. at 8-10.
71 Id. at 6.
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exacerbated the perpetuation of racial imbalance in the public schools
after 1954, Charlotte-Mecklenburg was an urban school district with
significant residential segregation that neither the district court nor the
court of appeals attributed entirely to school board action.7 2 Although
the precise contribution of state-required segregation to the pattern of
school attendance in 1971 might have been impossible to prove, it is
unlikely that the schools would all have been racially balanced, even
without official segregation.
Nor did Chief Justice Burger's opinion state that the precise restoration of an attendance pattern that would have existed but for the
state's segregative acts was the sole remedial goal in Swann. Lower
courts, he declared, have sufficiently broad authority "to eliminate from
the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 7 Remedial
assignment plans should "counteract the continuing effects of past
school segregation," 4 and district judges and school authorities "should
make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation. 75 Today, these formulations might be interpreted narrowly
in light of Dayton 1,16 but in 1971, the Court's evident concern in
Swann was not just with the physical restoration of a natural attendance pattern, but with the maximum possible disestablishment of a pat77
tern of segregated schooling that had been approved by state law.
Between 1971 and 1977, however, aspects of three Supreme Court
decisions indicated that the goal of school desegregation remedies was to
be more narrowly conceived. In 1973, in Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1,
Denver, Colo.,"8 the Court's first opinion focusing on a segregated
school district outside the South, the Court equated the question
whether a desegregation remedy should encompass each school in the
district with the question whether petitioners could demonstrate that
the attendance pattern of a substantial portion of the district schools
had been affected by intentional segregation.7 ' Although the evidentiary
7

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

7.

15 (emphasis added).
28.
71
26 (emphasis added).
"8See infra text accompanying note 83.
7 Chief Justice Burger did, however, characterize the judicial role in desegregation cases as a limited one: "We are concerned ... with the elimination of the discrimination inherent in the dual school systems, not with myriad factors of human existence
which can cause discrimination in a multitude of ways on racial, religious, or ethnic
grounds." Swann, 402 U.S. at 22. "[J]udicial powers," he reminded, "may be exercised
only on the basis of a constitutional violation," and in a school case, "[a]s with any
equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy." Id. at 16.
78 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
" Id. at 203-04. The Court noted that the district court finding of intentional
segregation with respect to 37.69% of Denver's total black school population was not
71

74
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rules the Court developed were extremely generous to the petitioners, it
is striking that so mechanical a measure of a school's involvement in a
plan of intentional segregation was adopted to justify the inclusion of
every school in the district's remedial obligation.
In 1974, the Supreme Court, in Milliken v. Bradley"° [Milliken
I], reversed a lower court decision to involve suburban school districts
in the desegregation of the Detroit public schools. The Court reasoned
that the Detroit plaintiffs had not shown any constitutional violation in
the suburban school districts that had produced a "significant segregative effect" in Detroit."1 The plaintiffs argued, without avail, that no
intradistrict remedy in Detroit could accomplish any significant integration: that inclusion of additional districts in the remedy was equitable because state authorities had contributed to the segregation of Detroit and that school district lines were no more than artifacts of state
law. The Court majority, however, viewed the minority students' remedial entitlement narrowly: "The constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing in Detroit is to attend a unitary school system in
82
that district."1
The 1977 Dayton case was the third case of the decade to indicate
that school desegregation remedies were to be narrowly construed.
Writing for eight of the nine Justices in a unanimous opinion, Justice
Rehnquist articulated a remedial methodology in specific and narrow
terms. After explaining the insufficiency of the factfinding used by the
district court to justify the systemwide remedy it had imposed on the
Dayton Board of Education, Rehnquist wrote that, if intentional racial
discrimination is found on remand,
the District Court in the first instance, subject to review by
the Court of Appeals, must determine how much incremental segregative effect these violations had on the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presently constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would
have been in the absence of such constitutional violations.
The remedy must be designed to redress that difference, and
only if there has been a systemwide impact may there be a
systemwide remedy."3
Thus, Justice Rehnquist finally formulated a narrow conception of the
"insubstantial or trivial." Id. at 199.
80 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
81 Id. at 744-45.
82
83

Id. at 746.
Dayton 1, 433 U.S. at 420.
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Court's remedial rationale: remedies should restore minority students to
the racial pattern of school attendance within the school district's confines that would have existed but for the school authorities' intentionally segregative acts.
Yet, the important point is that, while the doctrinal developments
just described pointed in the direction of a narrow, restorative conception of school desegregation remedies, the actual results of the post1971 cases other than Milliken I and Dayton I pointed toward an expansive view of these remedies, equally compatible with Green and
more compatible with the result in Swann.
The Court's decision in Keyes, despite its formal equation between
the permissible scope of remedies and the number of schools in which
actual taint by segregation could be proved, in fact requires integration
more broadly. Justice Brennan's opinion for five members of the Court
attempted to fit the remedial holding of Keyes into a narrow doctrinal
rendition of the holdings of prior cases. Separate concurring opinions,
reflecting very different policy perspectives, by Justices Douglas and
Powell, however, indicated that the doctrinal mold was"breaking. While
agreeing with Justice Brennan that a basis existed for a remand to
determine whether Denver school authorities were liable for the imposition of a systemwide school desegregation remedy, Douglas and Powell argued that the case put an end to the legal distinction between de
facto and de jure segregation. 4 In Powell's view, the case required a
reconception of the constitutional right at stake in school desegregation
cases.

85

The issue in Keyes was whether the principles of the Brown decisions had been correctly applied in a suit brought by black parents
against the Denver school system. The Court held that, contrary to the
different analyses of the lower courts,86 districtwide desegregation might
be the appropriate remedy in Denver given the record presented. 87
84 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 214-16 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 219-25 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85 Id. at 225-26 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 313 F. Supp. 61 and 313 F. Supp.
90 (D. Colo. 1970), modified, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 413 U.S.
921 (1973).
87 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 200. In June 1969, parents of Denver school children
sued for preliminary injunctive relief to prevent the Denver school board from implementing a decision to rescind three resolutions adopted by the board's previous membership. Id. at 191-92. These resolutions would have brought about the desegregation
of a portion of Denver called Park Hill, id. at 192, which was served by eight, id. at
192 n.3., of the city's 119 schools, id. at 191 & n.2. After winning a preliminary injunction, the parents sued for permanent relief and added demands for desegregation in
all schools throughout Denver. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 313 F.
Supp. 61, 63 (D. Colo. 1970), modified, 445 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
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Though the plaintiffs could not prove that intentional segregation existed throughout Denver, they had proved that intentional segregation
affected a "substantial portion" of the school district, called Park
Hill."8 That being so, the Court said, the plaintiffs had established a
prima facie case that intentional segregation affected the entire school
district-a case that the school board shouldered the burden to rebut."9
Through this shift in the burden of proof, Justice Brennan purported to cast the Keyes facts into the Brown I mold. 90 If evidence from
Park Hill gave rise to an unrebutted inference that no segregation in
413 U.S. 921 (1973). The latter demand was based on allegations that the school board
had manipulated student attendance zones and located new schools so as to insure that
the general student population would in fact be segregated by race.
The federal district court in Denver held that the school board's rescission of the
desegregation resolutions constituted an intentional act of segregation within the meaning of Brown L See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 303 F. Supp. 279, 28688 (D. Colo. 1969) (preliminary injunction); Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 64-69 (permanent
injunction). On that basis the court ordered the desegregation of the Park Hill zone. As
for other schools in Denver, the court did not find intentional segregation. See Keyes,
313 F. Supp. at 73, 77.
The school board had, since World War II, made various zoning and school site
location decisions that had led to increased public school segregation. The court found,
however, that educational considerations lay behind some of the decisions. See id. at 7576. In addition, the black population in Denver had been small when the decisions
were made and was of relatively little concern to the school board at those times. Id. at
75. So little attention had been paid to the problems of racial separation before the civil
rights movement of the 1960's that the district court found itself unable to conclude that
the Denver school board had intended to segregate schools outside Park Hill. See id. at
73, 77. It concluded that the segregation that had resulted from the school board's
policies prior to 1960 proceeded from the segregation of housing in Denver, which had
developed slowly and without the intervention of school authorities over a period of
decades. See id. at 75.
The court's findings as to intent, however, did not end the question of relief. The
court found that Denver's predominantly black schools outside Park Hill were inferior
to white schools in the quality of educational experience they offered. See id. at 77-83.
The court held that such inequality violated the separate but equal rule of Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which Brown I had not overruled in this respect. See
Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 83. In order to remedy such inequality, the district court concluded that both material improvements in the schools' programs and some degree of
desegregation throughout the city were required in relief. See id. at 97-99. The court
said that the establishment of educational equality in Denver necessitated the implementation of "compensatory education in an integrated environment." Id. at 96.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of relief with
respect to Park Hill but reversed both the educational improvement and desegregation
measures ordered with respect to the rest of Denver. See Keyes, 445 F.2d at 1007. The
court of appeals held that the district court's finding of no intentional segregation beyond Park Hill should have ended the judicial inquiry. See id. at 1005.
" Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201.
89 Id. at 211, 213-14.
90 Id. at 208-09. Rhetorically, the Court may have wanted to exert the same
moral pressure to desegregate in Keyes as is now commonly associated with the Brown
I-type case. See Fiss, supra note 45, at 37-38.
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Denver was "adventitious,""' then the results of intentional segregation
might be viewed as being as extensive in Denver as they were in any
southern school district. Because the school board's intended segregation
would thus reach the entire district, the obligation of districtwide racial
balance would follow in Keyes92 even under a narrow conception of the
remedial command of Brown II, Green, and Swann. That is, school
authorities who practice intentional segregation must cease their segregative practices and undo the segregation they created. Under the evidentiary rules of Keyes, such segregation would be deemed to have pervaded the Denver school system.9 3
The Supreme Court's use of a presumption of intentional segregation to draw the analogy between the facts of Keyes and of Brown I
would have been unremarkable except that, if accuracy in factfinding
was the Court's sole concern, the findings of the two courts below belied the fairness of the presumption.94 The Supreme Court reasoned
that, if a school board intentionally segregates a "substantial portion"
of a district, it may be causing the segregation of other schools in the
district by virtue of a spillover effect. 5 Thus, the Court said, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the intentional segregation of one
portion of a school system that is racially imbalanced might make the
entire district a "dual system."
The Supreme Court's analysis ignored, however, that a pattern of
racial imbalance may occur over time. The district court found, as Justice Rehnquist pointed out,9" that the pattern of segregation in schools
beyond Park Hill antedated by at least ten years the purposeful segregation of Park Hill itself.9" On such a record, and in light of the pattern of racial segregation that characterized housing in Denver, the
school board had proved that the segregation of Park Hill did not cre"BKeyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
Id. at 213-14.
11 On remand, the district court found that there existed a dual system, see Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1066 (1976), and ordered districtwide desegregation, see Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, Denver, Colo., 380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974), modified, 521 F.2d 465 (10th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
Fiss, supra note 10, at 207, says,
[in order to make the issues [of past racial assignment and its relationship
to current segregation] triable or capable of ever producing relief, the Supreme Court had to create a set of presumptions in favor of the existence
of these linkages and those presumptions, especially when viewed as a set,
do not seem supported by natural probabilities.
92

Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201-04.
Id. at 259-60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 303 F. Supp. 279, 282 (D. Colo.
1969).
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ate the pattern of segregation in the "core city." Although some black
enrollment in the core city may have represented Park Hill spillover,
the spillover effect of eight Park Hill schools on the 111 other Denver
schools was likely to be small.
The effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to school authorities to demonstrate that the racial segregation in other schools is not the
result of intentional segregative acts by the school board is likely in
every case to render an urban school board liable for more segregation
than it caused in any mechanical sense.9 8 If a school board such as
Denver's could never show precisely which schools were tainted by the
spillover effects of the board's segregative actions in a distinct portion of
a city,9" it follows that a district court might impose a districtwide remedy on that board even in the face of evidence that the school board did
not independently generate all, or even most, of the segregation found
to exist. This renders suspect any implication from the Keyes opinion
suggesting that the remedy in a Keyes-type case ought to seek to achieve
a pattern of attendance that would have existed but for the school
board's segregative acts. 100 The Keyes opinion allows courts to require
school boards to do more than undo only the segregation they themselves create or actively promote.
This view of Keyes is confirmed by the 1979 decision in Columbus
1 01 and the subsequent history of Dayton
Board of Education v. Penick
L In Columbus, the Sixth Circuit upheld a district court judgment imposing a systemwide remedy in Columbus, Ohio because (1) the Columbus public schools were "openly and intentionally" segregated on
the basis of race in 1954, and (2) after Brown I, the Columbus Board
g This is not to say that there is no legal conception of cause under which responsibility for segregation could reasonably be linked to school board action. Even if a
school board uses only geographic criteria to assign students to schools, its assignments
may facilitate or encourage housing segregation, with the result that racially neutral
school assignments lead to racial imbalance. The school board may thus be a joint
tortfeasor with other public and private agencies, whose collective action causes the
pattern of racial imbalance. See Fiss, supra note 47, at 583-88; Fiss, The CharlotteMecklenburg Case-Its Significancefor Northern School Desegregation,38 U. CHI. L.
REv. 697, 705-07 (1971). The observation in the text about the Keyes presumption
challenges only the implication that the Court was imposing liability on the Denver
school board based on the kind of immediate causal connection between racial assignment and segregated schools that existed in Brown L See Fiss, supra note 45, at 26.
91 The likelihood of any defendant's overcoming the Keyes presumption is further
reduced by the Court's description of the stringent showing necessary for the defendant

to prevail. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213-14.
100 Professor Fiss asserts that the Court's methodology entails institutional costs:
"The use of presumptions involves the court in fictionalizing and thereby impairing its
credibility." Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
145 (1976).
201

443 U.S. 449 (1979).
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of Education "never actively set out to dismantle this dual system."' 2
The lower courts reached the first conclusion after applying the Keyes
presumption 0 8 to the finding that, in 1954, the school board had maintained "an enclave of separate, black schools on the near east side of
Columbus."1 4 The segregation found to exist in 1954 was deemed to
have a current systemwide impact because Brown II imposed on Columbus a constitutional duty to desegregate, which the Columbus
Board never performed.10 5 Therefore, each instance of racial imbalance
in 1979 could be treated as the unlawfully neglected artifact of systemwide segregation existing twenty-five years earlier, thus justifying
current systemwide desegregation relief.
The Supreme Court, by endorsing the "affirmative duty" theory,
took a major step forward in expanding school board liability for the
desegregation of schools. Its approval of the Sixth Circuit's approach
meant that a school board's post-Brown II policies in a school desegregation case could now be viewed in an unanticipated light. As expressed in the accompanying decision in Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman08 [Dayton II], "[T]he measure of the post-Brown I conduct
of a school board under an unsatisfied duty to liquidate a dual system"
is now to be "the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in de'1 07
creasing or increasing the segregation caused by the dual system.
That is, if intentional segregation sufficient to trigger the Keyes shift in
burden of proof ever occurred in a particular school district, local authorities are responsible for desegregating the entire district unless, after 1955, the school board's policies had the effect of undoing the results of the intentional segregation.
However justifiable the results of this shift in focus from the purpose to the effects of a school board's post-1955 policies may be, the
Court's statement is remarkable. Although the Court, in Columbus and
Dayton II, dramatically increased the number of school boards against
.02 Id. at 452 (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 260
(S.D. Ohio 1977), affd, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), affd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)).
103 See Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp. 229, 260 (S.D. Ohio
1977), affd, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), affd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
104 443 U.S. at 455-56 (quoting Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429 F. Supp.

229, 236 (S.D. Ohio 1977), affd, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), affd, 443 U.S. 449
(1979)).
10I See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458-59; Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 583
F.2d 787, 799 (6th Cir. 1978), affd, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
106 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
107 Id. at 538 (citations omitted). The Court's reference in Dayton II to "the postBrown I conduct of a school board" betrays some carelessness since, as explained in
Columbus, the "affirmative duty" to disestablish dual school systems arose after Brown
11, a year later than Brown L Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458-59.
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which successful desegregation suits may be brought, 0 8 it again neglected to explain the harms at stake in desegregation cases that would
justify such an expansion of potential liability. Even assuming that
what is at stake in desegregation cases is attendance patterns, the reach
of the Columbus-Dayton I rule is extraordinary given the obvious uncertainties attending any attempt to repair distortions of attendance pat109
terns occurring more than three decades ago.
Indeed, the facts of Columbus show, as compellingly as those of
Keyes, that the defendant board of education was being held liable for a
greater degree of racial separation than could have been closely linked
to school board action alone. 1 Dayton II, however, illustrates this con108 It may be that school districts otherwise vulnerable to liability under Columbus

and Dayton II can shield themselves by invoking principles of collateral estoppel based
on pre-Columbusjudgments favorable to the school authorities. See Bronson v. Board of
Educ., 687 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1982) (Cincinnati); Bell v. Board of Educ., 683 F.2d 963
(6th Cir. 1982) (Akron).
109 The Court's statement is also remarkable because no one reading any Supreme
Court decision prior to Green, decided 13 years after Brown II, could have discovered
that Brown II imposed on school boards the "affirmative duty" to which Columbus and
Dayton H refer. See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 494-95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110 The Supreme Court accepted the district court's finding of intentional systemwide segregation based on the school board's pre-1954 use of gerrymandering, Columbus, 443 U.S. at 506, to preserve an enclave of five black schools in the predominantly black near east side of Columbus, id. at 467, 505-06. This act of intentional
segregation in a "meaningful" portion of the district shifted the burden to the school
board, under Keyes, to show that racial imbalance elsewhere in the district was not the
product of intentional segregation. The lower courts held this burden had not been met,
although the Columbus school system, at the time suit was filed, included 172 schools,
id. at 452, the racial imbalance of most of which could not be traced entirely to the pre1954 gerrymandering.
The lower courts did identify various post-1954 acts demonstrating the Board's
abdication of its legal duty to dismantle the dual system existing in 1954 and, in a more
limited way, its continuing intention actually to segregate the schools. The post-1954
acts that were intentionally segregative, however, may have affected even fewer students
relative to the whole system than the pre-1954 gerrymandering. For example, the
school board created "optional attendance zones" to allow whites living close to an allblack school to attend a white school instead. See Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 429
F. Supp. 229, 243-47 (S.D. Ohio 1977), affd, 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), affd, 443
U.S. 449 (1979). The district court reported specific data on the number of students
affected for only one of these zones; this optional zone, in 1972, apparently included 27
public school students. Id. at 245. Similarly, in the 1960's, the school board transported
70 students past an allegedly overcrowded black school to a predominantly white school
farther away. Id. at 247.
Although several other examples of actions preserving predominantly black or
white schools are cited in Columbus, see 443 U.S. at 461-62 & nn.8-11, 515-18, the
lower courts apparently made no specific findings as to their continuing segregative
effects. Thus, however justified systemwide relief in Columbus may have been, it cannot reasonably be supposed that the degree of racial imbalance proved as of 1976 was
attributable to the spillover effect of the proven intentional segregation. About 70% of
Columbus's public school students attended schools in 1976 that were at least 80%
black or 80% white, and half of the schools in Columbus were over 90% black or 90%
white, id. at 452. The court of appeals recognized that, even under Keyes, the post-1954
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clusion even more dramatically. On remand and after conducting an
evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed the complaint, because,
under Dayton I, the plaintiffs "failed to prove that acts of intentional
segregation over twenty years old had any current incremental segregative effects." 1 11 The Sixth Circuit reversed, declaring some of the trial
court's findings of fact clearly erroneous and reinterpreting the record
under its new theory of affirmative duty."'
The Supreme Court upheld the Sixth Circuit and distinguished

Dayton I:
On the facts found by the District Court and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals at the time Dayton first came before us,
there were only isolated instances of intentional segregation,
which were insufficient to give rise to an inference of systemwide institutional purpose and which did not add up to a
facially substantial systemwide impact.1 8
It may be that a Supreme Court majority viewed the records in Dayton
I and Dayton II as significantly different. The instances of segregation
on which the court of appeals relied, however, in imposing liability in
Dayton II amounted to little more than the "isolated instances of intentional segregation" held by the Supreme Court in Dayton I to be an
insufficient basis for systemwide liability.1 14 The factual record had not
"isolated" segregative acts alone could not have supported systemwide relief. Id. at 502
n.1l (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
MlDayton II, 443 U.S. at 532.
112 Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243, 247 (6th Cir. 1978), affd, 443 U.S. 526
(1979).
113 Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458 n.7.
114 In Dayton I, the Supreme Court regarded the three factual findings on which
the lower court imposed systemwide relief as insufficient. These were, first, the school
board's 1972 rescission of school board resolutions passed earlier, which "acknowledged
a role played by the Board in the creation of segregative racial patterns and had called
for various types of remedial measures"; second, the pervasiveness of racial imbalance
in the school system; and third, the use of "optional attendance zones" to increase racial
separation. Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 412-13. By contrast, the Court in Dayton II approved
the Sixth Circuit's conclusion as to districtwide liability based on the earlier record and
four additional factual considerations identified by the Supreme Court in its opinion:
the creation and maintenance of Dunbar High School as an all-black school, the establishment of the Garfield school as an all-black elementary school, the intentional districtwide segregation of faculty, and the use of enrollment and transfer policies to maintain two all-black elementary schools beginning in the 1930's. Dayton II, 443 U.S. at
534-35.
The district court in Dayton I, however, had already recited the facts regarding
Dunbar High School, the Garfield School, and faculty segregation. See Brinkman v.
Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232, 1254-55 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (appendix A, findings of fact
and memorandum of law reprinting the district court's Dayton I opinion). The district
court failed only to base its legal conclusions expressly on those facts. Thus, of the four
"new" factors that the Supreme Court stressed in Dayton II, the only ones discussed by
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significantly changed; only the Court's liability rules were in flux." 5
Assuming the unanimous Court was correct in Dayton I that the record
in the case could not justify a systemwide remedy under a narrow conception of the remedial goal, the change in liability rules in Dayton I
necessarily sanctioned a conception of school desegregation remedies
broader than the mechanical restoration of a natural attendance pattern
that Dayton I had approved.
The results in Keyes, Dayton II, and Columbus thus point to a
remedial theory that, although never clearly articulated, is broader than
the narrow conception expressed in Dayton P"' and implied by some of
the rhetoric of Keyes" 7 and by Milliken .118 Implicitly, plaintiffs in
school cases are being granted relief for the protection of interests other
than an attendance pattern untainted by intentional segregation and its
consequences.'"
the Sixth Circuit that had not been specifically elaborated in the district court's Dayton
I opinion-and not discussed in its opinion on remand-involved the use of enrollment
and transfer policies to segregate the Wogamon and Willard elementary schools starting in the 1930's. Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243, 250-51 (6th Cir. 1978), affd,
443 U.S. 526 (1979). (In 1972, when the Dayton case was first tried, Wogamon was
still all-black, Brinkman, 446 F. Supp. at 1260 (appendix A), and Willard had been
closed for 10 years, id. at 1239.)
In sum, the Sixth Circuit opinion upheld in Dayton H fails to recite significant
facts not before the Supreme Court in Dayton I but re-explains, under the Sixth Circuit's "affirmative duty" theory, the legal significance of facts found earlier.
115 Such was the district court's conclusion on remand, albeit with a result different from the judgment finally approved by the Supreme Court in Dayton I. See Brinkman v. Gilligan, 446 F. Supp. 1232, 1253 (S.D. Ohio 1977).
116 See supra text accompanying note 83.
,11 See supra text accompanying note 79.
"I See supra text accompanying note 82.
119 Further buttressing the implication that its conception of school desegregation
remedies should not be too narrowly understood was the Supreme Court's decision
affirming the judgment on remand in the Detroit desegregation case, Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [Milliken II]. After the Court in Milliken I disapproved the
metropolitan integration remedy that the district court had imposed and the Sixth Circuit had affirmed, the district court designed an intradistrict racial balance remedy
combined with a variety of "educational components," including remedial education
requirements, curricular changes, in-service training requirements, provisions for new
guidance and counseling programs, and revisions in Detroit's testing procedures. Id. at
272 & n.5. The Supreme Court, in Milliken II, approved the implementation of four of
these measures, which were challenged on certiorari by the state defendants.
In describing the remedial purposes that underlay the educational components of
the revised order below, the Court adopted a rationale going beyond the repair of attendance patterns, but which nonetheless has uncertain implications for remedial design. The district court had concluded, and the Sixth Circuit had agreed, that the educational components were necessary to assure the success of desegregation and to
remove all vestigial effects of past segregation. Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 241
(6th Cir. 1976), affd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). The latter purpose, as implied by the
required educational components, facially encompassed more than the vestigial attendance distortion resulting from past segregation. The Supreme Court expressly approved
this rationale. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 282.
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It could be argued that the apparent tension in the cases has been
overstated. Perhaps the narrow conception articulated in Dayton I is
the Court's actual conception of proper remedial design, and the other
decisions, to the extent they sanction broader remedies, do so only because of the difficulties involved in implementing precisely the pattern
of attendance that would have existed but for the history of intentional
segregation. Equity may simply require that the Court indulge a certain remedial expansiveness to assure, given the difficulties of proving
which schools in an urban district are tainted by intentional segregation, that all such tainted schools are actually desegregated. Such practicality on the Court's part does not necessarily belie the Court's underlying conception of proper remedies, which is no more than the narrow
conception of restoring a natural pattern of school attendance.
Such an argument, however, provides only weak justification for
the Supreme Court's school decisions for two reasons. First, characterizing the breadth of the remedy in Keyes, Dayton II, or Columbus as a
prophylactic measure to insure that the few schools actually tainted by
intentional segregation are mandatorily desegregated trivializes the extent of the "prophylaxis." Given the relatively small spillover effect
that the proven segregation in Denver, Dayton, and Columbus could
possibly have caused in fact, the expansiveness of the remedies sanctioned by the Court undermines any argument that the crux of the
remedy is the vindication of an historically based pattern of student
assignments.
Second, the Court's rhetorical appeal to a mechanical conception
of remedies to justify costly systemwide relief leaves the district courts
that render such decrees vulnerable to a public perception that the
courts are unrealistic in their goals and unjustifiably interventionist in
Miliken II, on its face, however, did not offer a strong indication of how much
should be made of its seeming remedial expansiveness. First, although the educational
components addressed problems other than attendance, the Court described the educational components in narrow, historically based terms: "These. . . remedies . . . were
deemed necessary to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they
would have enjoyed in terms of education" had they been able to attend a nondiscriminatory school system free of de jure segregation. Id. Second, nearly all the educational
components were suggested by the defendant school district, and the only truly contested issue on appeal was the appropriateness of the lower court's requirement that the
state defendants fund these components. Id. at 293 (Powell, J., concurring). Because
the interests of the plaintiffs and the school board were aligned, Milliken If could be
regarded as a weak precedent for sanctioning broad remedies unrelated to racial balance in cases in which those remedies are opposed by the defendant school authorities
and represent an incursion into their ordinary policymaking discretion.
It should be noted that Miliken 11 is consistent with the expansive fair governance
remedial theory explained below insofar as its approval of remedies other than those
aimed at racial balance has important precedential significance.
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local school systems. If we consider that the lower courts are the local
agencies charged by the Supreme Court with implementing the constitutional mandate of desegregation, the Supreme Court serves these
agencies poorly by articulating only a weak, and seemingly artificial,
rationale for the kind of intervention in local school systems that the
Court has required. 120 The Supreme Court has failed to provide the
lower courts with a firm and specific statement of remedial principle
with which to resolve in a justifiable way the competing interests of the
parties before them.
In sum, it is possible to understand the Supreme Court's remedial
results as compatible with a narrow demographic conception of the
harm that school desegregation remedies should relieve only if one ignores the absence of factual support for treating the degree of racial
balance ordered in these cases as having an historical demographic basis. The fact is that culpable school authorities in all successful urban
school desegregation cases have been required to do more than "fix" the
"broken" pattern of school attendance. It is at best an unhelpful fiction
to regard the pattern of attendance resulting from an urban school desegregation decree as "redressing" no more than "the incremental segregative effect" of constitutional violations, calculated by comparing the
school district's current attendance pattern with the distribution of students that would have occurred "in the absence of such constitutional
violations. ' 121 This realization does not mean that the results of the
school cases are unjustified, only that the Supreme Court's proffered
justification, to the extent it is explicit at all, is very weak when compared to the massive remedial undertaking that the cases entail. This
weakness, like the ambiguities of Brown I, turns our attention again to
the problem of identifying more cogently those harms that school desegregation remedies should address.
II.

FAIR GOVERNANCE AS THE PROTECTED INTEREST IN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION CASES

A.

Segregated Schooling and the Harm of Unfair Governance

Surveying those harms of segregated schooling to which the Supreme Court's opinions are most often thought to refer has not yielded
a conception of harm that is both a compelling explanation for the inherent inequality of segregated schooling and a useful guide to remedial
120 The political process may exercise an analogous effect on administrative agencies that are granted broad, standardless authority by Congress. See Jaffe, The Illusion
of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1188-91 (1973).
121 Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 420.

1078

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:1041

design. The perspective of the analysis thus far, however, has been limited. We have evaluated various harms as isolated, discrete phenomena,
attempting to determine whether each is objectively hurtful in the abstract or whether empirical evidence exists that clearly links the particular harm to segregated schooling. This approach has not made any
particular effort to reflect the experience of segregation as perceived by
its victims, rather than by a detached decisionmaker.
Although the impact of exclusion may be indeterminate in the abstract, blacks do not experience segregation in the abstract. Exclusion
derives its meaning for its victims from its historical association with a
hostile white power structure, unequal opportunities in every realm of
social activity, and schooling for black children that ordinarily was inferior, and markedly so, to the schooling reserved for whites. Although
social science may not have proved that segregated schooling inexorably
injures black children in specified, measurable ways, neither has it disproved such harm. Any risk that segregation does hurt educational
achievement, adult life chances, or personality adjustment falls solely on
black children, and there is no evidence that white school authorities
are unwilling to have black children shoulder that risk.1"2
An extended conception of the injury from intentionally segregated
schooling may be inferred when the aforementioned harms are considered as a totality, rather than separately. It derives from a recognition
that the intentional racial segregation of public school students renders
minority children systematically and continuously vulnerable to a variety of harms that may be inflicted solely on them by hostile public
authorities. For example, there can be no doubt that racial segregation
in public schools in the South was established and maintained primarily for the purpose of perpetuating an inferior educational system for
blacks. This was but a part of a deeply rooted cultural system that was
hostile to black dignity and advancement. 23 Likewise, although the role
of segregated schooling in a system intent on gross discrimination
against blacks was not broadcast as blatantly by the laws of the North
and West, it is reasonable to infer from the history and sociology of
blacks in those states that intentional segregation outside the South was
Notwithstanding the degree of controversy concerning the effects of desegregation on minority academic achievement, see supra note 50, it is widely accepted that
desegregation has no adverse impact on the academic achievement of whites. Crain &
Mahard, How DesegregationOrders May Improve Minority Academic Achievement, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 693, 696 (1982). Thus, whatever the aspirations of segregationists, segregation apparently does not secure for white students higher absolute levels
of academic achievement.
12 See Black, supra note 27, at 424-28.
122
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just as pervasive and invidious. 2 4
This systematic vulnerability of black children to discriminatory
treatment in public schools has an additional, objectifiable impact on
black students and parents that contributes to the inherent inequality of
segregated education. 12 5 For black students and parents, intentional
segregation justifiably creates a lack of confidence that invidious racial
discrimination does not or will not operate as a factor in public school
administration. This justifiable lack of confidence in school authorities
reflects the infringement of a constitutional entitlement to fair educational governance.
There is no Supreme Court decision that rests equal protection
doctrine on this tlheory of injury or that establishes fair governance as
See generally REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL
chs. 4-9 (1968) (report of commission formed by President Johnson to investigate the Summer 1967 racial riots in Newark and Detroit).
125 In a brief essay written in 1977, Professor Ronald Dworkin suggests a conception of the minority interest at stake in the school desegregation cases, which, except for
one facet, is very close to the fair governance conception. See Dworkin, supra note 43.
The difference lies in Professor Dworkin's contention that a proper identification of the
harm of segregated schooling does not rest essentially on a "causal judgment" asserting
a relationship between "independent and specifiable phenomena," id. at 21-22, presumably, between segregation and harm. Rather, it rests on an "interpretive judgment"
that nonempirically specifies the meaning of segregation "within the society in which it
occurs," id. Thus, Professor Dworkin states,
We know that de jure segregation is an insult, rather than the product of
equal concern [for blacks and whites], in the same way we know that a
rain dance is religious and not technological, although we [would] have
more confidence in the former than in the latter judgment, because the
community it judges is our own.
Id. at 29.
Contrary to Professor Dworkin's implication, however, society's judgment that
segregation is wrong is justified in part by "causal judgments" based on the observable
correlations between segregated schooling and a variety of adverse impacts on black
students and parents, including the objectively reasonable adverse impact of segregation
on their confidence in impartial school administration. Even if such judgments do not
rely on a precise mechanical model linking segregation to its various harms, relational
judgments linking segregation to harm must play a role in remedial efforts in order to
minimize the arbitrariness in judicial intervention to protect constitutional rights.
Neither the informality nor the incompleteness of the Court's empirical inquiries into
the relationship between segregation and harm renders this inquiry essentially intuitive
or unusual in the law. See Fiss, supra note 47, at 595-96.
Notwithstanding this point of difference, this Article shares Professor Dworkin's
essential perception of the kind of government decisionmaking that produces segregated
schools. Dworkin argues that segregated schooling violates the equal protection clause
because of the "high antecedent probability" that a "political judgment" to segregate
schools does not "fairly reflect the kind of preferences that rightly make up the general
welfare, but . . . [gives] influential expression to preferences based on prejudice."
Dworkin, supra note 43, at 29. Such a decision represents a "corruption" of the political process, id., because the Constitution requires that government, when it makes political decisions, "must treat each individual, as an individual, with equal concern and
respect." Id. at 28. See infra note 128.
124
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the core concern of equal protection. There is thus no single opinion to
demonstrate the authoritativeness of the fair governance theory. In the
one post-Brown opinion to attempt an express reconceptualization of
the purposes of school desegregation remedies, however, Justice Powell
isolated a justifiable lack of confidence in nondiscriminatory decisionmaking as the basis for a redefinition of the right at stake in school
desegregation cases in both de jure and de facto settings:
I would now define [the right derived from Brown I] as the
right, derived from the Equal Protection Clause, to expect
that once the State has assumed responsibility for education,
local school boards will operate integrated school systems
within their respective districts ...
[In] an integrated school system . . . all citizens and
pupils may justifiably be confident that racial discrimination
is neither practiced nor tolerated.1 2
Powell's use of the term "integrated school system" to describe a system
that is reliably nondiscriminatory is confusing because it does not necessarily rest on any requirement for a particular pattern of student attendance, which is part of what the word "integration" typically implies.127 Thus, although the following discussion rests on a conceptual
approach similar to Justice Powell's, it uses the phrase "unfair governance" to describe the harm caused when the administration of a school
system is such as to instill in the minority a reasonable lack of confidence in the public authorities' commitment to nondiscrimination and
"fair governance" to describe the condition to be restored in a system
where unfair governance has prevailed.
Beyond Justice Powell's discussion, the implication that the equal
protection clause guarantees citizens a form of governance sufficiently
sensitive to all persons' interests to justify reasonable confidence in nondiscriminatory decisionmaking resonates in the Supreme Court's constitutional equal protection jurisprudence generally. 28 It is implicit both
126 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 225-26 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
127 Indeed, notwithstanding his recommended abandonment of the de facto/de jure
distinction, Justice Powell has strongly criticized the degree to which the Court has
permitted the value of racial balance to interfere with local policies of neighborhood
schooling. See id. at 242-53; Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444
U.S. 437, 445-52 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari).
128 Justice Stone's well-known footnote number four in United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), is the seminal suggestion in fourteenth amendment
jurisprudence that heightened judicial scrutiny should be undertaken when ordinary
political processes may not be relied upon to protect minorities. On the footnote's impli-
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in the notion of guardianship that the words "equal protection" evoke
and in equal protection doctrine as elaborated by the Court. That doctrine not only requires government to proffer reasons for distributing
goods differently to different constituencies, but requires substantial or
even compelling reasons to justify discrimination against historically
victimized groups. The judicial demand for such justifications is a safeguard on behalf of disadvantaged groups to ensure that they are not
being handicapped by majoritarian prejudice and exclusion.
The elaboration of overarching constitutional philosophy is, of
course, not the Court's traditional task. Given the Court's historic reserve in deciding constitutional questions,"2 9 there is no single opinion
setting forth a comprehensive philosophy of equal protection. This may
be why the fair governance conception of equal protection is most fully
articulated in dicta in Steele v; Louisville & Nashville Railroad,130 a
pre-Brown pi case involving statutory interpretation. Steele held that,
under the Railway Labor Act,"3 2 a railroad union charged with the
representation of black non-union railroad employees may not discrimications for Brown I, see generally Cover, The Origins ofJudicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982). One noted commentator has argued
that the legitimate role of judicial review under the equal protection clause is solely to
police the mechanisms of representation, and not to impose on state governments any
substantive conception of equality. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 135-79
(1980).
A more substantive version of a representation-reinforcing conception of equal
protection, which is more closely akin to the theory of this Article, suggests that the
equal protection clause prohibits governmental resource and opportunity allocations
that are based on prejudice. Dworkin, supra note 43, at 28-31. Governmental decisions
tainted by prejudice are "unprincipled" because they cannot be defended on the basis of
validly determined "public values." Sunstein, Public Values, PrivateInterests, and the
Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 128.
It is hoped that this Article offers fruitful lines of thought for broad inquiries (my
own and others') into the nature of the equal protection guarantee, see infra note 267,
and the role of fairness in governance generally. It should be noted, however, that this
Article does not attempt to address these broad inquiries systematically, in large part
because the utility of the fair governance approach to desegregation does not depend on
their outcome.
Bolstering the effectiveness of representation in our republican form of government
is not a goal that is confined to equal protection cases or to cases decided under clauses
of the Constitution explicitly regulating governmental procedures. On "representation
enforcement" in dormant commerce clause cases and in cases decided under the privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, see generally, Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982).
129
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (setting forth seven categories of cases in which the Court has had jurisdiction but has avoided passing on constitutional questions).
130 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
131 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1S2 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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nate against the black workers in collective bargaining. 33 The terms in
which the Court describes the statutory bargaining obligation of union
representatives to minority workers express the notion of fair governance as described above:
[T]he [union] representative is clothed with power not unlike
that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate
against the rights of those for whom it legislates and which is
also under an affirmative constitutional duty equally to protect those rights ...
[Ilt is a principle of general application that the exercise
of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the
assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in
their interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power will
not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for
whom it is exercised unless so expressed.
We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes . . . at
least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the
members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for
whom it legislates. Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the
rights of those whom it represents, but it has also imposed on
the representative a corresponding duty . . . to exercise
fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for
1
whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against them. 4
The Court went on to say that fair union representation does not require that all union decisions favor all workers equally all the time. 3 5
Any given decision may advance the common good, even though not
advancing each individual's interest. The union's duty rather is "to represent non-union or minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith. 1 3 8
Steele imposes a statutory duty of fair governance that should be
constitutionally required of legislatures. Using power derived from the
consent of the governed, and acting as the exclusive providers of public
Steele, 323 U.S. at 204.
Id. at 198, 202-03 (citation omitted).
135 See id. at 203.
113Id. at 204.
13

134
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education, state authorities should be deemed to have fiduciary responsibilities to parents and students. Given such a duty, it is possible to
characterize the violation involved in Brown I as the failure to represent
minority students "without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially,
and in good faith." The remedy, in turn, should instill fair governance
as a means of protecting the minority's expectation interest in a system
of government that will administer the schools nondiscriminatorily and
that thus reasonably deserves the minority's confidence.
By "hostile discrimination," it should be understood that the Court
is condemning an unfair form of decisionmaking whether or not based
on actual animus. The collective bargaining agreement challenged in
Steele disadvantaged black railroad firemen explicitly, but the Supreme
Court did not indicate that it regarded the agreement as evidence of
subjective hostility or proof of such motivation as relevant. From the
victims' perspective, it is critical that hostile discrimination be interpreted to encompass not only discrimination deriving from animus, but
also discrimination based on the systematic insensitivity of power holders to the victims' needs and preferences. Such an interpretation reflects
the famous insight of John Stuart Mill:
We need not suppose that when power resides in an
exclusive class, that class will knowingly and deliberately
sacrifice the other classes to themselves: it suffices that, in the
absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the excluded
is always in danger of being overlooked; and, when looked
at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the persons
13 7
whom it directly concerns.

Focusing on the harm of unfair governance fully justifies the statement in Brown I that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal, "38 even though not all separate educational facilities stand as insults to racial minorities. Blacks and other minorities have, indeed,
experimented with minority-only education programs designed to respond to particular cultural traditions."3 9 Such experiments are not
237 Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, in THREE ESSAYS 18788 (1975).
1 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
139 See, e.g., Comment, Alternative Schools for Minority Students: The Constitution, The Civil Rights Act and the Berkeley Experiment, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 858

(1973); see also sources cited supra note 54.
Recognizing that the cultural value of black institutions results from black participation in their inception and management raises a central issue regarding the fair governance approach to school desegregation remedies: Is judicial intervention intended to
create reasonable minority confidence in fair governance as legitimate once black voters
succeed through the political process in securing black participation on school boards
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stigmatizing because the institutions were created by minorities, even
though the existence of such institutions may testify to a past history of
racial discrimination. They were established, designed, and maintained
to serve minority needs and to foster minority progress.
The value of these institutions for those they serve stems from participation in their inception and maintenance. Indeed, it seems apparent
that minority participation in such institutions is the key to their value.
By contrast, the heart of the injury in state-compelled racially segregated schooling is the element of involuntariness or powerlessness in the
subjection of blacks to a discriminatory school system over which they
have no effective influence and that expresses a racial hierarchy.
If unfair governance is recognized as the key to inequality in
Brown I, other elements of the Court's broad discussion take on additional meaning. Blacks suffer not from separation from the majority
culture per se, but from a forced and degrading estrangement from
it.1 40 Black students are taught their inferior status not only through
racial separateness or the application to blacks of a label of inferiority,
but also through the state's active intervention to create artificial separation. Segregation is an insult not so much because black children
would be better off going to school with whites; the objective insult lies
largely in the minority's powerlessness to partake of an educational
program that is not hostile to the minority.
Closely connected to the pervasive element of involuntariness in
the establishment of segregation is the majority's use of racial separateand in state legislatures? In the near term, the answer is affirmative. Even if, in some
cities, blacks control the school board or mayor's office, black-dominated political agencies are still subject to the control of white-dominated political agencies at the state and
national level and to the influence of extrapolitical powers, such as banks and industry,
which make it impossible to translate numerical power immediately into substantive
political changes. Fiss, supra note 100, at 152-53. The Supreme Court has thus been
unwilling to limit judicial solicitude for the protection of minority rights even when the
"governing majority" in a particular jurisdiction consists of members of the "minority"
group. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499-500 (1977).
Over time, of course, one hopes that an ongoing history of government that is
routinely sensitive to black interests will allow relaxed judicial scrutiny of political decisions that affect blacks adversely. At that time, the scope of a school board's legal obligations may change to reflect the new egalitarian society.
140 The claim that separateness is forced on a particular group is central to the
debate over the "inherent inequality" of separateness in other contexts as well. Compare Chamallas, Exploring the "Entire Spectrum" of DisparateTreatment Under Title VII: Rules Governing Predominantly FemaleJobs, 1984 ILL. L. REV. 1 (low status
and pay imposed on "women's work" renders sex-segregated work "inherently unequal") with Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Protection
of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 1050-54 (1981)
(defending federal support of Indian reservation development as contributing to Native
American autonomy in part because the residential segregation of Native Americans is
not compulsory).
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ness to facilitate the disparate treatment of blacks. The institutional
separation of whites and blacks not only instills in blacks a knowledge
of the majority's belief in their inferiority, it also enables white authorities more easily to provide black students with less qualified teachers,
poorer facilities, insufficient transportation, and inadequate programs.
Such material inequality in schooling may, in turn, help to legitimate
inequality in all aspects of life, thus extending the harm of unfair governance beyond the specific context of education. Blacks also suffer
under segregated schooling from a sustained subjugation to political
decisionmaking processes intent on ensuring that their resources remain
inferior. Thus, their powerlessness is a double burden: it both transforms racial separateness into an insult and attests to the continuing
vulnerability of the segregated minority to government discrimination
facilitated by separateness.
Although the lack of fair governance is a profound harm in itself,
judicial concentration on remedying the harm of unfair governance is
likely to provide remedies for other harms of segregated schooling as
well. After all, the crucial measure of the utility of any possible fair
governance remedy 41 will be its probable effectiveness in promoting
official sensitivity to the educational interests of all persons in the community. In choosing among possible procedural or structural norms for
fair governance, courts should therefore focus on measures that appear
most likely to avoid any of the substantive harms that are suspected to
result from segregated schooling. It is the supposed connection between
norms of fair process or structure and the achievement of substantive
fairness that makes fair governance an appropriate remedy for the lack
of black confidence in educational decisionmaking by school authorities
in segregated districts.
Recognizing that fair governance may achieve other desirable goals
does not mean that courts, instead of striving for fair governance,
should shift their remedial focus to more substantively defined goals,
such as equal educational achievement or equal resource "inputs." It is
difficult to articulate specific substantive criteria for equality in formerly segregated school systems that both command broad support and
are capable of implementation through mechanisms more direct than a
fair governance approach."4 2 Unlike the elaboration of substantive cri141

On the design of fair governance remedies, see infra sections IIC and IIIA-

IID.
142 It is sometimes urged that courts enforce a substantive right to equal education
for minorities, either as the proper implementation of Brown I, see Bell, Civil Rights

Commitment and the Challenge of Changing Conditions in Urban School Cases, in
RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CIrY 194, 201 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman & C.
Schelling eds. 1981) (urging remedial stress on effective school leadership, close paren-
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teria for equality, however, it is a manageable task for courts to specify
procedural and structural norms for the governance of school systems
that would facilitate policy decisions untainted by prejudice and, thus,
would be generally acceptable to blacks in the long run on substantive
grounds as well.
Focusing on unfair governance as the inherent harm of segregated
schooling may seem akin to explaining Brown I in terms of the objective stigma of intentional segregation. Conceptualizing the inherent
harm of intentional segregation as unfair governance rather than as objective stigma, however, may yield two significant advantages for the
elaboration of a remedial theory.
First, recognizing the harm as unfair governance may better direct
attention to the problem that needs redress in the school cases: the continuing vulnerability of minority children to policymaking that is hostile or otherwise insensitive to minority interests. Although no single
remedy suggests itself as the one logically compelled means of correcting unfair governance, the goal of fair governance may provide
more guidance for determining the appropriate scope of a remedy than
does the goal of "counteracting insult."
Second, to understand a desegregation remedy as an attempt to
tal involvement, and "accountable teachers"); Chang, The Bus Stops Here: Defining the

ConstitutionalRight of Equal EducationalOpportunity and an Appropriate Remedial
Process, 63 B.U.L. REv. 1, 58 (1983) (interpreting Brown I as creating a right that
government "ensure that average minority educational performance equals average
white educational performance in essential curricular areas"), or as a right distinct
from the right to nonsegregated education, see Kutner, Keyes v. School District Num-

ber One: A Constitutional Right to Equal Educational Opportunity?, 8 J.L. & EDUC.
1 (1979) (urging judicial scrutiny of arbitrary disparities in educational inputs for minorities). The difficulties that would attend an attempt to formulate and implement any
criterion of substantive educational equality are addressed at length in Cohen, Defining
Racial Equality in Education, 16 UCLA L. REv. 255 (1969); see also Kirp, Community Control, Public Policy, and the Limits of Law, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1355, 1367
(1970).
Intriguingly, two prolific writers on desegregation and minority academic achievement have recently written that the one remedy courts are competent to implement and
that is likely to promote minority educational achievement, is the implementation of
desegregation monitoring provisions that will make data publicly available on the quality of education in the system's schools. See Crain & Mahard, How DesegregationOrders May Improve Minority Academic Achievement, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 693
(1982). This remedy, and its proponents' rationale, id. at 714-33, are consistent with a
fair governance orientation to desegregation remedies. See infra text accompanying
notes 241-42.
As this Article discusses, however, see infra text accompanying notes 232-38, even
a remedial approach focused broadly on fair governance may have to include substantive policy requirements. This is either because certain substantive steps may be needed
to help assure the effectiveness of the more process-oriented elements of a fair governance order or because, given the facts of a particular case, there are no process-oriented
remedies available that are sufficient to generate reasonable confidence that nondiscriminatory policies will be followed by school authorities.
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instill fair governance and, thereby, to redress black students' and parents' reasonable lack of confidence in nondiscriminatory school administration is to conceive of that remedy as an attempt to redress an objectifiable adverse impact on the injured parties. This is likely to invite a
more narrowly channeled and, therefore, more acceptable judicial role
than is an attempt to decree arbitrarily the measure of official endorsement for racial integration that adequately counteracts what the court
construes as the insult inherent in an intentionally segregative act.
Spelling out the implications of fair governance as the interest to
be protected in school desegregation cases sheds new light on the justifiability of the Supreme Court's decisions and may help explain the
Court's rhetoric. The theory does more, however, than illuminate the
possible logic of results that the Supreme Court has justified with other
rationales. The fair governance theory provides a basis for exposing
deficiencies in the Court's guidance on remedial design. It provides, in
particular, a basis for criticizing the Court's treatment of metropolitan
desegregation, and it suggests legitimate desegregation remedies that are
not yet employed. To put these points in proper perspective, I will pursue the implications of the fair governance theory for five major issues
in school desegregation litigation: (1) the requirement of proof of some
intentional segregation before the imposition of liability; (2) the rules
for proving the existence of a dual system; (3) the role of actual integration as a desegregation remedy; (4) the appropriate geographic scope
of desegregation remedies; and (5) the choice of desegregation tools in
cases where intradistrict integration is impracticable and interdistrict
remedies are legally barred.
B. Fair Governance and the De Facto /De Jure Distinction
I have urged that a minority group's expectation interest in the
fair governance of schools is the interest to be protected through desegregation decrees, and the measure of appropriate protection is the reasonable restoration of minority confidence in nondiscriminatory school
administration. Should relief then be limited to cases in which acts of
intentional segregation can be proven, or should the de facto/de jure
distinction be abandoned as irrelevant to the issue of fair governance?
Would the difficulty in reconciling a theory of remedial design based on
the harms cited in Brown I with the de facto/de jure distinction pose an
equal doctrinal obstacle to the Supreme Court's acceptance of fair governance as the interest to be protected in school desegregation cases? To
answer these questions, it is necessary to decide whose perspective will
be used to determine whether a violation of constitutional right has occurred. Assuming that the Court has several relevant perspectives
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before it, it becomes critical to decide the manner in which these viewpoints are to be reconciled.
If the Court were to adjudicate rights entirely according to the
victims' perspective, the right to fair governance in schooling would imply more than a right to be free from intentional segregation. At the
extreme, one could imagine victims of discrimination advocating a rule
of law that any person is entitled to some judicial relief if that person
demonstrates a sincere lack of confidence in the fairness of educational
decisionmaking. It is easy to see, however, that such a rule of law
would soon undermine the presumed authority of elected officials to
make educational policy. Because every government act can be viewed
as disadvantaging some persons, every such act may prompt someone's
sincere lack of confidence in government. Allowing one person's sincere
lack of confidence to trigger judicial relief against any government decision would impede stable decisionmaking.
A less extreme rule, however, would be to grant judicial relief to
any person who could point to a particular event as justifying a reasonable lack of confidence, not only on the plaintiff's part, but on the part
of all members of an identifiable protected class. Courts would not
grant relief solely upon demonstrations of personal distress, but would
grant relief based on the proof of events that are widely known to have
a high probability of manifesting unfair governmental decisionmaking.
Once an event, such as intentionally created segregated schooling, was
regarded as having such a high probability of taint, subsequent plaintiffs would not need to reprove that probability, but would only need to
show the existence of the suspicious event in each case.
The Supreme Court's current doctrine embodies just such a rule.
From the victim's perspective, however, the requirement that intentional segregation be proved as the event manifesting likely government
unfairness erects an unjustified barrier to relief. Justice Powell argued
in Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1, Denver, Colo.14 3 for the abandonment
of the requirement of proof of intentional segregation because difficulties of proof might lead to inconsistent results in different regions of the
country, which would not be justified given the uniform interests of
minority plaintiffs. It could be urged even more directly that black
plaintiffs can reasonably doubt the fair governance of schools as an historical matter based on indicia far easier to prove than intentional segregation. Given this country's racial history, black parents might reasonably doubt the fairness of educational administration in any racially
243

part).

413 U.S. 189, 223-36 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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imbalanced school system that is or ever was under predominantly
white control. If reasonable confidence in fair governance is to be the
measure of appropriate desegregation relief and if that measure is to be
gauged solely from the perspective of the victims of segregation, it
should be enough to establish liability that the attendance pattern in a
school district is racially imbalanced and that the school system was
subject to white control at some point during the existence of such
imbalance.
Reasons exist, however, why the Court is unlikely to adopt this
perspective as the governing perspective from which the scope of constitutional rights is to be determined in school desegregation cases. Aside
from factors of personal ideology and political climate that would make
such a result unlikely,"" this victims' perspective fundamentally challenges the model of intentional tort litigation most familiar to the Justices. The rhetoric of the Court's desegregation opinions may be interpreted as attempting to confine an expansive view of victims' rights
within a tort framework involving particular injured parties, charging
certain named wrongdoers with particularized injuries that are attributable to those wrongdoers through a discernible causal chain. 4 5 Each
aspect of this familiar framework may now have only an attenuated
relationship to the form and substance of most current desegregation
cases. 46 The points of attenuation, however, may have been less clear
to the Court when it first adopted the tort model, and, in any event, a
full-fledged victims' perspective would not fit easily within any other
14 7
traditional model of litigation.
Even if the victims' perspective did fit more comfortably within
familiar forms of litigation, there may be reasons why it should not be
the sole perspective from which the measure of constitutional rights
should be gauged. Under our constitutional system, it is impossible to
ignore the presumptive authority of democratically elected officials in
government decisionmaking. One means for respecting majoritarianism
See generally Freeman, supra note 23.
See Fiss, supra note 45, at 35.
146 See generally Kirp, Legalism and Politics in School Desegregation, 1981 Wis.
L. REV. 924.
144

145

147 This point originated with Professor Martha Minow. Tort law has, of course,
developed strict liability as a model for litigation that escapes problems of correlating
particular injuries with particular blameworthy wrongdoers. The strict liability goal of
spreading losses to those most able to bear them, however, seems inapposite to the
desegregation context, in which the victims bear much of the remedial burden. A
thoughtful attempt to reconceptualize public law litigation that takes account of the
implicit departures of the desegregation cases from the traditional model of civil litigation is Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv.
1281 (1976).
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without unduly compromising constitutional values of equality is to
make the threshold for liability either a particularized showing of majority unfairness or the existence of some event that a majority recognizes as manifesting a high probability of unfairness. Intentional segregation, although not racial imbalance per se, is now understood by an
overwhelming majority of Americans as manifesting virtually a certainty of antecedent prejudice, and proof of such segregation is therefore a defensible requirement for the imposition of liability in school
desegregation cases.
Adhering to the de facto/de jure distinction increases, however, the
risk that some unfair governance of schools will not be remedied. Cases
of unfair governance may exist in which no intentional segregation can
be proved, and the Court has not yet approved any alternative standard
for proving prima facie unfairness. 4 8 For this reason, the fair governance theory might seem to require us to reject the de facto/de jure distinction. The difficulties are much the same as with theories of remedy
based on harms to black children's educational achievements, adult life
chances, and personality development. Under any of these theories,
proof of government inaction in the face of a high degree of even adventitious segregation might seem a more appropriate factual trigger for
government liability.
The possibility that the de facto/de jure distinction may erect too
high a barrier to government liability prompts two comments about the
utility of the fair governance theory, even if the distinction survives.
The first pertains to the theory's usefulness in shaping the rhetoric of
judicial decisions in school desegregation cases. For those who criticize
the de facto/de jure distinction, judicial acceptance of the fair governance theory might shift the doctrinal debate to more fruitful territory
for analysis. Under the fair governance theory, judicial observance of
the de facto/de jure distinction would be given a specific, and therefore
debatable, justification; namely, that intentional segregation is an appropriate signal that government conduct has been tainted by prejudice.
Supreme Court adoption of the fair governance theory would invite
continuing judicial attention to the question whether other phenomena
are equally demonstrative of government unfairness. In contrast, the
conception of the remedial process manifested in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman14 9 [Dayton I] submerges the question of what harm
is to be remedied in school desegregation cases and thus obscures the
148 It is also conceivable, though it seems far less likely, that cases exist of past
segregation in school districts that, without judicial intervention, are now administered
with the utmost sensitivity to black students.
149

433 U.S. 406 (1977).
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question whether the Court's liability rules are justified.
The second point relates to the practical significance of the de
facto/de jure distinction, which depends on the rules for proving intentional segregation. The applicable evidentiary rules could either make
the right to fair governance extremely easy or else virtually impossible
to enforce. One way to characterize the developments from Keyes
through Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman1'" [Dayton II] is to
view the evolving doctrine as a preservation of the de facto/de jure distinction that is nonetheless sensitive to the dangers of leaving government unfairness unremedied because of difficulties of proof. The fair
governance theory is helpful in reconciling the Brown I liability doctrine with the remedial consequences of the Court's post-Brown IP1M
decisions by providing a more persuasive justification for the rules of
Keyes and Dayton II than the narrow Dayton I conception of school
desegregation remedies based on incremental distortions in patterns of
attendance.
When intentional segregation occurs, it may be regarded generally
as probative of a lack of fair governance. Specifically, it implies official
intent to use racial separation, even adventitious racial separation, to
facilitate the disparate treatment of black students.1 "2 Given our nation's racial history, any significant intentional racial segregation is a
reasonable ground for losing confidence in nondiscriminatory policymaking by school authorities. Indeed, given our historical experience,
it is difficult to understand why white school authorities would try to
create racial separation at all if the officials' objective were truly to
provide equal educational opportunity for black students.
It is, therefore, a reasonable inference that, whenever school authorities intentionally segregate a substantial portion of a school district, all racially separate schools in that district reinforce the condition
of unfair governance. If school authorities act intentionally to create
racially separate schools to facilitate disparate treatment, the minority
community can reasonably expect the authorities to rely on even adventitious racial imbalance to accomplish the same discriminatory purposes. Absent compelling proof that racial imbalance in some schools is
neither the product nor the instrument of unfair discrimination, it is
justifiable when some significant intentional segregation is proven to
433 U.S. 526 (1979).
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
115 On remand in Keyes, the district court stated, "The affirmative evidence is...
that defendants' actions in Park Hill are reflective of its attitude toward the school
system generally." Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 368 F. Supp. 207, 210 (D. Colo. 1973),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
1c0
115
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include all of a district's racially imbalanced schools in a Keyes-type
remedy. Only by removing the condition that the authorities have indicated they will use to effect discrimination can a system of fair governance be achieved.
Correspondingly, our historical experience may be such that, once
significant intentional segregation occurs, black students and parents,
can legitimately doubt the good faith of school authorities until those
authorities affirmatively undo the system by which black students have
been made vulnerable to discriminatory treatment. That is, the skepticism of minority parents about the uses of racial separation in any district that has ever been subject to significant intentional segregation
may be so justified that school authorities should now be liable to provide a fair governance remedy even if the most significant segregative
acts antedated Brown L
These justifications for the results in Keyes and Columbus Board
of Education v. Penick15 are not beyond debate, but at least the debate
they might raise would focus on what truly is at stake in those
cases-the implementation of public school governance that reasonably
deserves the confidence of all persons subject to it. Unlike the narrow
conception of remedies articulated in Dayton I, the fair governance approach should not appear artificial or inattentive to the facts or competing interests that those cases present.
C.

Fair Governance and the Remedial Importance of Integration

Although the fair governance theory can be reconciled with the
Supreme Court's decisions on the scope of school board liability for
desegregation relief, the theory goes beyond the Court's decisions in
terms of the remedial tools it suggests. Most important, a strong case
can be made that, under the fair governance theory, integration should
be the remedial tool of first resort for redressing systematic discrimination against black students.
For purposes of clarity in explaining this point, it is necessary to
provide definitions for two recurring terms-"racial balance" and "integration"-that may misleadingly be regarded as interchangeable.
"Racial balance," the Supreme Court's preferred remedial strategy,
means the reassignment of students throughout a public school district
to prevent, to whatever degree possible, the concentration of minority
students residing within the district in racially identifiable schools.
Thus, if a district is seventy percent white and thirty percent black, the
53 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
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goal of racial balance would be the rough approximation of that ratio
in as many schools as possible. It is critical to note, however, that racial
balance need not imply significant interracial education unless the racial composition within the district could permit it. That is, if a school
district is ninety percent black, racial balance cannot afford most black
pupils the opportunity for interracial education.'" "Integration," in the
following discussion, means something different from mere racial balance; it means the assignment of majority and minority pupils in such a
way as to assure substantial interracial contact in each school. Therefore, for example, the lower courts' rationale for the necessity of a metropolitan remedy in Milliken v. Bradley155 [Milliken I] can be rephrased as follows: racial balance in Detroit would not produce
integration in Detroit because Detroit had become a nearly all-black
school district.
Integration fosters the goal of fair governance both as a form of
restoration and as a deterrent. As a restorative measure, integration is
designed to undo much of the intended discrimination that went handin-hand with the establishment of segregation. To the extent intentional
segregation instilled in blacks feelings of inferiority, integration restores
the dignity of the minority. To the extent intentional segregation prevented blacks from associating with white students, integration vindicates freedom of association. To the extent intentional and de facto segregation facilitated inequalities in the availability of material resources,
integration prevents white school authorities from distributing resources
to different races in a conspicuously unequal manner.
Integration, however, has an equally critical prophylactic aspect.
First, by dispersing white students throughout a school system, it offers
some guarantee of improved official treatment for blacks. If blacks and
15
Precisely how many districts would face difficulty generating substantial interracial enrollments throughout their schools apparently is not known. For the 1974-75
school year, the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare identified 19
large school districts in which metropolitan desegregation would be needed to place all
minority children in predominantly white schools. G. ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 68-69
(1978). Assuming relative demographic stability, however, intradistrict integration
might still be a realistic goal in a number of these "majority minority" communities
because schools need not be predominantly white to be substantially integrated. A major source of concern, however, is that demographic trends point to an increasing concentration of minority public school enrollment in central cities. Rossell & Hawley,
Understanding White Flight and Doing Something About It, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 157, 157-63 (W. Hawley ed. 1981). As of 1980, 57.2% of all blacks
in the United States lived in central cities as compared to 24.6% of all whites. BUREAU

OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:

1982-83, at 21

(103d ed. 1982). This concentration may indicate increasing difficulty in affording substantial integration in some urban school districts.
155 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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whites attend the same schools, there is a structural incentive for school
authorities intent on benefitting white students to afford distributional
equality to all students attending each school. 156 Second, by creating a
minority presence in each school, integration restructures a school system so as to help assure that blacks have some decisionmaking influence
throughout the formerly segregated district and generates increased
confidence that official decisions will take minority interests into
account.
A significant analytical advantage of the fair governance approach
over the Rehnquist approach in Dayton p57 is that it clarifies the need
for prophylactic relief to protect plaintiffs' expectations of educational
fairness. The fair governance theory recognizes the pervasiveness of the
constitutional evil to be redressed, but it also admits the impossibility of
recreating the precise school system that would have been but for the
unlawful discriminatory acts of school authorities. It follows that the
most appropriate means for achieving reasonable confidence in nondiscriminatory school administration is to fashion a system of governance
in which discrimination will be substantially deterred. Thus, under a
fair governance conception of remedies, the goals of restoration and
prophylaxis merge. The remedial goal of a fair governance decree is
primarily restorative in that the remedy aims to encourage conditions
that would reasonably justify the confidence of minorities in nondiscriminatory school administration. The remedial tools used, however,
are intended to foster fair governance now and in the future.
The merger of a restorative remedial rationale with prophylactic
remedial tools is especially justified in a school desegregation case.
Given the history and pervasiveness of racial discrimination in the
United States, minority communities cannot reasonably be expected to
have faith in school authorities ordered to do nothing more than
mechanically undo particular acts of past injustice. To a large degree,
the opportunity to atone for the past losses suffered by students and
parents has long passed. To compensate the current minority community, the historical slate must, in a more emphatic way, be wiped clean.
Formerly segregated communities should seek a structure of school governance that promises a new pattern of educational decisionmaking 5 8
156

School-by-school integration may be insufficient to generate equal treatment

and distributional equality in the schools. The landmark case on intraschool inequali-

ties is Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393
U.S. 801 (1968), which condemned the District of Columbia "track" system. On other
potential sources of intraschool discrimination, see W. HAWLEY, supra note 4, at 97135.

IMSee supra text accompanying note 83.
58 One might object that such an approach would go beyond Supreme Court pre-
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These justifications for integration as a fair governance tool highlight the critical distinction between integration and the conventional
goal of racial balance that may appear in particular cases. If racial
balance does not entail integration, then the restorative and prophylactic purposes of the desegregation remedy under a fair governance theory will be largely undermined. That is, because the remedial goal of
fair governance is not merely the repair of an artificially distorted pattern of school attendance, it is not a sufficient remedial strategy to redistribute temporarily a small percentage of white students in a school
district throughout the system. To assure fair governance, integration
must proffer some hope of sustained interracial education throughout
the school system. Hence, integration will be a sufficient remedy only if
there is substantial representation of both white and black student
groups in each school and if the pattern of integrated attendance has
15
some chance of lasting.

9

cedent in affording the right of minority students to particular results in education,
rather than to an undoing of a particular history of unconstitutional conduct. It could
be argued that the purpose of the de facto/de jure distinction is precisely to confine the
conception of rights in school desegregation cases to an historically-based principle. See
generally Fletcher, The DiscretionaryConstitution:InstitutionalRemedies andJudicial
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 673-79 (1982) (noting the Court's reluctance to choose
between historical and end-result principles for determining whether a constitutional
violation has occurred).
Such an objection, however, would misconstrue the utility of the distinction between "historical principles" and "end-result principles," R. NozIcK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 153-55 (1974), in analyzing desegregation remedies. Because only
the unconstitutional conduct of public school authorities triggers the prospect of the
kind of fair governance decree being considered here, the fair governance approach is
historically based. To reach the question of remedial design, however, it is necessary to
depart from the historical focus of the suit to recognize the impracticality of establishing
fair governance by attempting to refashion a school system merely by undoing certain
historical acts of discrimination. The resulting remedial emphasis on deterrence need
not, however, undermine the historical basis of the remedy. Even if the fair governance
approach requires courts to assess the adequacy of remedies according to their likely
success in achieving a broadly conceived "end-result" of fair educational governance in
the future, the degree of protection against discrimination may still be determined according to the school authorities' past performance. See infra text accompanying notes
212-19. That is, the more frequent and pervasive the proven acts of discrimination in a
given school system, the more a court will be justified in intervening to prevent future
unfair governance. Thus, the fair governance approach to remedial design is reconcilable with the historical focus of the post-Brown I cases.
159 Cf Gewirtz, supra note 23, at 641 & n.145. This Article refers recurringly to
problems of black students and parents and relies chiefly on this country's history of
race relations to justify its emphasis on fair governance. As the Supreme Court recognized in Keyes, however, Hispanics are also an identifiable class for purposes of equal
protection analysis, and the history of educational inequity common to both blacks and
Hispanics justifies Keyes-type relief for segregated Hispanics as well. See Keyes, 413
U.S. at 197-98. Concentration on the experience of blacks to justify the fair governance
theory in this Article should not be read to imply that the approach is less useful when
other groups are victims of intentional segregation.
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Integration should be the remedy of first resort not only because of
its utility, but also because of its legitimacy in principle. A remedy is
both a response to particular parties' injuries and also a judicial instrument imposed on public school authorities and on a complex social institution-the public school system. For this reason, there are considerations of institutional legitimacy with which remedial design must also
be concerned. The problem of legitimacy is implicated in the remedial
process, for example, because any judicial desegregation decree represents the intervention of an unelected and nonexpert agency into the
policymaking realm of persons normally vested with educational decisionmaking power on behalf of a particular community.
From this perspective, however, integration becomes especially attractive as a principled compromise among the various viewpoints on
legitimacy that are most likely to surface in a desegregation case. In
order to accommodate the value of majoritarianism, integration eschews
direct and detailed interference into the substance of educational decisionmaking by defendant school boards. Given the remedy's ambitious
task, this represents a profound concession to local autonomy. Although
integration appeared to be a radical form of intervention in the South
in the 1950's and 1960's, it most directly alters only the structure of
governance. In terms of dictating particular educational policy outcomes, it is a highly restrained measure.
On the other hand, integration forcefully accommodates what is
likely to be the victim class's prime criterion for legitimacy: the guarantee of a fair educational process for minority students. If it were possible to specify with precision and to implement any prevailing substantive standard for what equal education should mean for each student,
the remedial focus on government process might seem too modest. 60
Absent such a standard, however, integration vindicates minority educational interests in powerful ways. It erects a pattern of school attendance that does not reflect an antecedent pattern of prejudice, deprives
school authorities of a primary mechanism for dealing with minority
students in bad faith, helps assure that black students will benefit from
distributional decisions that benefit white students, and eliminates other
risks of harm inherent in racial imbalance per se. In sum, integration
vindicates legitimate concerns of both plaintiffs and defendants.
Given the apparent legitimacy of integration, it is not surprising
that at least racial balance, typically implemented through busing, has
been the federal courts' remedy of first resort. Indeed, the Supreme
Court's desegregation opinions in Keyes, Columbus, and Dayton II can
"0 See supra note 142.
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be reinterpreted as relying on racial balance as a two-edged approach
to relieve state-imposed segregation. On one hand, the Court implicitly
makes an effort to undo discriminatory systems of school governance in
which blacks were subjected to school authorities intent on treating
them unequally. On the other hand, the Court's choice of racial balance
as a remedial technique indicates a desire to inculcate new norms of
institutional behavior in school systems without seeming to take over
the governance of formerly segregated schools.
There are two differences, then, between the fair governance orientation and the Supreme Court's approach to busing. First, the fair
governance theory offers a different and more persuasive explanation
for the utility and legitimacy of student reassignment remedies. Second,
if student reassignment is to be the primary remedy in a particular
case, the fair governance theory stresses the importance of establishing
integration, not merely racial balance.
D.

Milliken v. Bradley: The Conflict of the Goal of Fair
Governance and the Value of Local Autonomy

The importance of integration as a remedial tool to achieve fair
governance supports the use of interdistrict integration to remedy segregation in a district in which intradistrict integration is not possible. The
desirability of that remedy, in turn, raises what the Court has treated
as a key problem of remedial legitimacy: the conflict between judicial
intervention in public school systems so as to protect constitutional
rights and the legitimate autonomy of local school boards to govern
their own school systems.1 61
In the Detroit desegregation litigation the conflicting values of fair
governance and deference to local authority collided. An assessment of
the consequences of Milliken I for the implementation of fair governance standards in school districts outside the South, and in large cities
generally, requires a review of the facts of the case.
On April 7, 1970, the Detroit Board of Education voluntarily
adopted a racial balance plan for twelve of the twenty-one high schools
in Detroit. Under the plan, the high schools would have been desegregated grade-by-grade over a three-year period. 6 2 At that time, De161 Stephen B. Kanner has argued that the Court's very articulation of a narrowly
compensatory or restorative purpose for school desegregation remedies represents an
appropriate compromise between competing values of remedial efficacy and local autonomy. See Kanner, From Denver to Dayton: The Development of a Theory of Equal
Protection Remedies, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 382, 385 (1977).
18' Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 232-33 (6th Cir. 1976), afjfd, 433 U.S.
267 (1977).
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troit's public school enrollment overall was 63.6% black."6 3 On July 7,
1970, however, Michigan's governor, William G. Milliken, signed into
law legislation that blocked implementation of all local attendance provisions adopted by boards of education for the 1970-71 school year,
pendifig the advent of new "first class school district" boards of education. 6 4 A first class school district was defined as a district with over
100,000 students.1 6 5 Detroit was the only such district in the state. 66
Before the new school year, a recall election removed from Detroit's Board of Education the four-member majority that had adopted
the racial balance plan. Governor Milliken appointed four replacements who, together with the incumbents, rescinded the plan."6 In August 1970, the Detroit NAACP, together with individual parents and
students, filed a class action to declare the 1970 act unconstitutional
and to secure desegregation under the terms of the board's plan. Litigation began and interlocutory questions went before the court of appeals.
In late September 1971, the district court found that the Detroit schools
were unconstitutionally segregated under policies adopted and implemented by state and local officials.1 6 '
Hearings on appropriate relief were conducted from March 28
through April 14 of 1972. On June 14, 1972, the district court appointed a panel to design an integration plan for Detroit and for fiftythree of its neighboring school districts on the ground that intradistrict
busing would not accomplish effective desegregation. The court of appeals affirmed on June 12, 1973, over three years after the Detroit
Board of Education had originally voted to adopt racial balance in the
high schools voluntarily.16 9
In July 1974, the Supreme Court voted five to four to overturn the
court of appeals decision and to remand for the design of intradistrict
relief only.170 The Court held that the neighboring districts could not
be incorporated into the plan absent a finding that each district had
perpetrated a constitutional violation that produced "a significant segre"'8Id. at 233. The district court incorrectly reported that black enrollment was
63.8%. See Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 586 (E.D. Mich. 1971), afJ'd, 484
F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
184 1970 Mich. Pub. Acts 48, reprinted in Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897,
905-09 (6th Cir. 1970). The occasion of state interference with voluntary local desegre-

gation is not limited to Michigan. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
458 U.S. 457 (1982).
1 5 Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 905 (6th Cir. 1970).
168 Id. at 900.
167 Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 233 (6th Cir. 1976), affd, 433 U.S. 267
(1977).

11" Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 722-24.
169

Id. at 733-35.

170

Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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gative effect" in Detroit.171 In doing so, the Court, in its desire to respect the integrity of local authority and governmental structure, fully
overcame any value that earlier cases had implicitly placed on the ideal
of fair governance.
The starting point of the majority's analysis was the uncontested
fact that no suburban school district was guilty of any proven wrongdoing. " 2 The Court then deduced that the only reason for joining the
suburban districts in the remedy was the lower courts' aim to "produce
the racial balance which they perceived as desirable.' 173 This aim, the
majority said, misconstrued the nature of the plaintiffs' right, which
"does not require any particular racial balance in each 'school, grade or
classroom.' "174 The plaintiffs' right, the majority said, was to attend a
"unitary school system" within the school district in which they resided.' 5 Consequently, the initial premise-that no wrongdoing was
proved against any other district-along with the fact that no proven
intentional discrimination underlay the initial drawing of the district
lines, led the Court to its conclusion: no district other than Detroit
could be joined to vindicate the rights of plaintiffs living in Detroit.
The majority's analysis appears to be syllogistic, but its first deduction from its factual premise is fundamentally wrong. The analysis
rests on the deduction that the inclusion of the suburban districts could
be justified only by positing that plaintiffs have a right to a particular
racial balance in the school they attend. The existence of such a right
need not have been assumed by the plaintiffs, by the district court, or
by the court of appeals, in order to justify interdistrict relief. A sufficient assumption is that plaintiffs have the right to a racial balance
remedy that includes a sufficient degree of racial integration to guarantee that black children will, in the future, be treated as well as white
children by the governing state and local school authorities. Unless racial balance accomplishes substantial integration, black children are
likely to remain as isolated and as susceptible to discrimination as
before.
Nondiscrimination, not a particular ratio of whites and blacks,
was, in fact, the district court's overriding goal.'1 6 Although the Su744-46.
745.
740.
1
740-41 (quoting Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 918 (1972)).
175
746.
176 [I]nsofar as pupil assignments are concerned, the system of public
schooling in every state must be operated in a racially non-discriminatory,
unified fashion; until that objective is met, the very system of public
schooling constitutes an invidious racial classification. The adoption of an
171
172
173

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
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preme Court in Milliken I said, "The target of the Brown holding was
. . .the elimination of state-mandated or deliberately maintained dual
school systems," 1 " it again failed to consider the constitutional rationale for the abolition of those systems. If the rationale is deemed to be
the vindication of the plaintiffs' right to fair or nondiscriminatory governance, that rationale supplies convincing justification for the lower
courts' approach.
The justification for including suburban school districts in a remedy for Detroit is twofold. First, as explained above, racial balance
must entail sufficient racial integration to assure fair governance by
school authorities. The steady egress of white students from the Detroit
public schools to the suburbs indicated to the lower courts that any
student reassignment plan confined to Detroit would produce only a
small improvement in the degree of racial mixture in Detroit schools
and classrooms. Consequently, to achieve effective integration, the district court broadened its remedy."'
Second, and just as important, convincing evidence persuaded both
lower courts that state discrimination also required relief.17 9 The July
1970 legislation, which accomplished nothing more than the prevention
of the voluntary desegregation of Detroit's public schools, evidenced the
state's desire to maintain separation between whites and blacks. The
maintenance of segregation was surreptitious but certainly probative of
the state's intent to use racial separation to facilitate the disparate treatment of blacks-an inference that justifies the expansive liability approved in Keyes."" The inference of discriminatory intent was buteducation theory having the effect of maintaining a pattern of de jure segregation is therefore clearly impermissible.
Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 921-22 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1972), modified, 484
F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
17 Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 737.
178 Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 245 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd 418 U.S. 717
(1974).
179

Id. at 238-41.

180 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Court could have
justified state liability for metropolitan desegregation in Milliken I on the same basis as
it imposed districtwide liability in Keyes on school boards responsible for intentional
segregation in a significant portion of a school district. See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 207-11.
That is, since local authorities, whose power derives from the state, have been found
liable for intentional intradistrict segregation, the burden should shift to the state to
show that interdistrict racial imbalance is neither the product nor the instrument of
unfair discrimination. The evidentiary gap linking past state discriminatory practices to
interdistrict racial imbalance can be handled through a presumption no less easily than
the evidentiary gap handled by a presumption in Keyes. See Fiss, supra note 45, at 29
n.25.
The second Milliken opinion, Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), suggests
that the Court might be more willing to impute such remedial responsibility to the state
where the remedies do not entail interdistrict transportation. See id. at 287-90; supra
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tressed by evidence that educational resources in predominantly white
suburban districts throughout Michigan were superior to those available in the predominantly black city district.181 Thus, including suburban districts in a remedy for Detroit could be justified on the ground
that interdistrict racial integration was needed to guarantee local nondiscrimination and on the complementary ground that metropolitan integration was needed to discourage racial discrimination by the state of
Michigan.
The Supreme Court made only passing mention of the state's influence in derailing voluntary desegregation in Detroit. The Court's observation that the plan it sidetracked "had no causal connection with
the distribution of pupils by race between Detroit" and the suburban
school districts182 was true, but, in the light of the fair governance analysis, inapposite.
The Milliken I opinion suggests two countervailing rationales for
the Court's devaluation of the remedial importance of integration. The
first is deference to local autonomy-the traditional practice in many
states of giving local communities extensive decisionmaking power over
schools within a limited geographical area. 1 83 The tradition of local autonomy may reflect both a state's desire to maximize parental input in
school governance and the desire of parents to have children attend
schools close to home. The second rationale appears to be deference to
state-imposed structures of school administration. The Court's concern
in Milliken I was that metropolitan relief might impose administrative
changes on Michigan that would, in turn, "disrupt and alter the structure of public education in Michigan."'"
Neither of the localist values described above finds any more support in the Constitution than do specific prescriptions for school desegregation relief. Milliken II describes Milliken I as articulating only
"appropriate limits of federal equitable authority,"'8 5 not as implementing a specific constitutional mandate. Subsequent commentary has
identified such guidelines for the exercise of judicial discretion in the
design of traditional equitable relief as "extra-constitutional" or "subnote 119. But cf.United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 677 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir.)
(where state is solely responsible for unconstitutional interdistrict segregation, state
must pay entire cost of interdistrict remedy, including the cost of transportation for
integration of extracurricular programs), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 568 (1982).
181 For example, Michigan excluded Detroit from state funding for intradistrict
student transportation, which the state provided to nonurban Michigan school districts.
Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 238 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
182 Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 750.
183 Id. at 741-42.

Id. at 742-43.
185 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 270 (1977).
184
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Whatever the sources of these guidelines, how-

ever, it may be that the Court's reliance on either or both of them will
be crucial in determining whether desegregation relief in the future will
vindicate the right of fair governance implicit in the pre-Milliken I and
post-Dayton I cases.
If the Court relies on the first rationale, espousing popular traditions of local autonomy, a possibility still exists that courts faced with
racial discrimination and unable to secure actual integration within a
local school district might yet design a wide range of intradistrict remedies to effectuate the right to fair governance. If the Court relies, however, on values implicit in deference to state-imposed administrative
structures, implementation of the right of fair governance may be much
more difficult where integration is not feasible. Lower courts may be
forbidden both to attempt integration through interdistrict desegregation and to interfere in other significant ways with the governance
structures of local school systems to secure reasonable confidence in
nondiscrimination.
The argument that Milliken I is concerned chiefly with local autonomy springs from the greater support in case law for the relevance
of such a value. Justice Powell, who voted with the majority in Milliken I, wrote the Court's opinion in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,18 7 cited in Milliken P88 as support for judicial
deference to local control of schools.1 8 Powell's separate concurrence in
Keyes, in which he argues for a conception of plaintiffs' rights in school
desegregation cases broader than that made explicit in Brown 1,190 dis'86 On the impact of "subconstitutional values"-the traditional "equitable principles" referred to in Brown I-on values expressed in constitutional norms, see
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 44-45 (1975). Monaghan argues that the development of a
body of "subconstitutional" law in connection with the general guarantees of due process and equal protection would lead to the judicial creation of liberties without "constitutional reference points." Id. at 45. It is equally possible, as in Milliken I, that "subconstitutional rules" will be usedto circumscribe the enforcement of equal protection.
See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293 (1976) (referring to Milliken I as implementing "fundamental," but textually unstated, "limitations on the remedial powers of
the federal courts to restructure the operation of local and state governmental entities").
But cf. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), affd mem., 423 U.S. 963
(1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 973 (1976) (upholding the metropolitan desegregation of Wilmington, Del., as consistent with Milliken 1).
187

411 U.S. 1 (1973).

188

418 U.S. at 742.

'89 Justice Powell's allegiance to the value of local political control over schooling

may reflect his experience as chairman of the public school board of Richmond, Virginia, from 1952 to 1961. B. WOODWARD & S.ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 161
(1979).
190 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 217-53 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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cusses at length the danger of geographically expansive remedies that
disrupt values of home, family, and neighborhood that he believes are
deeply ingrained in our national tradition."' 1
On the other hand, the facts of Milliken I imply that the Court
opposes more specifically any judicially imposed structural change to
accomplish desegregation. 9 2 If attaining a nondiscriminatory system of
local administration is the proper goal, then Michigan's involvement in
stymying voluntary desegregation in Detroit appears to have been a
valid basis for ordering interdistrict relief. 93 One would have thought
that the state's blockage of even modest voluntary desegregation in Detroit would have made Milliken I the paradigmatic case in which the
value of fair governance would outweigh deference to the state's choice
of administrative structure.
If Milliken I rests on a theory of the inviolable integrity of state
administrative structures, the prospects for implementing the fair governance standard appear dimmer in districts where intradistrict racial
balance will not secure sufficient integration to produce a system responsive to minority interests. Lower courts seeking to accomplish fair
governance by imposing even intradistrict remedies that require
changes in administrative structure will find little direct case support
for such relief. Milliken I may restrain such lower courts completely,
forbidding them either to reach beyond district lines to secure integration or to tamper with state administrative structures within district
lines.
If Milliken I rests, however, on community concern for local control over schooling, the prospects for implementation of the fair governance standard are greater. Though the desegregation cases do not discuss the prospect of structural changes within districts to secure fair
governance, they can, if this Article proves persuasive, be read to imply
that fair governance is the proper remedial goal. Therefore, courts
seeking guidance in the design of remedies to secure fair governance
may look beyond racial balance cases to those school cases that have
considered structural changes and to other equal protection cases in
Id. at 237-52.
The Court's implicit solicitude in Milliken I for the structural inviolability of
local governmental entities was articulated in dicta in Milliken I. See 433 U.S. at 291
(Court orders should "not jeopardize the integrity of the structure or functions of state
and local government").
191

92

"9 See Gewirtz, supra note 23, at 648; cf. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 296300 (1976) (relief against HUD for its unlawful financial support of racially discriminatory activities of the Chicago Housing Authority, which affected public housing options in Chicago, appropriately extended beydnd Chicago city limits to include the entire metropolitan housing market).
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which structural remedies have been imposed. 19 4
If courts are not innovative in shaping remedies, the achievement
of racial balance, where it cannot secure integration, will not provide
fully satisfactory relief. It offers little promise in such circumstances of
securing an affirmative right to fair governance and, as discussed below, presents a significant likelihood in many districts of reimposing the
same harms it was designed to relieve. As for Detroit, the court of appeals opinion on remand rings with frustration at the court's inability
to provide genuine relief through racial balance.19 5
III.

INTRADISTRICT REMEDIES IN PURSUIT OF FAIR GOVERNANCE

Part II of this Article considered some of the general problems that
any theory of school desegregation remedies will have to address. This
part concerns the more specific characteristics of desegregation decrees
that are framed in accordance with the fair governance theory. First,
the overall structure of such decrees is reviewed; second, specific steps
'

See infra part III, especially sections C and D.

'95 By 1975, when the district court entered its remedial judgment on remand, the
school system had become over 75% black, as compared to 63.6% five years earlier.
Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 233, 236 (6th Cir. 1976), affd, 433 U.S. 267
(1977). The court of appeals, in affirming the district court, wrote,
When this school desegregation case was filed in August 1970, Ronald Bradley, one of the black plaintiffs, had been assigned to enter the
kindergarten of a Detroit school whose enrollment was 97 per cent black.
In September 1976 Ronald Bradley is scheduled to enter the sixth
grade of the Clinton School, which now is more than 99 per cent black.
The decisions of the District Court which we now review do nothing to
correct the racial composition of the Clinton School. They grant no relief
to Ronald Bradley nor to the majority of the class of black students he
represents.
Nevertheless, this court finds itself in the frustrating position of having to leave standing the results reached by the District Judge on the issue
of assignment of students, although we disagree with parts of his opinions
and orders. Our affirmance is found to be necessary for the simple reason
that reversal would be an exercise in futility under the situation now existing in the Detroit school system and the law of this case as established
by the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley.
Id. at 232 (footnote omitted).
The Court-imposed limitation on remedies decreed in Milliken I is unfortunate,
not only because it may perpetuate racially imbalanced school systems, but because
Milliken I insulates suburban school districts from the social burden of integration and
may actually cause more logistically burdensome intradistrict remedies in some districts.
See Fiss, supra note 45, at 33-34. For vigorous statements in support of creating metropolitan school districts to achieve educational equality generally, see Chemerinsky,
Ending the Dual System of American Public Education: The Urgent Need for Legislative Action, 32 DE PAUL L. REV. 77 (1983); Pettigrew, The Case for Metropolitan
Approaches to Public-School Desegregation, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE Crry
163 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman & C. Schelling eds. 1981).
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that directly address the governance structure of a school district are
examined.
A.

The General Structure of a Fair Governance Remedy

What remedial tools are appropriate in pursuing fair governance?
Where Milliken v. Bradley9 8 [Milliken 1] does not permit interdistrict
integration, what form is a fair governance decree to take in a district
where meaningful intradistrict integration is impracticable?
No general prescription, of course, can precisely answer the myriad remedial questions that a given case will pose. As familiar a scholarly sidestep as it may be, only case-by-case development can yield a
detailed system of remedial guidelines for courts to follow. It is possible, however, to outline at least a preliminary approach to the design of
fair governance remedies. For this purpose, the fair governance theory
is useful in two ways. First, it sheds new light on the utility of, and
justifications for, racial balance and ancillary remedies now implemented under conventional court orders. Second, it suggests desegregation remedies that are not now employed but that would be justified
responses to the problem of unfair governance.
One foreseeable policy objection to a fair governance orientation
may be addressed immediately. Each of the remedial steps explored below is based on some supposition of which administrative practices may
generate confidence in the nondiscriminatory administration of public
schools. Each step entails either a change in procedure or structure
designed to facilitate fair educational administration or a change in
substantive educational policy aimed at advancing more effectively the
interests of minority students. None of these measures provides an absolute guarantee of fair governance; each is at best a significant step
toward that guarantee. One might thus protest that a fair governance
approach is less effective than a conventional racial balance remedy because its goal is open-ended and its remedial tools are but gross proxies
for the ultimate remedial aim.
In responding, it is not denied that the fit between the remedial
tools suggested below and any detailed conception of fair governance
will be imperfect. The point, however, is that the remedial approach
takes aim at the pervasive inequalities of racially separate schools.1 97
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
119The impossibility of vindicating a right of fair governance perfectly does not
invalidate fair governance as a conception of right. The expression of a constitutional
right is, in part, the expression of a constitutional ideal, and "it is meaningful . . . to
preserve [a right] as an aspiration that may be vindicated" not only by courts, but by
political processes as well. Gewirtz, supra note 23, at 606; see also id. at 672-73.
298
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The narrower aim of achieving an historically natural attendance pattern, which seems to underlie the conventional racial balance approach,
is more metaphorical than actual.19 More important, the racial balance
approach fails to target the pervasive harm that segregated schooling
inflicts.
The apparent open-endedness of the fair governance remedy might
also raise questions as to the theory's manageability. 9 Three such concerns include the amenability of the proffered standard to orderly and
principled implementation, °0 the competence of courts to make the pol198See Kanner, supra note 161, at 393-94 & n.53.
199

On the legitimacy and manageability of structural injunctions generally, see P.

SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 150-81 (1983), and sources cited therein. Detailed ac-

counts of the implementation phases of specific desegregation cases appear in R. DENTLER & M. SCOTT, SCHOOLS ON TRIAL: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF THE BOSTON DESEGREGATION CASE (1981); D. KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS (1982); E. WOLF, TRIAL AND
ERROR: THE DETROIT SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASE (1981); LIMITS OF JUSTICE:
THE COURTS' ROLE IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (H. Kalodner & J. Fishman eds.

1978). For a study of school reform through judicial intervention on issues other than
desegregation, see M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra note 7.
200 Under a fair governance approach, judicial discretion as to which remedial
tools to use, and to what degree to use them, will be less bounded than under a conventional racial balance theory. Implementing remedies under a fair governance ideal,
however, involves no more judicial inventiveness or breadth of discretion than judicial
implementation of institutional remedies in other contexts involving broad constitutional
standards. Besides schools, the public institutions most frequently subject to "structural
injunction"-type litigation are legislatures involved in reapportionment, see, e.g.,
Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653 (1983), and cases cited therein; prisons, under the
eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments, see cases cited in Fletcher,
supra note 158, at 684 n.152; and mental institutions, under a due process-based "right
to treatment" theory, id. at 688-91. But cf. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 n.12 (1981) (reserving the issue whether 'the fourteenth amendment creates a "right to treatment" for the "involuntarily

. . .

, much less the volunta-

rily committed"). In assessing the legitimacy of judicial latitude in remedial design in
such cases, one must weigh against the cost of discretion the cost of denying effective
constitutional relief through overinsistence on inflexible rules of decision. See Fiss,
supra note 10, at 215-16.
As with all institutional remedies, the fair governance elaboration of general
guidelines as to how much of what kind of remedy is appropriate, so that similar cases
may be dealt with similarly, will depend on case-by-case judicial experience. In this
respect, the open-endedness of the fair governance approach should not be overstated.
This Article does not recommend that courts implement remedies and then try to measure, in some empirical way, whether fair governance prevails; that would be a more
complex inquiry than whether racial balance exists. Instead, this Article sets forth a
variety of measures-such as student reassignment, changes in the structure of school
governance, affirmative action, and the implementation of fair educational policies-which, as a matter of law, may be regarded as appropriate measures for achieving the fair governance goal. Once the appropriateness of these measures is assumed, a
court need only determine the proper mix in an individual case; once implementation is
ordered, the court need not then inquire empirically whether reasonable confidence in
fair governance has been created. It can more simply determine whether the measures
ordered have actually been implemented. These inquiries are no more problematic as
an empirical matter than is the verification of the existence of racial balance.
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icy decisions necessary to implement the remedy,"' and the ability of
courts to recognize when the remedy has been effected such that jurisdiction over the case may cease.20 2 Even if fair governance remedies
achieve their goals only imperfectly, they are, nevertheless, compelling
goals for which to strive.
The remedial steps a fair governance decree comprises may be categorized in five complementary components. Two of these components
should be identical to measures taken under any conception of appro101 The charge that courts are unsuited to make the kinds of factual or policy
judgments that fair governance "judicial activism" requires is subject to challenge. See
Fiss, supra note 10, at 209, 211-16. A recent study by Michael Rebell and Arthur
Block on judicial intervention in educational policymaking "largely rebut[s] the criticism that the judiciary lacks the resources, expertise, or comprehensive perspective
needed to implement educational reform successfully." M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, supra
note 7, at 210. In particular, Rebell and Block find little reason to conclude that courts
are inferior to legislative or executive decisionmakers in terms of anticipating implementation problems. See id. at 211.
Rebell and Block state that the suits they investigated were generally less confrontational than desegregation cases, in that the parties involved were not as deeply
committed to antagonistic moral and legal positions. See id. at 212-13. Perhaps because
of institutional problems resulting from the confrontational character of desegregation
suits, researchers have had doubts as to the remedial competence of courts deciding such
cases. A fair governance approach to school desegregation cases may, however, actually
bolster judicial competence in such cases by mitigating the degree of the opposing parties' antagonistic commitment to deeply held policy views.
This possibility has three sources. First, the fair governance approach is grounded
in values embodied in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), about which
consensus is more likely. Second, and of more concrete importance, the fair governance
approach sanctions a wider variety of remedies than does the racial balance approach.
Therefore, the possibility of judicial reconciliation of competing interests is greater.
Third, by counseling nonintervention into the substantive authority of school boards
undertaking leadership roles in the implementation of integration, the fair governance
approach may promote the kind of cooperation under which judicial competence appears greatest.
20' The racial balance approach ensures against excessive judicial intervention by
forbidding courts from requiring school authorities to revise their remedial plans as
population shifts or other conditions undermine the effectiveness of the remedies initially ordered. See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
Thus, for example, once a school board implements a racially neutral attendance pattern under a racial balance order, it will be deemed to have fulfilled its obligation
under conventional remedial principles.
It should not be significantly more difficult for courts under a fair governance
approach to identify the appropriate point at which to terminate jurisdiction. Jurisdiction would exist as long as necessary to implement fully the variety of remedial measures that fair governance requires, including, for example, integration, affirmative action hiring, or raising academic standards in minority schools. Presumably, the court
will adopt a schedule for remedial implementation. If, during implementation,
problems arise that significantly undermine that strategy, courts may employ other remedial options and continue to exercise jurisdiction as long as necessary to assure implementation. Once the district court, however, has "fully performed its function of
providing the appropriate remedy," id. at 437, jurisdiction may cease. Cf., e.g., Tasby
v. Wright, 559 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (tri-ethnic committee disbanded once
designated roles no longer needed or adequately performed by others).
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priate school desegregation relief. First, any reasonable school desegregation decree must contain a prescriptive antidiscrimination component, that is, an injunction against future racial discrimination
generally and against those kinds of racial discrimination particularly
identified in the individual case. Second, any reasonable decree must
contain an historically-basedaffirmative action component, aimed specifically at the undoing of particular unconstitutional acts.2" 3 Thus, if
school authorities have discriminated in the hiring and assignment of
teachers and other staff, affirmative action will be required to redress
such discrimination. If school authorities have discriminated in neighborhood school siting decisions, they will be required to give special
consideration to under-served neighborhoods in any subsequent school
construction or closing decisions. Such particularized measures should
help to foster confidence in the restoration of nondiscriminatory educational administration. Such a remedial decree, however, narrowly tailored to individualized acts of discrimination, would insufficiently redress persistent and systematic discrimination.
It remains to be considered what affirmative remedial measures
are sufficient for the establishment of fair educational governance in a
formerly segregated school system. Because of the advantages that integration offers in terms of utility and legitimacy,2 '" the remedy must
contain an integration component, the scope of which will depend upon
the prospects for its effective implementation. If integration is not possible, the remaining avenues for reform entail judicial intervention more
directly into the structure of governance or into the substance of educational policymaking. Thus, the remaining categories of a fair governance decree will be a structural nondiscrimination component and an
educational policy component.
B.

Implementing Integration

The critical issue posed under a fair governance theory after Milliken I is how to pursue integration within the confines of a single school
district. Few major urban school districts are at the point where substantial representation of more than one racial or ethnic group in each
school is unattainable, 20 5 although, as the Detroit case indicates, 20 6 the
203 These two components were contained, for example, in the Fifth Circuit's first
model desegregation decree that bound all district courts in the deep South. See United
States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 896-900 (5th Cir. 1966), affd,
380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
204 See supra part HIC.
205 See supra note 154.
206 See supra note 195.
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possibility exists that demographics alone will make an effective intradistrict remedy impossible. A more troubling issue in relying on intradistrict integration alone is whether such integration can be expected
to endure.
Prospects for successful and enduring integration depend on four
factors: the availability of integration options, the availability of resistance options, the leadership role of the responsible school authorities,
and the existence of incentives for desegregation.
Integration Options. The first index of likely success in the integration of a given school district is the extensiveness of the measures
that would have to be taken to attain this goal. In some districts, progress may be achieved through the cessation of the school board's current segregative acts and through voluntary integration measures. That
is, courts may find that schools are segregated solely because local authorities transport students past schools close to their homes in order
that they may attend racially identifiable schools perhaps even farther
away.107 The termination of such practices would entail no added logistical burdens for students or parents and might thus encounter little
resistance. Similarly, the creation of "magnet schools" or other voluntary programs that would successfully attract integrated participation
from a variety of neighborhoods might help to yield a stable integrated
system and perhaps would even attract whites back from suburban
schools.20o
For most big city districts, however, this combination of measures
will not be sufficient to yield systemwide integration. 0 9 This is partly
because school siting decisions by local school boards are likely to have
reinforced racial patterns produced by residential segregation. It will
thus become necessary to determine how integration can be accomplished through measures that, although inconvenient, are least burdensome for students and parents. Resistance may be somewhat diminished
if options are available that involve little added transportation time for
most students and afford the opportunity of attending schools whose
programs are especially attractive. Where such options are available,
enduring integration is a realistic goal.
Resistance Options. Any judicial assessment of the likely stability
207 See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 462 n.9 (1979);
Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 426 (D. Mass.), affd sub non. Morgan v.
Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (Boston).
208 See Coleman, The Role of Incentives in School Desegregation, in RACE AND
SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 182, 191-92 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman & C. Schelling
eds. 1981); see also W. HAWLEY, supra note 4, at 25-59 (comparing desegregation
strategies involving student assignments).
209 See W. HAWLEY, supra note 4, at 27-34.
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of an integration plan must include a consideration of the available avenues for avoiding the plan. That is, the success of a given integration
plan will largely depend upon the costs involved in leaving the school
district. If there are parochial schools210 or nearby suburban public
school systems available to white students, it will be easier for them to
resist participating in an integrated system. If integrated schooling is
available more conveniently and more cheaply than nonintegrated
schooling, integrated schooling may be an attractive option even to persons predisposed to resist integration."- '
Courts trying to decide the degree to which they can rely on integration as the centerpiece of a remedial decree should thus be expected
to make a threshold judgment as to integration's likely durability. If
there exist attractive integration options and little incentive or opportunity for resistance, the courts may rely with greater confidence on integration as the basis for a fair governance decree. If integration options
are nonexistent, or if the options co-exist with possibilities for resistance that may be attractive to white parents, a court's judgment must
be guided by additional factors. It may be possible, as discussed below,
to build into the decree other support for integration that would justify
relying on it as the core remedy, even in the face of genuine resistance
possibilities. Alternatively, a court may conclude that the likelihood of
resistance or the demographic impossibility of integration make additional tools necessary to effect fair governance.
Leadership of School Authorities. In any school system where the
durability of integration is problematic, a key factor for judicial consideration will be the degree of cooperation and leadership the court can
210 Parental resort to parochial schools, even if animated by resistance to integration, is a constitutionally protected educational choice. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925).
211 The degree to which desegregation accelerates white flight from urban school
districts is a hotly debated issue, particularly since sociologist James Coleman delivered
a paper in 1975 concluding that school desegregation in some cases was a significant
cause of declining white public school enrollments (J. COLEMAN, S. KELLY & J.
MORE, TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION, 1968-73 (1975)).
The extent and significance of this phenomenon, however, is a source of continuing disagreement. See The 14th Amendment and School Busing: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 16-136, 276-377 (1981) (testimony and submissions of David J. Armor and Gary
Orfield); G. ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 99-101 (1978); SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE (Harv. Educ. Rev. ed. 1976) (articles by Pettigrew &

Green, and Coleman); Armor, White Flight and the Future of School Desegregation, in
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 187 (W. Stephan & J. Fea-

gin eds. 1980); Gewirtz, supra note 23, at 629-30 n.114; Rossell & Hawley, supra
note 154. For a criticism of public misreporting of the Coleman conclusions and white
flight research generally, see Orfield, Research, Politics and the Antibusing Debate, 42
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1978, at 141.
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secure from defendant school authorities.21 2 Studies of desegregated
communities show that actual integration occurs through racial balance
more easily when school and community officials, through enthusiastic
and cooperative leadership, assure the white community that integration will proceed smoothly and will improve the overall quality of
schooling.2 1 Correspondingly, black students and parents can reasonably be expected to have greater confidence in the educational administration of such school authorities. Thus, if school authorities willingly
proffer a "leadership plan" for encouraging popular support for integration, a court may rely more confidently on integration as the central
school desegregation remedy, even where exit options exist for white
parents.21 4
Boston is perhaps the most dramatic northern example in which
the absence of positive leadership might have counseled the court to
intervene more emphatically at the earliest remedial stages in order to
effectuate fair governance.2" 5 For ten years prior to the first Boston
212 The necessity of invoking judicial intervention to secure local desegregation
does not itself invariably indicate that local authorities will prove uncooperative in implementing a remedy. As Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), illustrates, cases
may arise in which a local school board will resist desegregation, partly in the hope
than an eventual lawsuit will result in the state sharing the obligation to fund the
desegregative effort.
213

U.S.

COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DESEGREGATING THE BOSTON PUBLIC

SCHOOLS: A CRISIS IN CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY 1-7 (1975); Gewirtz, supra note 23, at
652 n.183.
214 The judicial preference for implementing desegregation plans devised by defendants reflects, in part, the supposition that defendant school authorities will support
such plans more vigorously, thus helping to insure more effective implementation. See,
e.g., Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 541 F. Supp. 1048, 1052 (M.D.
La. 1982).
215 In chronological order, the reported decisions in the Boston case include Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974) (finding that defendants had
intentionally maintained Boston public schools as an illegally segregated dual school
system), affd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 599 (1st Cir. 1975) (affirming district court orders regarding hiring and transfer of faculty); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1975) (denying motion to stay sanctions imposed by civil
contempt order for failure of school committee to submit desegregation plan); Morgan
v. Kerrigan, 388 F. Supp. 581 (D. Mass. 1975) (ordering hiring of black and white
faculty on one-to-one basis until 20% black faculty goal reached; affirmative recruitment program to be maintained until 25% black faculty attained), affd, 530 F.2d 431
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216
(D. Mass. 1975) (district court's basic remedial order, including creation of community
school districts, citywide magnet schools, closing of schools, etc.), affd, 530 F.2d 401
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 270
(D. Mass. 1975) (denying motion for stay of order directing school committee to pay
masters for their services); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975)
(placing South Boston High School (SBHS) under temporary receivership); Morgan v.
McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976) (affirming district court orders regarding
temporary receivership and transfer of staff at SBHS), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042
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decision, the school committee had steadfastly opposed all state and federal efforts to secure any school integration in Boston, even challenging
21 6
the constitutionality of the Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act.
After the committee's liability for desegregation was determined,
the committee still took no initiative-either in assisting the court or in
implementing relief-and refused to take steps beyond adherence to the
literal meaning of even the most modest court order.217 For example,
the committee's resistance included a refusal to submit voluntarily a
timely proposal for the final grant of relief.21 The committee's public
opposition to integration before and during the lawsuit was truculent
and unremitting. 219 Members and former members, after the court's
first decision, helped to organize mass rallies in opposition to integration and to lobby Congress to prohibit busing through a constitutional
amendment.
Using the nature of school leadership as an indicator of prospective white resistance affords at best an imperfect index of the viability
(1977); Morgan v. McDonough, 548 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1977) (affirming district court
orders relating to repairs to SBHS and appointment of school administrators named by
court); Morgan v. McDonough, 456 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Mass. 1978) (terminating temporary receivership of SBHS under certain terms and conditions); Morgan v. McDonough, 511 F. Supp. 408 (D. Mass. 1981) (holding that intervenors, counsel for Hispanic students in Boston public schools and their parents, were entitled to attorney's
fees and costs even in absence of explicit judicial determination that school defendants
intentionally discriminated against Hispanic students), affd, 689 F.2d 265 (1st Cir.
1982); Morgan v. O'Bryant, 671 F.2d 23 (1st Cir.) (affirming district court orders to
maintain percentage of black teachers and administrators in the event of layoffs), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 62 (1982); Morgan v. O'Bryant, 687 F.2d 510 (1st Cir. 1982) (affirming district court order insulating from layoffs faculty at SBHS even during budget
crisis); Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1982) (affirming various district court orders regarding closing of schools and court's rejection of defendants' student assignment plan and "linkage" and "beacon schools" proposals; affirming denial
of motion that court terminate altogether its jurisdiction over student assignments);
Morgan v. McDonough, 554 F. Supp. 169 (D. Mass. 1982) (first step in court's "transitional course of disengagement"-various orders defining continuing roles of parties,
implementing a dispute resolution process, and providing for monitoring of defendants'
desegregation progress by State Board of Education) Morgan v. McDonough, 726 F.2d
11 (1st Cir. 1984) (upholding dismissal of voluntary parent organization as intervening
party); Morgan v. McKeique, 726 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1984) (vacating for further finding, lower court order specifying funding levels for parents councils). For an account of
the Boston case written by two court-appointed experts, see R. DENTLFR & M. SCOTT,
supra note 199.
216 See School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d
729 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968). The Racial Imbalance Act required school committees to take affirmative action to eliminate "racial imbalance" in
schools where nonwhites constituted more than 50% of the student population. Id.
217 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141, 1151 (D. Mass. 1975).
218 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 618, 619-20 (1st Cir. 1975).
219 On the belligerent attitude of former Boston School Committee members, see
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FULFILLING THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE LAW:
DESEGREGATION OF THE NATION'S PUBLIC ScHooLs 27-32 (1976).
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of integration as a desegregation remedy. It is a sensible indicator, however, because school authorities have significant access to parents
through public media and private channels. A school board's capacity
to set the tone of public response to integration is likely to be great.
School authorities may also be able to mobilize other community agencies-businesses, civic groups, and parent organizations-to encourage
white participation in an integrated school system.
Further, under a fair governance approach, the use of an index of
official cooperation to help measure the need for relief makes sense
given the school authorities' incentives to cooperate. Enthusiasm in administering integration may justifiably be deemed probative of the kind
of governance that will prevail in an integrated system without further
court intervention. More drastic intervention, to the extent of curtailing
the powers of the school board, may be justified where racial balance
alone will not assure integration and fair governance. If school authorities are aware of the possibility of losing governance powers, even reluctant school boards may be induced to cooperate in the implementation of integration. Any resistance of school authorities in the face of
possible reprisals might indicate the likely reaction of other members of
the community who perceive their interests to be threatened by integration. Such resistance would justify a more interventionist intradistrict
role for a court trying to secure nondiscriminatory schooling for minority plaintiffs.
Incentivesfor Desegregation. In deciding how much to rely on the
prospect of stable integration as a remedy, a court should also consider
what additional strategies might be implemented to enhance the success
of an integration plan. One promising suggestion, for example, concerns the establishment of incentives for housing desegregation. The
more integrated housing is, the easier it becomes to establish integrated
schooling without burdensome transportation requirements. If desegregation plans exempt residentially integrated neighborhoods from crossdistrict busing, while providing that reassignments will be ordered if
schools in those neighborhoods become segregated, courts can provide
incentives for integrated neighborhoods to remain integrated and for
segregated neighborhoods to integrate.2 20 Such incentives are preferable
to integration-maintenance plans, employed by some communities, that
maintain racial balance in housing by limiting black entry into inte'22 1
grated neighborhoods at a certain "tipping point."
220

See G.

ORFIELD, TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR URBAN INTEGRATION

71-72

(1981).
221 See generally Smolla, IntegrationMaintenance: The Unconstitutionalityof Benign ProgramsThat DiscourageBlack Entry to Prevent White Flight, 1981 DUKE L.J.
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A second range of possibilities for enhancing the desirability of
desegregation involves improvements in the schools that would respond
to parental interests in stable, disciplined, and educationally effective
school environments. Some parents may now resist integration not because of hostility towards blacks but because of apprehension that a
desegregation effort will absorb resources that would otherwise go towards instruction or generate discipline problems that would detract
from teaching and learning.2 22 To forestall such resistance, courts may
order measures to help bolster the educational effectiveness of all integrated schools. These could include not only instructional enhancement
measures but also orders to involve black and white parents and students in cooperative efforts to develop codes of acceptable school behavior and understandings regarding fair and effective discipline.223
After evaluating these four factors, a court should be able to make
a threshold judgment as to the amount of integration possible and its
likely durability. If reasonable promise exists for obtaining substantial
and stable representation of both majority and minority student groups
in each school, then the court can confidently pursue integration as the
key to its fair governance remedy. Its selection of remedial tools from
the other categories of affirmative orders outlined below should be
based only on the need to buttress the success of integration.
If, however, integration is demographically impossible or stable integration cannot reasonably be expected, then the court should exercise
its discretion to implement other affirmative remedial tools that intervene more substantially in educational administration than would integration. Such remedies would be necessary to assure reasonable confidence in the nondiscriminatory administration of the schools.
Another important difference between the fair governance orientation to integration and the conventional racial balance approach becomes clear at this point. As stated above, courts following a fair governance orientation would find it legitimate to invoke non-racial
balance remedies if stable integration is unlikely because of community
resistance; under the conventional approach, many courts have acted as
891. On the general undesirability of racial ceilings in desegregation decrees, see
Gewirtz, supra note 23, at 643-44, 659-65. Some of the potential harms Professor
Gewirtz identifies with regard to school desegregation remedies that leave some onerace schools intact, id. at 668-70, may be ameliorated by those nonintegration remedies
associated with fair governance that would enhance the power of the racial minority in
an imperfectly integrated district. See infra part III, sections C and D.
222

Interview with Hon. Alvin B. Rubin, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,

in Iowa City, Iowa (Nov. 3, 1983).
22" See W. HAWLEY, supra note 4, at 124-25 (1983). See generally Gewirtz,
supra note 23, at 652-56.
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if only the demographic impossibility of actual desegregation could legitimately sanction the use of alternative remedies.22 4 This is because,
under the conventional approach, judicial willingness to calculate the
possibility of white flight in designing an appropriate remedy might
seem to reward resistance to the restoration of a nondiscriminatory attendance pattern.2 25 It would thus be viewed as illegitimate per se and
discounted in order to avoid perpetuating the segregated pattern of
schooling it is the court's aim to undo.2 26
The problem with the conventional analysis, which may be based
on Cooper v. Aaron,227 is that failing to account for the prospect of
224 See Levin, School Desegregation Remedies and the Role of Social Science Research, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs., Autumn 1978, at 1, 9-15, and cases cited

therein. A few instances do exist in which courts have considered evidence of white
flight in the remedial design process. Id. at 15-21.
For an elaborate defense of the necessary legal relevance of white flight, see
Gewirtz, supra note 23, at 635-43.
225 In Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), affd, 530 F.2d
401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), the federal district court in Boston
analyzed the problem as follows:
Some of the parties have urged that the court limit the extent of actual desegregation lest children from middle class white families leave the
public school system and to prevent racial turmoil and violence in Boston's
schools and communities ....
These prophecies of "white flight" and racial turmoil, like opposition itself, are not "practicalities" that can be
weighed against the rights of the plaintiffs.. . . Expression of that opposition constitutes a problem, of course, which the desegregation plan must
confront in its implementation. But it does not constitute one of the "practicalities" to which the plan itself properly can make an accommodation..
Id. at 233-34 (citations omitted). One might argue that desegregation should not accommodate the prospect of white flight because predictions of white flight cannot be
verified and that any "accommodation" would be a sacrifice of relief for only speculative purposes. It is important to note, however, that this is not the argument that the
district court makes. The court does not rest on the unpredictability of white flight, but
rather on what accommodation to prospective white flight represents, namely "to trade
away the constitutional rights of children to receive a desegregated education ....
The rule of law must prevail." Id. at 234. As the court puts it, a deliberate failure to
acknowledge prospective white flight in planning racial balance is a matter of principle,
not practicality.
226 But cf. Clark v. Board of Educ., 705 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1983) (White flight
and subsequent resegregation can be taken into account in devising alternative plans to
promote integration. The school board was allowed to create four virtually all-black
schools as long as all white children attended integrated schools and substantial measures were taken to improve education in the all-black schools.); Levin, supra note 224,
at 19-21 (discussing California's consideration of the effects of white flight in its devising of alternative desegregation plans in response to the affirmative duty placed on
school officials to correct de facto racial imbalance as well as de jure segregation).
227 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Cooper is, on its facts, not directly apposite to cases involving problems of accommodating local white resistance to desegregation relief. In
Cooper, local school authorities cooperated in implementing the federal decree, and the
local citizenry "reluctantly accepted" the desegregation plan. Official resistance in Little Rock manifested itself through the intervention of the state governor. Id. at 7-11; see

Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U.
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white flight in remedial design threatens even the narrow remedial conception on which the conventional racial balance order is based. If the
remedial objective in a desegregation case is to achieve the restoration of
a natural pattern of attendance, it must be relevant whether white exit
from the public school system in response to a desegregation plan will
make such a pattern unattainable.
More practically, the conventional attitude is insensitive to the reality that white flight tends to isolate black students in the desegregated
system, to shift the tax base to the suburbs, and to reimpose the harms
initially associated with segregated schooling. Black students may remain isolated, stigmatized, and vulnerable to systematic discrimination
against minority interests, albeit by state-level school authorities who
may favor all-white suburban districts over predominantly black urban
school systems. 2 Ironically, if a court order produces such results, the
consequent injuries may continue to appear to blacks as the artifacts of
an affirmative government policy, thereby perpetuating their lack of
confidence in fair governance.
In sum, if the conception of school desegregation remedies expressed in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman2 29 [Dayton I] is
the sole remedial principle on which lower courts may rely, these courts
are caught in a dilemma. They cannot secure the proper remedial objective-a genuinely desegregated pattern of attendance-unless they
bus. At the same time, their very reliance on busing may accelerate
white flight, thus eliminating the possibility of creating the desired attendance pattern. In contrast, the fair governance orientation would legitimate-and, indeed, mandate-the greater use of nonbusing remedies whenever stable integration is genuinely unlikely.
One issue such an approach will pose for courts will be the
grounds on which they can legitimately predict the impracticability of
ILL. L. REV. 387, 391-93. On its facts, Cooper neither bars a court from considering
the likely default of local leadership, nor prevents it from weighing the probable consequences of that default for integration. But cf. United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd.
of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972) (White flight cannot "be accepted as a reason for
achieving anything less than complete uprooting of the dual public school system.");
Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968).
228 Disenchantment with such continuing harms, even under court-ordered desegregation, prompted a group of black parents in Boston, in February 1982, to advocate
replacing the court plan with a student assignment plan based on parental choice and
increased black staffing of predominantly black schools. As in Detroit, the progress of
effective intradistrict desegregation may have been hampered after the initial decree by
a statewide political initiative, a 1980 property tax cap measure that resulted in a $30
million reduction in Boston's annual school appropriations over a three-year period.
School Assignments in Boston: Black ParentsWant Control, CENTER FOR LAW AND
EDUC. NEWSNOTES 6-7 (Aug.-Sept. 1982).
229 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
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integration. For reasons of manageability and legitimacy, a court would
likely be uncomfortable imposing remedies on local school authorities
that do not presume their good faith in the implementation of the remedial order.2 30 The point, however, is that extreme cases may well exist
in which the grounds for presuming the impracticability of integration
counsel against reliance on busing as an effective remedy. Indeed, there
may be cases in which the minority plaintiffs and defendant school authorities agree that other remedies will be more effective in vindicating
minority interests without compromising interests the local system is
trying to protect, such as neighborhood schooling.23 If the remedial
possibilities are viewed as a range of tools, each of which can be used to
secure the overall goal of a fairly governed educational system, courts
will have at least a framework within which to respond to the competing interests at stake in school desegregation suits.
C. Fair Governance and Nonintegration Remedies
There are only two categories of options other than integration for
restoring what should be a minority community's reasonable confidence
in the fair administration of schools. The first involves structural reforms that hold reasonable promise of deterring discrimination and promoting fair representation of minority interests. The second entails
court-ordered measures to improve the educational effectiveness of the
schools that minority children attend. Rather than focusing on process
or structural norms of fair governance directly, these latter measures
aim at inducing those substantive policy changes that a fair decisionmaking process might yield. Although it may be more difficult to implement substantive educational policy measures rather than structural
changes, courts may, in some cases, prefer to focus directly on altering
the educational policies of the school district in order to make the system more effective for minority students. Such courts may doubt
whether structural remedies other than integration will produce fair
230 Aside from any independent principled justifications for such a presumption of
good faith, a fair governance approach to remedies might well buttress the reasonableness of such a presumption. The threat of judges imposing alternatives to busing that
would more drastically undercut the authority of local officials over their school system
could encourage the official support of integration that courts would wish to presume.
231 The controversial desegregation settlement approved for Atlanta involved decelerating racial balance in exchange for more black staffing and administrative control.
See Calhoun v. Cook, 362 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ga.), remanded, 487 F.2d 680 (5th
Cir. 1973); Calhoun v. Cook, 522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975). For an analysis of this
remedy, see Bell, supra note 9, at 485-87; Jackson, Urban School Desegregationfrom a
Black Perspective, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 204, 209-14 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman & C. Schelling eds. 1981).
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educational administration unless they are combined with requirements
for substantive policy change as well. One element of an "educational
policy component" of a desegregation decree might require that
predominantly minority schools be at least as well funded as are those
schools serving predominantly nonminority students. 2 Such a decree
might also contain measures calculated to bring the academic standards
in such schools up to the level achieved in predominantly white
schools.2"'
In Milliken v. Bradley23 4 [Milliken II], the Supreme Court has
already sanctioned a variety of particularized educational remedies as
tools "to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position
they would have enjoyed in terms of education" had educational services "been provided in a nondiscriminatory manner in a school system
free from pervasive de jure racial segregation. '2 3 5 The Court is comfortable with such remedies, in part because such programs do not represent an attempt "to restructure local governmental entities nor to
2' 3 6
mandate a particular method or structure of state or local financing.
The main difference between Milliken 11 and the fair governance
rationale for desegregation relief, therefore, lies in the justification the
latter proffers for educational remedies. Under the fair governance approach, educational remedies are legitimate even absent a showing that
the resulting educational program would restore minority students to
the educational position they would have enjoyed absent discrimination. 237 Indeed, the district court's rationale for the educational remedies ordered in Detroit involved not only remedying effects of past segregation but also "assur[ing] a successful desegregative effort and . . .
231
233

See Bell, supra note 53, at 130.
Id. But cf supra note 142 (providing sources discussing the feasibility of at-

tempting to provide substantive educational equality).
234 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
238 Id. at 282. On the particular remedies approved, see supra note 119.
236 Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 291.
217 What the educational status of minority students in a segregated district would
have been but for the history of race discrimination is at least as immeasurable and
unknowable as is the pattern of racial attendance that a history of nondiscriminatory
assignments would have yielded. It may be that the school authorities in a formerly
segregated district, had they never segregated the schools or discriminated against minority students, would have appropriated the same number of dollars for the district
but distributed those dollars more fairly. A nondiscriminatory school board might have
thus provided an education of lesser quality for all students rather than bringing the
quality of minority education up to the level of that afforded to nonminority students in
the segregated system. It would thus not be entirely persuasive for courts to order that
minority schooling quality be raised to the level of that now afforded white students
based entirely on a narrowly restorative remedial conception. The point of such remedies should be to provide minority students with an education commensurate with the
education provided current to nonminority students.
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minimiz[ing] the possibility of resegregation." 2 8 This rationale is
clearly more expansive than a narrow restorative view of desegregation
relief.
The aim of structural remedies other than integration is to enhance the effectiveness of the minority voice in reaching educational
decisions. Integration, by itself, does not change the cast of persons in
authority; rather, it hampers the ability of persons in authority to treat
minority students differently. The alternative reforms suggested below
as parts of a "structural nondiscrimination component" of a desegregation order attempt to increase representation of minority interests by
providing minorities with some direct authority to govern the school
system.
Under conventional remedial rationales, courts have implemented
three structural remedies. As to these three remedies, the essential contribution of a fair governance theory is the insight it offers into their
utility and legitimacy.
The most obvious means of increasing minority input into educational decisionmaking is to guarantee the hiring and placement of a
significant number of minority administrators in a school system.2" 9
Such a measure may be useful to buttress integration even if it proves
less than adequate as a complete alternative to integration.2 4 Whether
or not evidence of past employment discrimination exists, increasing the
number of minority educators in positions of authority can be justified
as a means of bolstering the system's administrative sensitivity to minority interests.
The second technique for increasing minority power in school governance, which may or may not involve changes in the command structure within a school system, is to establish community boards, on either
a neighborhood or school basis, to oversee the progress of desegregation.24 If integration is the core of the desegregation order, such boards
may be confined to overseeing, advising, and disseminating information.
On the other hand, if community review is employed, in some measure,
as a substitute for integration, the boards should be given actual policymaking functions or veto powers over existing school authorities. 4 2
28 Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1118 (E.D. Mich. 1975), modified,
540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), affd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
239 On the adoption of such a plan for Atlanta, see supra note 231.
241 See supra note 139.
241 A variety of such mechanisms are discussed in W. HAWLEY, supra note 4, at
73-88, and sources cited therein.
242 Under the latter scheme, a school committee might be required to negotiate
with each community panel an initial agenda for school reform that would then have to
be approved by the school board itself. Additional procedures might be ordered under
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A third way of dealing with school authorities who are antagonistic or insensitive to minority interests is to place all or part of the school
system in receivership. 48 The receiver might be the court or, in appropriate cases, state authorities likely to be more responsive than local
authorities to minority interests.2 44 This technique, however, has obvious disadvantages. It assures nondiscriminatory schooling only so long
as a court is willing to administer the schools, and it has the potential
for straining federal-local relations to a great degree. State receivership
may also be an unsatisfactory alternative because of justified local objections that statewide authorities cannot be as sensitive to legitimate
local interests as would be locally elected authorities or even the local
federal court.
A compromise position would invoke judicial receivership until
such change in local leadership as would promise greater responsiveness to minority interests; in such an event, the court might appoint a
local official, from within or without the school system, to be the receiver. 245 The court would thus remain as a lever for increased minor-

ity input into educational decisionmaking but could extricate itself from
the details of day-to-day educational administration.
D.

Restructuring the Governance of Formerly Segregated Districts

In addition to justifying the three structural remedies that have
been employed under different rationales, the fair governance theory
suggests a fourth major structural approach to remedies not yet taken
which the community panels would retain effective influence over future decisions affecting local schools. It should be noted that such panels could pose problems by requiring courts to determine the respective roles to be played by the panels and the already
constituted school authorities. See, e.g., Tasby v. Wright, 559 F. Supp. 9, 10-12 (N.D.
Tex. 1982) (difficulties in defining role for tri-ethnic committee led to committee's relative inactivity and disbandment). Without clearly defined powers, review committees
must depend more on their members' individual resourcefulness and on recourse to the
courts to be effective checks on the exercise of an existing institution's power. Cf Note,
The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a JudicialDecree Ordering Institutional Change,
84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1353-64 (1975) (analyzing role of Human Rights Committee in
overseeing the implementation of injunctive relief against a state hospital for the mentally impaired in Alabama).
141 See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975); Turner v.
Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ga. 1966). See generally Comment, An Outlook on
the Use of Receivers in the Implementation of Institutional Reform: Perez v. Boston
Housing Authority, 21 URB. L. ANN. 255 (1981).
244 Cf Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 635-39 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (Alabama prison case in which, after over six years of litigation, the district court appointed
a new governor as receiver for the prison system).
141 In Boston, for example, the district court appointed the school superintendent
as receiver on the recommendation of special experts. R. DENTLER & M. SCOrr,
supra note 199, at 178.
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in school desegregation cases-the complete political restructuring of a
district's governance system. While political restructuring has not been
employed as a school desegregation remedy, it has been litigated in the
context of voting rights.2 46 Because both issues concern the effectiveness
of the minority voice in governance decisions, however, political restructuring seems as reasonable a remedy for desegregation as for voting
rights, even if justified only in cases of extreme official intransigence.
One form of political restructuring would involve the dismantling
of a centrally-elected school board24 and replacing it with a school
board elected by different wards within the school district. A second
form would divide the district itself into subdistricts, each under the
power of a local board, which might be subject to some central coordinating agency. The central agency under the latter plan might be a
separately elected board, a board elected from the local boards, or some
executive officer or agency connected to the office of the mayor.
The premise of either plan is that the closer the school board is to
its constituents, the more responsible it will be to those constituents.248
Because integration is most problematic in residentially segregated
school districts, blacks in such districts would be assured under these
plans of either some representation on the central school board or control of a local board catering to minority interests.
Each plan suffers from some disadvantages. Under the first plan,
11"See, e.g., Brown v. Board of School Conun'rs, 706 F.2d 1103 (11th Cir. 1983);
NAACP v. Gadsden County School Bd., 691 F.2d 978 (11th Cir. 1982); Black Voters
v. McDonough, 565 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977); Brantley v. Brown, 550 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.
Ga. 1982); United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 548 F. Supp. 794 (S.D. Ala.
1982). In addition to challenging at-large systems as unconstitutional, plaintiffs can
challenge changes in school board selection systems in some states as violating section 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976). See, e.g.,
United States v. Louisville Mun. Separate School Dist. Bd., 557 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D.
Miss. 1983).
111 The capacity of at-large voting systems to dilute minority voting strength unfairly is well-recognized in the case law. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
765-70 (1973); Wallace v. House, 377 F. Supp. 1192 (W.D. La. 1974), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated, 425 U.S. 947, on remand, 538
F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977). One consequence has
been for the Supreme Court to instruct lower courts, where possible, to prefer singlemember districts in reapportionment cases. See, e.g., East Carroll Parish School Bd. v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 639 (1976); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971).
Policy arguments favoring decentralized school boards are set forth in Lyke, Representation and Urban School Boards, in COMMUNITY CONTROL OF SCHOOLS 138 (H.
Levin ed. 1970).
248 The ability of at-large representatives to ignore the political agenda of even a
substantial constituent group is traced in Wallace v. House, 377 F. Supp. 1192, 119699 (W.D. La. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part, 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated, 425 U.S. 947, on remand, 538 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
965 (1977).
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in which the creation of a minority district would assure minority
membership on a central board, such minority presence might not adequately deter discriminatory policies if the majority of the electorate is
always antagonistic to minority interests. On the other hand, one cost of
the latter plan is the increased logistical problem of coordinating citywide programs and establishing citywide standards of equality in a decentralized district.
Minority parents in a growing number of cities have been seeking
such remedies, often unsuccessfully, as relief for voting dilution.249
Plaintiffs in such cases have sought to overturn centrally elected school
boards on the ground that such governance systems were adopted or are
operated for the purpose of furthering racial discrimination. Such particularized showings of intent, however, are extremely difficult to prove.
Even if a case of purposeful voting dilution cannot be established,
however, the Boston litigation indicates that attempts to overturn atlarge elections of school boards may make good sense as desegregation
remedies. Black voters in Boston were denied the relief they sought in
part because they could not show that the choice of a centrally elected
school committee was made for the purpose of disempowering black
students and parents in educational decisionmaking.2z 0 Such a showing
could not be made, however, because the system had been adopted
through state legislation in 1905 for the purpose of limiting Democratic
and working-class Catholic influence in school politics.2 5' That blacks
fell victim to the system only as black migration to Boston became demographically significant does not lessen the role that the school committee structure has played in subordinating minority interests to the interests of the white majority. Had the court thought genuine integration
impracticable, it would have been rational to conclude that, in Boston,
See supra note 246. Notwithstanding the increasing concentration of minority
students in urban school systems, blacks typically do not constitute a majority of the
voting population in such districts. For example, although black students represented
45.8% of the Boston public school enrollment in 1979-80, R. DENTLER & M. Scorr,
supra note 199, at 12, the black population of Boston is 22% of the total population
and accounted for only 18% of the vote in 1982. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1983, § 1, at 30,
cols. 1, 4.
250 See Black Voters v. McDonough, 421 F. Supp. 165, 192 (D. Mass. 1976),
affd, 565 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977). The district court also found that, under the standards set forth in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1971) and Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124 (1971), the Boston at-large system did not have an impermissible effect of
denying black voters access to the political process. 421 F. Supp. at 189-92. The First
Circuit upheld this finding tentatively: "We cannot quite say on the present record that
plaintiffs have demonstrated . . . an exclusionary effect. But our decision is close
.... " 565 F.2d at 7.
2' See P. Shane, The Origins of Educational Control: Class, Ethnicity, and
School Reform in Boston 1875-1920 at 219-53 (March 1974) (unpublished undergraduate honors thesis available at Widener Library, Harvard University).
2"
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the implementation of community control or a ward-elected school committee should be part of an effective alternative to busing.25 2 The court,
indeed, would not have had to choose an alternative structure itself but
could have permitted the city to conduct a referendum on all alternatives supported by enough signatures to get an initiative on the ballot in
a Boston election.2 5a
In sum, a fair governance decree, in addition to prohibiting future
discrimination and redressing particularized showings of past discrimination, should seek to establish a system of school governance that reasonably guarantees nondiscriminatory educational administration in the
future. The preferable remedy is actual integration coupled with such
other structural or substantive educational changes as are needed to ensure the stability of integration. If integration is impracticable or impossible, courts should resort to alternative structural forms and substantive educational changes necessary to accomplish fair governance.
E.

The Efficacy of Fair Governance Remedies

One concern in evaluating the fair governance orientation towards
remedies is whether such remedies would effectively protect the relevant interests of minority students and redress the harms imposed by
unlawful segregation. Doubts as to the efficacy of fair governance remedies in this respect may be articulated from different points of view. 2 "
It may be argued that sanctioning alternatives to integration where integration is even hypothetically possible is to give up on the promise of
actual desegregation, "caving in," as it were, to unjustified white resis251 Indeed, the First Circuit stated, "Court control of the schools [as undertaken in
the Boston desegregation case] is a more drastic remedy than taking whatever steps, if
any, may be proper to ensure full and equal participation in the political process by all
groups." Black Voters v. McDonough, 565 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1977).
"' In June 1974, a variety of reform plans to restructure the school system and
incorporate some element of community control were defeated in a citywide referendum. Black Voters v. McDonough, 421 F. Supp. 165, 183-84 (D. Mass. 1976), affd,
565 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977).
2" One weak argument, perhaps implicit in the dicta of Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1971), is that the fair governance theory
promises more than can be achieved, while racial balance remedies focus on more realistic goals. It is true that the less ambitious a set of remedial goals, the more effective a
remedial order can be expected to be in meeting them. The relevant issue, however, is
what set of harms a school desegregation remedy ought to redress. If the pervasive evils
of segregation include the systematic subordination of minority interests by school authorities hostile towards those interests, the effectiveness of a conventional racial balance remedy in adjusting student attendance patterns is not a meaningful objection to
setting the court's sights higher. If unfair governance is an evil that causes our legal
system to regard racial segregation as unconstitutional in the first place, courts can
legitimately view themselves as duty-bound to try, however imperfectly, to relieve minority students of unfair racial domination in the governance of schools.
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tance to integration. Alternatively, it can be argued by even critics of
the conventional racial balance approach that the goal of school desegregation remedies should be the educational effectiveness of minority
schools rather than fair governance; that is, minority plaintiffs should
view desegregation suits as levers for improving education, not for more
elusive goals of fair representation.
The appropriate response to the first concern is three-fold. First,
the fair governance theory gives remedial priority to integration where
reasonably practicable. Second, proponents of any form of desegregation must be concerned about remedies that substantially reimpose the
harms on black children that desegregation is supposed to relieve. Busing that promises only questionable gains for minority pupils is not a
sensible policy, especially because alternatives exist.
Finally, the development of alternative legal strategies to achieve
equal protection cannot justly be blamed for forestalling otherwise
unachievable integration. Under the fair governance approach, local
school boards would have incentives to accept integration as the minimum level of interference necessary to effect constitutional standards of
fair governance. Where officials forego those incentives and entrench
themselves against change, no court order can secure integrated schooling. Boston and Detroit are two painful examples; others may exist.
Where community leaders are dedicated to maintaining a segregated
system, only a reallocation of political power can begin to set the stage
for integration. Moreover, it is likely that one would find as much integrated classroom experience in the long run in a public school system
administered under a fair governance order as in an antagonistic, residentially segregated community subject to a conventional racial balance
decree. The results in cities like Boston2"5 suggest that, in some cases,
blacks would be giving up little in actual integration under a fair governance decree while receiving increased leverage over the operation of
the schools their children attend.2 56
2 See supra note 228.
258 The tradeoff between integration and local control is implicated in a related
question that litigants may face-whether, if intradistrict integration is not possible, to
pursue a fair governance intradistrict decree or a metropolitan decree to achieve integration. Notwithstanding the reasons argued above for favoring integration as the desegregation remedy of first resort, see supra section II C, from the perspective of the
black community there are two possible objections to metropolitan desegregation. First,
metropolitanization may place the overwhelming burden of integration on blacks, decreasing the value of whatever integrated classroom experience does occur. Second, the
dispersion of black students may dissipate the political influence of blacks within their
school system.
These objections to metropolitan remedies raise issues that can probably be resolved only within the context of a particular case. The desirability of metropolitan
integration will depend on at least two factors: first, on the support among metropolitan
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An alternative concern for the effectiveness of fair governance remedies comes from the opposite direction, challenging not the theory's
doubts about conventional pursuits of racial balance but the emphasis
still placed on integration as a remedy of first resort. Dean Derrick Bell
is perhaps the best known current advocate for concentrating on educational effectiveness and not racial balance as the judicial goal for minority education. He argues,
[B]lack parents are increasingly disenchanted with remedies
that have increased their educational burden without improving the quality of schooling provided their children. Alternative remedies [should] seek to translate the desire of
black parents for educationally effective schools into school
policies that can gain judicial approval. They [can] provide a
vehicle for continuing the Supreme Court's and the country's
commitment to the equal educational opportunity mandate of
Brown.257
Unlike the writings of critics that argue that busing be abandoned
and that remedies be targeted at particularized educational interests of
black students, 58 Dean Bell's theoretical critique of the principles underlying conventional racial balance incorporates an expansive view of
the harms of segregation. In a case in which a court regards integration
as impossible or impracticable, the fair governance orientation is, in
fact, likely to lead to a remedial mix perhaps identical to Dean Bell's
prescription for making minority schools more effective and giving
black parents more political power in school systems.25 9
communities and educators for a transition to integrated education in their schools, see
generally La Pierre, Voluntary Metropolitan School Desegregationin St. Louis-An
Opportunity Lost or a Second Chance?, 2 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. FORUM 69 (1982); and
second, the importance of undoing state discrimination by eliminating the prospect of
systematic racial discrimination along city-suburb lines. It is important to note, however, that, to some extent, the importance of localism as an issue may be determined by
black parents themselves; black plaintiffs in each case in which metropolitan relief is
possible must make an initial judgment as to what reforms they expect will achieve the
fairest treatment for black children.
257 Bell, supra note 53, at 138-39.
28 See, e.g., The 14th Amendment and School Busing: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm'n on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess.
16-40 (1981) (statements and testimony of David J. Armor, Senior Social Scientist,
Rand Corp.); id. at 136-43 (statement and testimony of Nathan Glazer, professor of
education, Harvard University); cf. id. at 312-15 (article by John G. Bunzel); L.
GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND

THE SCHOOLS 258-83 (1976); Coleman, The Role of Incentives in School Desegregation, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CrrY 182 (A. Yarmolinsky, L. Liebman & C.

Schelling eds. 1981).
259 Bell, supra note 53, at 128-33.
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The significant difference between the fair governance theory and
the Bell approach to remedies is that implicit in Dean Bell's writings is
a warning against devoting any judicial energy to "futile adherence to
racial balance remedies that are increasingly hard to obtain." 260 So persuaded is Dean Bell of the counterproductivity of pursuing racial balance that he challenges the propriety of giving any priority to integration as a remedial tool for segregated schooling. This difference
between Dean Bell's perspective and the fair governance theory may
thus depend more on political judgment than on overriding principle.
The Bell thesis is less a challenge to the importance of integration than
to predictions of its achievability. 6 1
Because of the importance of integration, it is essential, however,
for substantial districtwide interracial education to remain the remedy
of first resort. The only long-term hope of maintaining an official commitment to effective minority education is to change the system of
schooling in a way that requires official sensitivity to the educational
concerns of the minority community. This is not to say that quality
26 2
education cannot be obtained in predominantly black schools; it can.
The point is that meaningful educational equality for all racial and
ethnic groups cannot be expected if such groups attend separate educational institutions governed by school authorities representing the racial
or ethnic majority.26 3 Although one may hope that a demonstration of
the educational effectiveness of minority schools will encourage integration, it may be more realistic to hope that stable integration will encourage a long-term public commitment to equal educational
2
opportunity. "
260

Id. at 138.

Dean Bell bases his pessimism for the achievability of integration remedies on
what he identifies as an increasingly powerful conviction among whites that integration
is not in the interest of whites. See Bell, Brown and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma,
in SHADES OF Brown: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 91 (D. Bell
261

ed. 1980).
262 Several examples are noted in Bell, supra note 53, at 126-27.
262

See supra note 139.

Proponents of more effective public education for minority students must recognize also the importance of social integration to maintenance of any long-term social
commitment to any form of public education. In American society, public schooling
may be regarded not only as a good to be distributed fairly, but also as a form of
coercion, depriving parents of the opportunity and, in large part, the resources to educate their children in more individualized ways. But cf.Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (State may not "standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only."). It is true, of course, that the government's
incursion into child raising may be justified by a host of beneficial services that public
schools render. As one scans the list of such services, however, the most compelling
reason for permitting government to require children to spend large parts of their early
lives in predominantly government-run institutions may be the critical importance of
2"
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Whether or not fair governance decrees prove as effective in promoting fair governance as racial balance orders are at guaranteeing student reassignment, the goals of fair governance decrees are broader and
more critical than are those of racial balance and are therefore worth
pursuing. In addition, by focusing judicial attention on actual integration as the remedy of first resort, the fair governance theory offers hope
of accomplishing integration wherever possible without sacrificing minority interests quixotically in districts in which only alternative remedies can hope to protect those interests effectively.
CONCLUSION

The unfair governance of intentionally segregated school districts
renders racially separate schools in those districts inherently unequal.
School desegregation remedies should attack what was the systematic
and continuous vulnerability of minority children in those districts to a
variety of harms inflicted upon them by hostile public school authorities. That vulnerability, which deprives minority students and their
parents of objectively reasonable confidence in the nondiscriminatory
educational administration to which they are entitled, is the crux of
unfair governance.
Focusing on fair governance as a central issue in the school desegregation cases has three major advantages over the approach taken by
26 5
the Supreme Court in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman
[Dayton I], which articulates only a narrow remedial conception aimed
at achieving some natural pattern of racially balanced student assignment as the key desegregative aim. First, the fair governance focus provides a standard against which to assess the utility of busing as a remedial tool and against which it is possible to suggest and assess
alternatives to busing in school districts in which busing cannot and
will not promote actual integration. Second, it justifies the Court's imposition of stringent liability rules on culpable school authorities.
Third, the fair governance focus helps reconcile the Court's allegiance
schooling to social integration. See Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131
(Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state
cannot demonstrate that its interest in compulsory schooling until age 16 is compromised by exempting 14- and 15-year-old Amish children, in light of evidence that
Amish are effectively socializing their children in a separate agrarian community based
on religious faith, which has proven economically self-sufficient and politically and socially responsible). If schools admittedly give up on that function, it is a reasonable
prediction that long-term support for any high-quality public education would be
eroded in favor of private forms of schooling that might serve minority interests even
less well. This is surely a result to be avoided.
265 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
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to a de jure/de facto distinction in the school cases, with its unwillingness to permit case-by-case litigation of the question whether racially
separate schooling is equal or ever justified.
In terms of remedial design, the fair governance orientation to
remedies differs from the conventional racial balance approach in that:
1. The success of busing under a fair governance approach depends on the likelihood of achieving significant actual and stable integration in all schools;
2. Alternatives to busing are permissible under the fair governance
approach even if the impracticability of integration results from community resistance rather than demographic impossibility;
3. The fair governance approach would regard as legitimate, in
extreme cases, the restructuring of educational agencies to accomplish
fair governance; and
4. The fair governance approach would permit improving the educational effectiveness of minority schools even if no showing could be
made that the current educational deficiencies of those schools are directly traceable to particular instances of past discrimination.
The fair governance theory of the school desegregation cases cannot, however, be fully squared with Milliken v. Bradley266 [Milliken
I]. The Court's preference in that decision for the value of local autonomy over the value of actual integration reflects a balancing of competing interests that either tacitly incorporates a narrower conception of
the minority interests at stake than the fair governance theory suggests,
or weighs those interests far less heavily. Milliken I does not, however,
necessarily proscribe a fair governance approach to intradistrict remedies. Of key importance in this respect is the degree to which the Court,
notwithstanding Milliken I, would tolerate judicial requirements for
structural and policy changes within school districts, so long as the integrity of school district boundaries is respected. There is reason to expect that, if adopted, such intradistrict remedies would be manageable
and effective. Such remedies would also have the distinct advantage
over conventional orders of explicitly targeting the pervasive evils at
issue in the school desegregation cases, thus warranting the expenditure
of resources they require.
The fair governance theory, despite its invitation to courts to focus
on the process of educational administration, is fully compatible with a
substantive view of the equal protection clause, which regards that
clause as protecting a normative view of equal educational opportu286

418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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nity.267 Even under a substantive view of equal protection, however, the
central problem for school desegregation remedial design is securing a
long-term commitment from public authorities to provide minority children with education as effective as that received by white children. In
part because any substantive view of equality may be hard to prescribe
in specific terms, it seems reasonable to give priority to securing for
minority students a structure of governance in which school authorities
cannot succeed in being administratively insensitive to their interests
while working to serve effectively the interests of nonminority students.
Although some sacrifice of local autonomy would be a reasonable
price to pay for meaningful school desegregation, the enforcement of
the fair governance norm need not require extensive intervention into
the command structure and substantive policymaking of a public school
system. Integration, if it can actually be accomplished, is a desirable
compromise between the egalitarian and majoritarian values at stake in
the desegregation cases. When those values conflict, however, inequality
should not prevail.

267 Much current writing on equal protection and judicial review addresses
whether the equal protection clause signifies particular substantive values for judicial
protection or whether the proper function of "noninterpretive" judicial review is, instead, policing the processes of democratic representation. The latter view is set forth
most systematically in J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT (1980). Instructive critical
responses include M. PERRY, THE CONSTrrUTION, THE CouiTs, AND HUMAN

(1982); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceof Process-Based ConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); and several portions of Symposium: Judicial Review
versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981). The debate has been given a further
RIGHTS

dimension of complexity by Professor Westen, who has argued that, however "significant and enduring" the "legal and moral substance" of the equal protection clause, this
substance cannot be derived from the idea of equality per se. See Westen, The Empty
Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. Rav. 537, 565 (1982). His view of equality likewise has
been criticized from a variety of perspectives. See Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas":
LogicalPositivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982); Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REv. 575
(1983); D'Amato, Comment: Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?, 81 MICH. L. REV. 600
(1983); Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167
(1983); Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. Rzv. 245, 247-50 (1983).
For present purposes, recognizing these scholarly disputes prompts only the observation that the legitimacy of a fair governance theory of school desegregation remedies
does not depend on their resolution. The focus of the fair governance theory makes it
obviously compatible with a process-oriented conception of equal protection. As the text
elaborates, however, fair governance may also be part of the substantive ideals of equal
educational opportunity and distributional fairness.

